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
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
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SOUTHWESTERN IRAN, INCLUDING KHUZESTAN

(See opposite page)

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IRAN: A TVA FOR THE KHUZESTAN REGION

Gordon R. Clapp

THE TVA IDEA AND IRAN

A NEW approach to the challenging problems of economic development is taking shape in the Khuzestan region of southwestern Iran, where five rivers flow in the broad plain north of the Persian Gulf and the vast oil fields feed the gigantic refinery at Abadan. For this region, Iran has asked a new kind of American company to take responsibility for a program of unified development of water and land resources.

National planning is not new in Iran. Her government is now embarked on the second Seven Year Plan, calling for a long list of projects—new highways, dams, irrigation facilities, airports, schools, hospitals and industries. But building a program of economic development on the inter-related natural resources of one of its great regions is a new approach in Iran. Indeed, it had not been done anywhere until the Tennessee Valley Authority was launched in the 1930's to try the idea in a sorely depressed area of the southeastern United States.

It does not seem strange to anyone familiar with the world-wide interest in the TVA that Iran should covet the TVA concept for the region of her greatest river valleys. The success of the TVA has brought

◆ GORDON R. CLAPP, who was chairman of the board of directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority from 1946 to 1954, headed the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East in 1949. In 1955 he and David E. Lilienthal, also a former TVA chairman and former Atomic Energy Commission chairman, formed Development and Resources Corporation to provide planning and administrative services to foreign countries in resource development work. Following a visit to Iran in February 1956 their company agreed to work for the Iranian Plan Organization in developing the Khuzestan region. The two former TVA chairmen recently returned from a second trip to Iran.

a steady stream of visitors to the Tennessee Valley—technicians, officials, and heads of state—to see and study the approach and the methods used. In many lands, the TVA has become a symbol of progress and hope. In recent years, projects patterned after the TVA experience have been built in some countries, and planned in others. Until 1956, however, the concepts on which the TVA was established had gained no firm footing in the Middle East.

Then, in March of that year, the Iranian Government took up the TVA idea as part of its vigorous effort to raise the living standards of its people through the full utilization of the nation's enormous resources. The Government signed an agreement with Development and Resources Corporation of New York, which was formed in 1955 by David E. Lilienthal and the writer, together with the investment banking house of Lazard Freres & Co. of New York. Under this agreement, our company will plan and help carry out a long-range program of agricultural and industrial development of the Khuzestan region, along TVA lines.

This region, an area of 58,000 square miles which includes the rugged peaks and valleys of the Bakhtiari Mountains and the greater Zagros Ranges, is generally defined as the drainage basins of the Karun, Karkheh, Ab-i-Diz, Jarrahi and Hindijan rivers. The greatest of these is the Karun, the largest river in Iran. The Karun has another claim to distinction; it is one of the largest rivers in the Middle East whose entire course lies within one country. From its source in the snow-capped mountains 14,000 feet above sea level to the Persian Gulf near Abadan, this mighty stream contains much of the future of the Khuzestan region—and of all Iran—in its precious waters.

Interest in the comprehensive development of the region is not a recent phenomenon. Centuries ago, the Khuzestan area was the seat of the great Persian empire, and the Khuzestan plain, watered by the Karun and Karkheh, harbored ancient irrigation works. In recent years, the region has been marked by Iranians, U. S. Point IV experts and United Nations technical assistance missions as a place of great promise for diversified agriculture and industry. The full development of the Khuzestan region, now the center of Iran's established oil industry, will go a long way toward strengthening the economy of all Iran.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization selected the Khuzestan region for special study several years ago. Its preliminary report, circulated in draft form early in 1956, described the need and the opportunity for comprehensive development of the Karun and Karkheh basins. Then, Mr. Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, managing director of the Plan Organization of Iran, invited Mr. Lilienthal and the writer to visit the region and assess its possibilities. Now, after an engineering reconnaissance and study

carried out by our associate, William L. Voorduin, a general outline of a tentative plan is in hand. This plan will be filled out in detail as the results of carefully selected surveys and studies are brought together.

The heart of the program, as tentatively conceived, will be a system of storage dams on the five rivers, to permit the irrigation of vast lands in the Khuzestan plain. Special treatment of drainage and salinity problems will have to be devised. The dams also will control floods and make possible the generation of electricity on a large scale for industrial, commercial and residential use. Mineral resources, too, are to be developed, including large quantities of natural gas produced at the oil fields which now are being burned as waste.

For Iran, as for any nation, the ultimate importance of such an undertaking can depend a great deal on the kind of planning and foresight that go into it. A major dam which is built before the controlling outline of a system of dams has been established may close the door to greater benefits for the future. In any land, it is important that a river be viewed as a whole, and that each project be conceived as part of one system. And in a land where water is the key to life itself, such foresight is imperative. In this way, Iran ultimately will achieve the best use of her rivers for irrigation, flood control, navigation, power and other primary purposes, as dictated by the needs of present and future populations. These principles were tested and proven successful in the Tennessee Valley; that Iran recognized the need for a careful approach to the development of the valleys of the Khuzestan region was clear a year ago when we were invited to see the area—its resources and its people.

THE NEW APPROACH IN THE KHUZESTAN REGION

Twenty-five centuries ago, the Khuzestan region was the wealthy center of a great civilization, the first world-empire. The city of Susa was the capital of the emperor Darius, and the surrounding lowlands produced quantities of grain for the Achaemenid rulers. Many thousands of acres which now are barren were under intensive cultivation in those days. Remains of an extensive system of irrigation dams and canals, some of them built in later years by captive Roman soldiers, can be seen today. A few of these ancient structures are still performing a useful service while the ruins of others portray the purpose they once served.

To restore and expand this historic agricultural capacity is one aim of the regional development program. FAO data suggest and Development and Resources Corporation engineers estimate tentatively that a system of dams in the headwaters of the region's rivers will some day permit the irrigation of 2,500,000 acres—or about 4,000 square miles—of the vast Khuzestan plain.

Other facets of the promise of the Khuzestan region—the tremendous stores of energy locked in the mineral reserves of the land and in the rapid descent of the great rivers from the mountains—may have been shadowy portents of power in the dreams of the ancient emperors or their wise men. But the means, regardless of the ideas and knowledge, were not then available to bring this latent power into being. Today, even with the best of engineering skills and equipment, it will be no easy task to put these natural forces to work for the benefit of the Iranian people. The wild and perilous gorges of the Bakhtiari Mountains, for example, present a challenge to technology which is as great as their potential value in terms of flood control, irrigation and power. There will be challenges, too, in administration, planning and execution of other features of the regional program—improvements in health, sanitation, and in training and educational opportunities to mobilize skills for new agricultural practices and new industry. Hard work, careful investigation and ingenious methods of execution, plus large amounts of capital, will be needed to reap the harvest of the valleys of the Khuzestan region.

The inspection of the area in February, 1956, readily showed to Mr. Lilienthal and the writer that it could become a land of abundance and good living for many Iranians.

Following our tour, we reported to Mr. Ebtehaj our strong belief that the region's wealth in oil and gas constituted "the modern door to the full development of the Khuzestan, the key to an industrialized Iran. Oil and the volatile gas with which Iran is blessed, can become a source of energy convertible into electricity in great quantities at low cost. Processed in Khuzestan and elsewhere in Iran it can become the raw material, not alone of the refineries of Abadan and elsewhere in the world, but a raw material for a great complex of inter-related chemical manufacturing to begin a great industrial empire to balance with Iran's agriculture."

Following this preliminary report on the region's potential development, a formal agreement was signed in March between Development and Resources Corporation and the Plan Organization, which was established in 1949 by the Shah to use 60 to 80 percent of the funds from oil revenues for the nation's economic and social advancement.

Under this agreement the American firm has started to make selective investigations of the resources of the region—to measure the flow of its streams, map the contours of its valleys, test the quality of its soils. From a detailed knowledge of the facts about these resources—and about the aspirations and will of the people and their leaders—a comprehensive scheme will emerge, fixed as to its central and critical features, flexible as to its inter-related details.

In this first phase, selective studies will seek facts to illuminate the central features of the tentative plan. Before the end of summer, 1958, Development and Resources will submit a report describing a program of work for the unified development of the region. This plan will include estimates of how much each proposed project will cost, recommendations as to how they might best be financed, and a description of the kind of organization required to administer the entire program. But a start on a program of action will not be held up until the unified development plan is completed. Work is to begin as soon as possible on specific projects which clearly do not preclude or detract from the larger program and which offer important immediate benefits. Planning for the major river control projects and a start on smaller, more localized activities can go hand in hand; this will avoid unnecessary delay and will provide practical experience which will be helpful in formulating and getting started with the long-range plan.

This approach was not only welcomed by Mr. Ebtehaj and his associates; it was espoused by them. They pointed out that a plan would be of little use if it remained largely on paper. They added that they had found it easier to have surveys made than to have projects built. For our part, we knew this had been the experience of many countries, and we could cite a few examples of the glorification of "surveys without works" in our own native land. It did not surprise us to find that similar experience was not unknown in Iran. In fact, we had organized Development and Resources Corporation primarily because we wanted to help get things done in places where people were ready to put their resources to work. We were not interested in confining our activities to surveys and reports. Therefore, although at first we had assumed that Iran would be asking for our advice in the working out of its ambitious second Seven-Year Plan, we were receptive to Mr. Ebtehaj's request for more than just advice. He wanted help, from men who had lived through the experience of not only the planning but also the responsibility for execution of a program of regional development and seeing to it that the region's people benefited from that development. This request to help Iran develop the Khuzestan region meant that our organization would have to be expanded in order to provide a staff in Iran to act for the Plan Organization in the Khuzestan region. After we had consulted some of our former TVA associates by cable, we decided to meet Mr. Ebtehaj's request, and agreed that our company would accept responsibility for the vastly larger task of organizing the work and seeing that it was carried out. The decision to make this substantial enlargement of our responsibility was given form as a supplement to the original agreement of March, signed last December 1 during a second visit to Iran by Mr. Lilienthal and the writer.

It formally committed our company to assume an executive role not only in the case of new projects we propose but also in the case of some of the projects already under way in the Khuzestan region. These include several small irrigation works and land improvement programs in varying stages of planning or construction, some of which were encountering delays because of managerial and technical staff shortages. We agreed with the Plan Organization that these undertakings, as contributions to the economic life of the region, must be integral parts of the carefully planned development of the Khuzestan region.

This new and deeper commitment to take a more active and immediate part in the growth of this region will mean intensive work on our part to build up our staff and push forward all facets of the program more quickly than had been contemplated earlier. By the time of our second visit to Iran, a considerable portion of the preliminary work had been accomplished or was under way. Eight months after the signing of the March agreement, an engineering reconnaissance had been completed, a schedule of selective studies and investigations had been formulated, two general administrators had been selected and had taken up their duties in Iran, and the first engineering survey parties were in the field. In the largely unexplored mountainous area in the northern part of the region, where the headwaters of the Karun and the Karkheh are formed, these survey parties began collecting data to plan a system of dams and to determine the suitability of possible dam sites. In the spring of 1957, core-drilling tests of foundations at several sites will be made. Hunting Aerosurveys, Ltd., a British concern which already had survey engineers in Iran on other assignments, is supplying some of the survey teams by contract with Development and Resources. A soil survey classification study and an expanded program of soil fertility and fertilizer experimental use and demonstration are under way by UN Food and Agriculture Organization experts in Iran, whose services were obtained by special arrangement with Development and Resources, acting for Iran. This assignment, being an addition to the regular mission of the FAO, will be paid for by Iran. From this survey of the region's soils, areas suitable for large-scale irrigation will be selected.

In January, 1957, a group of Italian chemical engineers was assigned by Montecatini of Milan by contract with our company to explore for us in the Khuzestan region specific possibilities for utilizing some of the waste gas now being burned off at the wells as oil is brought to atmospheric pressure at the earth's surface. Gas turbines for pumping water for irrigation, thermal gas-fired electric stations, domestic and industrial heating, are some of the more immediate possibilities to be examined. The object of this search is dual: What can be started soon to put this

abundant waste gas into Iran's local economy, even on a small scale, and what are the longer range possibilities of gas and oil as raw materials for a complex petrochemical industry as Iran's economy grows, her skills of technique and management improve and her ability to mobilize private capital for internal development increases. Projects for gas utilization based on Montecatini's analyses and other sources will enable us to recommend the next steps to the Plan Organization. Decisions, in all cases, will in the last round be made by Iran with our recommendations as to "what, how and how much" in hand.

This combination of private concerns—the Hunting firm and Montecatini—and a public body—the FAO group—working on different parts of inter-related projects illustrates a major function of Development and Resources Corporation. As the Plan Organization's formally designated agency for regional development, it can, by contractual arrangements, coordinate public and private, foreign and domestic agencies in a concentrated program of action in a particular geographical area.

For Iran, this arrangement may prove of no little significance. An important aim of the Plan Organization is the stimulation and establishment of enterprises, both public and private. This approach will be reflected in the unified development program for the Khuzestan region. Such a means of economic development is not new to men with TVA experience. In the Tennessee Valley, the TVA encouraged the establishment of new industry; it sharpened the initiative of other public bodies. The TVA acted as a catalyst, a unifying influence, helping these public and private organizations to work co-operatively to improve the living standard of the region on a basis which proved acceptable to all. The Khuzestan region differs vastly from the Tennessee Valley; it has its own problems, for which new solutions must be worked out. But the technique learned in the TVA of encouraging a variety of private and public groups and agencies to work co-operatively toward common goals should be valid anywhere.

The application of this idea in the Khuzestan region is spelled out in the agreement between the Plan Organization and Development and Resources. For example, the company's chief administrators in Iran are to prepare technical and factual justification to enable Iran to obtain for the region appropriate assignment of, or additions to, the technical assistance personnel of the various foreign aid missions, private foundations or specialized UN agencies. These administrators also are to assist these groups in coordinating their activities with the appropriate governmental and public agencies as designated for the region by the Plan Organization.

A program of physical works unrelated to the culture, traditions, skills and aspirations of local peoples can be disruptive instead of beneficial; if the full benefits are to be realized, the people and their local leaders should understand and participate in the planning and the execution of the program.

A significant step which will have increasing importance in such public participation was taken by the Shah when he appointed a seven-member body called the Preparatory Commission for the Khuzestan Region. In appointing each of the commission members, the Shah weighed the views expressed by Mr. Ebtehaj and by the Prime Minister. The Commission includes men who know the region and live in it. Some members also carry national responsibilities. Such a body, working under the chairmanship of the managing director of the Plan Organization for all of Iran, can help make sure that the development of the regional program will add strength to the entire Iranian economy. Members of the Commission are their Excellencies, Morteza Gholi Bayat, Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Company; Mohammad Ali Mafi, Senator; Abolghassem Najm, ex-Governor General of Khuzestan; Mahmood Naseri, Minister of Agriculture; Ebrahim Mahdavi, Governor General of Khuzestan and Director of the Karkheh Dam Authority; Abdol-Hamid Bakhtiar, *Majlis* Deputy and Sadegh Bushehri, *Majlis* Deputy.

The following members of the Plan Organization participate in the advisory and consultative meetings, for which the Preparatory Commission is called into session: Mr. Ebtehaj, the Managing Director, who acts in the capacity of chairman; Dr. M. Kazemi, Assistant Director for Agriculture; Engineer Safi Asfia, Advisor General, and Engineer Mostafa Mozayeny, in charge of Khuzestan Development Affairs.

This new body functions within the framework of the Plan Organization. Its purposes are to lead the way to public understanding of the regional development plan and to contribute ideas as that plan is being defined by Development and Resources. The creation of the Commission and the appointments made by the Shah signified Iran's determination to approach the Khuzestan development program on a regional basis. It also constituted recognition of the fact that the region is not ready for a full-scale plan and program but that a period of careful and speedy preparation is required.

The Preparatory Commission meets the need for a group of articulate public leaders who can help the Plan Organization interpret the regional program to Iranians. If this program is to succeed, it must be accepted and supported by the people. In order for the people to accept it, they must understand it. Perhaps the most challenging task of the Preparatory Commission will be to achieve this public understanding.

The program should be understood and supported as well by organized groups—public agencies, private concerns, foreign missions. Here, too, the Commission is in a unique position to assist the Plan Organization in providing leadership. At the same time, through meetings it will hold with such groups periodically on specific regional problems, the Commission can help the Plan Organization promote a co-operative exchange of ideas and information. Further, as the only governmental body with the primary duty of viewing the region as a whole, the Commission can impart to these organizations the broader concepts which are bound up with this responsibility. The Commissioners can stimulate others to think, as they themselves think, of a region's vital contribution to the growth of Iran and of Iran's opportunity to build more life and living on the resources of the Khuzestan area.

THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION

One belief held strongly by those of us who took part in the TVA experience is that the precise methods which work in one region require considerable adaptation when applied to another. A system which produced results in the Tennessee Valley might well falter if applied ready-made to the Ohio Valley or to the Missouri-Mississippi watershed. Within the United States, there are substantial differences between one region and another in the potentialities of the land and the rivers; there are differences, too, in the social habits of the people and in the ways in which they are accustomed to getting things done. While the central idea of river basin development has wide application wherever there are rivers and people, no precise pattern could fit them all.

If this is true about regions within the U.S.A., it should be emphatically clear in discussing the application of the TVA idea to Iran. The concepts on which the TVA was established may be valid for Iran—and we feel deeply that they are—but many of the methods by which these concepts are translated into real achievement will not be the same.

The vehicle through which these methods are worked out should grow from and build on indigenous roots and administrative customs. In the Tennessee Valley, this vehicle was a new kind of organization: a special and independent agency of the federal government, given broad powers to develop a river whose watershed lay across the boundaries of seven states. In Iran, the final form of the organization which will perform similar functions has not yet taken shape. The preliminary work, however, is being undertaken, for the Plan Organization, by a private corporation possessing some unique characteristics which may bring results of broader and deeper significance than those sought by a single private contractor responsible for planning and building physical works.

Development and Resources Corporation is a wholly private American concern. As such, it has no ties with the U. S. Government; it will, therefore, make its own way and make its own policies. This is in contrast, of course, to U. S. Governmental agencies or missions, whose programs are inevitably instruments of U. S. national policy and bound by its restrictions and fluctuations. Development and Resources, like other private firms, will be constantly aware of American policies on all matters affecting its work abroad; but it will not have to tailor its operations to fit the shape of these policies.

This new venture is of a new character, both private and public in nature. In its private aspect, the company is strengthened through its association with the banking firm of Lazard Freres & Co. This relationship will permit us to draw on the worldwide experience of the international Lazard group of New York, London and Paris, in the financing problems which will necessarily arise in our work. On the side of public responsibility, there is the fact that Development and Resources Corporation's chief officers and most of their associates have spent much of their careers in public service, principally with TVA. Mr. Lilienthal was for many years TVA chairman and was a member of the agency's first board of directors. John B. Blandford, Jr., our chief representative in Iran, was the first general manager of the TVA and later was U. S. ambassador and representative in the Middle East. More important in this regard, much of the Company's aims in Iran will be achieved through publicly-controlled organizations.

Of greater significance in illustrating the unique character of Development and Resources Corporation is the role this private American company is playing under the terms of its agreements with the Plan Organization, particularly the supplemental agreement signed last December. In accordance with this later arrangement, we are establishing a new organization in Iran to carry forward our work which will give a definite but flexible administrative form to this combination public-private undertaking. This new agency of our company, directed by Mr. Blandford, carries the title of Khuzestan Development Service, and will have its principal center at Ahwaz, in the heart of the region, with a liaison office at Teheran. It in turn will set up and operate two subsidiary agencies, one concerned with irrigation, flood control and other land and water projects, and the other with the development and use of electric power. The Plan Organization periodically reviews and approves the programs proposed by the company—which will be carried out by the new Khuzestan Development Service—and provides it with advance deposits to pay for the work, just as any government will appropriate funds for one of its agencies after a budget review.

The purpose of these arrangements is not just a series of printed documents, outlining ambitious schemes of development. The object is development itself—dams, irrigation canals, factories—a dynamic, integrated economic growth. The Khuzestan region will be developed to the full, for the good of its people and the rest of the nation, in accord with plans, policies and decisions made by Iranians.

This program can benefit the Khuzestan region—and all Iran—as directly as the TVA has benefited the region and nation it serves, by helping build prosperous farmlands and attracting new industry to the cities and towns. One indirect benefit from such a program concerns the relationship between a people and a government. In the Tennessee Valley, before the days of the TVA, the federal government was remote and generally identified with such unpleasant matters as tax collections. The TVA was held in suspicion by many at first, but when the people of the Valley began to realize that the TVA was not there to tell them what to do or to impose its will upon them, hostility gave way to a search for partnership on both sides. State governments, local agencies, private groups and thousands of citizens voluntarily joined with the TVA to make the valley a land of opportunity—on the farm, in new factories and in revitalized state and local governments able to serve their people.

In many nations of the Middle East, as in so much of the world, this sense of a bond between a people and a government is a recent and evolving phenomenon of great significance. There are responsible leaders in many of these re-born lands who recognize that national independence by itself cannot sustain this link. They know that political independence must be followed by the kind of progressive development of the country's latent productive resources which is identified with the deepest aspirations of the people. The program which is taking form in the Khuzestan region may have an important place in helping to satisfy needs of the spirit as well as of the body, in re-establishing the area in which Iran achieved her ancient glory.

The interest other nations may take in watching the development of the Khuzestan region may arise in part from the feeling that the new approach in Iran could have a significant bearing on a complex problem which is central in international relationships: How the industrialized Western countries can make their experience available to the newly awakened countries of the East, on a basis which is both acceptable and workable. The program in the Khuzestan region may suggest some way in which this problem can be met. Its potential importance in this larger context could far outweigh its immediate aim of helping the farmers and townspeople of Iran build their own version of a better life.

THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN APPRAISAL

Majid Khadduri

IN any design to organize an effective security system against Soviet expansionism the Middle East area cannot be ignored. Some nations, afraid of a direct threat, need little or no persuasion to join; others, either because they are remote from danger or opposed in principle to the idea of collective security, prefer neutralism. The Middle East, though it has common borders with the Soviet Empire and has been traditionally the object of direct Russian expansionism since Peter the Great, is still divided on this issue. Attempts have been made to organize a security system by special treaty arrangements between a Western Power and one, or more, Middle Eastern countries but it has not yet been possible to work out a comprehensive security system which would include most—if not all—the Middle Eastern countries. The list of plans designed for the security of the Middle East is impressive indeed but all have failed to include a sufficient number of countries to be of real significance. The essential problem for us to investigate is not, therefore, the defects of previous plans—which always preoccupy policy-makers—but rather the underlying factors in Middle East society which have constantly militated against building up a regional security structure.

I.

The Balkanization of the Middle East is at the root of the regional security problems. In the past the integration of this region under the aegis of a great Power provided strength and prestige for the central authority, which could play a stabilizing role in international politics. Conversely, its disintegration into a decentralized, or partitioned, region created either internal insecurity and confusion, or contention among rival powers which has often invited foreign intervention.

During the nineteenth century, when the greater portion of the Middle East was under Ottoman rule, the Western Powers could formulate policies toward this region with relative ease. The real difficulties arose from the conflicting interests of the Western Powers themselves as to how to deal with the Ottoman Porte. The division of the Middle East into several independent political entities, with conflicting interests inevitably arising among them, made it exceedingly difficult for the

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Western Powers to formulate a unified policy for the entire region.

It is significant to note in retrospect that during the inter-war period, when the Soviet Union had "withdrawn" from the Middle East owing to its preoccupation with internal problems, England and France, in the absence of a common enemy, followed a policy of dividing the area into zones of influence (each sub-divided into various independent or semi-independent entities). In the long run this policy served neither their interests nor those of the Middle Eastern people. Not only did this policy create many artificial boundaries and weaken the area generally, but it also produced national frustration and apathy toward the West, which is expressed in the use of such terms as "Western colonialism" and the accusation of Western intervention in the domestic affairs of countries in the area.

As a result, when the Soviet Union resumed its traditional expansionism after World War II, the legacy of Western intervention in the internal reorganization of the Middle East militated against the West. The disintegration of the Middle East into various entities not only made it exceedingly difficult for these entities to coordinate—much less to unify—their foreign policies, but also afforded some of them the opportunity of forcing the Western Powers to give up their privileges by threatening rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Some of the Powers have agreed to give up their privileges in order to win the friendship of certain Middle Eastern countries; but the conflicting interests of Middle Eastern rulers deprived them of the fruits of their endeavors. Thus, when Great Britain moved to give up her air bases in Egypt and Iraq in order to gain the good-will of the Egyptian and Iraqi peoples, her identical policy toward both these countries conflicted with the local rivalry between Egypt and Iraq (to mention only one of its consequences) and resulted in winning one country and in antagonizing others. Curiously enough, the United States has fallen into the same awkward position: She strongly supported Syrian and Lebanese independence (to say nothing of her valuable contribution in settling the Anglo-Egyptian controversy) in order to gain the good-will of Arab nationalism, but her support of independence for Israel antagonized the very nationalism she had reconciled only a short while before.

The break-up of the Middle East into a number of political entities was not accomplished until after World War I, although it had begun long before that. For centuries medieval Muslim unity had been undergoing a process of decentralization which resulted in the separation of Persia, Central Asia and other peripheral portions of the Muslim world. During the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth there were attempts at separation from Muslim unity in

certain parts of the Arab world. It was the importation of nationalism from the west, however, which became the dynamic factor in accelerating this breaking-up process. Against such a background the charge that the Western Powers deliberately Balkanized the Middle East may not be wholly true, but the Western Powers have lent substance to this charge in so far as they did not allow the Middle Eastern nations (except the Turks) to determine their own political frontiers. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) may be cited as a case in point, as its provisions ran contrary to the nationalist aspirations of the Turks. Its replacement by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which conformed to Turkish nationalist aspirations, made possible not only the reconciliation of Turkey with the West but also the identification of her interests with those of the West during and after World War II.

The territorial settlements of the Arab world were made differently. The European Powers, without consulting the Arabs, carried out a settlement which was not considered by the latter to be in accord with their aspirations. The Arabs may not have been able to create a united Arab kingdom, as hoped by their leaders, but the intervention of the European Powers in making the new political frontiers gave ample ground for criticism. Arab nationalists have violently attacked Great Britain and France on the ground that they did deliberately divide the Arab world into several weak states in order to facilitate their domination by a policy of *divide et impera*. Having already won independence for several Arab countries, the Arab nationalists are seeking at the present moment the elimination of the legacy of Western colonialism wherever it exists in Arab lands.

II.

What is the Middle Eastern conception of nationalism? In the narrow sense of patriotism, the Middle Eastern peoples were patriotic before Westerners were. But patriotism was not territorial; it was, as Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), an Arab sociologist and philosopher of history, keenly observed, an attachment to the ethnic structure of the group. Islam superseded this feeling by shifting the loyalty of the believers to the Caliph, or the supreme authority in Islam. When the Caliphate declined and the sultans (secular rulers) usurped these powers, local particularism asserted itself and nascent territorial patriotism began to develop. When the Middle Eastern peoples came into more intimate contact with the West they began to learn the significance of a European type of patriotism in the form of the cult of the nation-state. They were impressed with its effects on the rise of Germany, Italy, and Japan during the nineteenth century.

In the twentieth century nationalism delivered the final blow to Muslim unity and aimed at transforming the Islamic state (or states) into modern constitutional states. As a liberal movement it received the sympathy and support of the Western Powers, inasmuch as it helped strengthen the Middle Eastern peoples against Russian aggression. Except perhaps the Egyptian nationalist movement (which arose as a protest against the British occupation of the Nile Valley) the nationalist movements on the whole were well-disposed toward the West.

During the inter-war period—when Soviet Russia was absent from the Middle East and England and France assumed virtual control of it—nationalism was no longer the ally of the West: It was focused in an attack against England and France, and reconciliation with the interests of the latter became increasingly difficult. Moreover, the recent influx of European ideas (whether in the form of fascism, nazism, or communism) aroused lay society, which became increasingly active in politics. This inspired the rise of "popular" leadership and the transformation of nationalism into a mass movement, not merely limited to the élite, as it was during the nineteenth century. Popular nationalism made possible the emergence of such national leaders as Kemal in Turkey and Zaghlul in Egypt, and more recently Musaddiq and Nasir, who could defy the Western Powers with confidence at moments of national outburst.

This nationalist surge was paralleled by a corresponding decline in the prestige of Great Britain and France in the Middle East, due in part to the steady decline of their power in international politics. This gave the Middle Eastern countries the opportunity of taking the initiative not only in abrogating their treaty relations with the West—as demonstrated by Egypt's unilateral abrogation of her treaty with England in 1951 and more recently in the termination of the Suez Canal Company concession¹—but also in seeking the liberation of the North African dependencies from European control.

The United States has long been regarded in the Middle East as the ally of nationalist movements, and her prestige and moral influence were never surpassed by any other power. Since 1946², however, the prestige of the United States has been steadily declining in the Middle East, mainly

¹ This act on the part of the Egyptian Government has been mistakenly called the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Since the original concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company was granted by the Government of Egypt as the owner of the territory, the Egyptian Government's action on July 26, 1956, in terminating that concession would have the legal effect of merely nationalizing (i.e., terminating) the private operation—not the possession—of the canal.

² Other dates could be cited, but President Truman's demand for 100,000 immigration certificates for Palestine in this year marked the beginning of an activist American policy and outspoken Arab disillusionment. It was widely regarded as a breach of President Roosevelt's promise of prior consultation before committing U. S. policy on Palestine.

due to her support of policies which were regarded as inherently opposed to Arab nationalism.

The United States now finds herself on the horns of a dilemma in her Middle Eastern policy. Her long educational activities in the Middle East, no less than her support of Syrian and Lebanese independence, have earned her a high reputation as upholder of the rights of small nations; but her support, for strategic reasons, of French rights in North Africa has been denounced as bolstering the legacy of colonialism. More antagonistic to Arab nationalism was American support of Israel against traditional Arab rights and her indirect help in the establishment of the Northern Tier defense system, known as the Baghdad Pact. From the point of view of the Middle Eastern people it is ironical that the Power which, in the recent past, supported their nationalism should be opposed to the ideals of this nationalism. Her recent opposition, through the United Nations, to the attack on Egypt (Oct. 29, 1956) by British, French and Israeli forces has greatly enhanced her prestige among the Arabs and this may well prove to be the beginning of a reconciliation in American-Arab relations.

III.

Unlike nationalism, which was readily imported by the Middle Eastern peoples as a model of life on Western lines, communism met strong initial resistance on both doctrinal and political grounds. Unfortunately, there are still some who argue that Islamic doctrine may serve as a barrier to communist infiltration in the Middle East. Communist penetration into the Middle East, however, is very serious at the present moment, and Russia has never before enjoyed greater prestige. Some experts point out that there may still be greater surprises, which Soviet leaders might fully exploit.

On purely doctrinal grounds it is difficult to reconcile Islam with communism. As a system which assesses all values of life in terms of divine revelations, it is opposed to Marxian materialism and, of course, to atheism. To the pious Muslim who conforms to the rules of religious law, communism appears to reduce life to a mere mechanical process, stressing earthly rather than spiritual values. In theory this opposition is undoubtedly true, but the same argument could be advanced with equal truth on behalf of Christianity, Judaism and Confucianism. However, this doctrinal incompatibility has not prevented Christians, Jews and Chinese from becoming communists. Moreover, there are a few Muslim thinkers, witnessing the present plight of the poor and the exploitation by the landlords, who argue that Islam does not tolerate the great dis-

parity between rich and poor. They maintain that Islam is inherently opposed to exploitation and poverty and that it is the duty of the community to regulate its economic life on an equitable basis.

Thinking along these lines has become common among writers in the Middle East, but it is interesting to note that the writer who initiated such thinking was an Arab professor of Islamic history at the University of Baku. Since World War II, when the Soviet Union had come to terms with religion and permitted its Muslim subjects to conform to their religious practices, Muslim thinkers have begun to argue that the early Islamic creed, divorced from later accretions, was in accord with socialist ideas. Such thinking is based on the Islamic principle of equality, which recognizes no differences in society on the basis of wealth. These thinkers maintain that no social or economic distinctions were imposed by God upon the followers of the Islamic religion.

In order to demonstrate how Islamic life could be adapted to the Soviet system—perhaps for the purpose of giving an exemplary lesson, no less than for publicity—Muslim dignitaries have been invited to visit Muslim centers in the Soviet Empire. Although reports of recent visitors have not all been flattering, they are agreed that Muslims in the Soviet Union are treated equally with non-Muslim subjects and that they can with freedom practice the tenets of their religion. To an educated Arab who recently visited Uzbekistan the mode of life of the young Muslims seemed to be an example of "reformed" Muslim life. He pointed out that the campaign against illiteracy, including the building of new schools, libraries, universities, and theatres, is just what his country needs in its present emergence from medieval life. The Grand Mufti (expert in religious law) of the Soviet Union seems to be satisfied (at least outwardly) with this kind of progress, since he praises the Soviet authorities in his Friday sermons. Traditional Islam does not tolerate submission to non-Muslim rule, but the Muslims of the Soviet Union are of the opinion that Islam permits submission to non-Muslim rulers if they are just.

It would be idle to argue that Muslims are willing to abandon their entire traditional way of life in favor of communism, but as they believe that change is inevitable, they are convinced that certain aspects of the social and economic life of the Soviet Union might be adopted to solve the pressing social and economic problems of their countries. Thus both the nationalists and the communists agree as to what their common grievances are, and often use the same language in their argumentations.

In this state of mind—a mixture of grievances against the West, willingness to adopt, with reservations, certain measures of reform from the Soviet Union, and assertion of newly won independence—the Middle Eastern peoples (except, perhaps, the Turks) are willing to experiment

with ideas borrowed from both the East and the West without losing their own cultural identity. Perhaps it is too early to judge whether they will be able to maintain a balance between the ideas imported from both sides, but the history of Islam indicates that in medieval times the Muslims showed a remarkable ability to synthesize the elements of culture they borrowed from other nations. Historical parallels, however, could be misleading, and the tactics of the Soviet leaders might trap the Middle Eastern rulers before they could adapt the imported ideas to local needs. Middle Eastern thinkers are not unaware of these dangers, and the West could be very helpful to those elements in the Arab World which are not willing to be snared by the lures of Soviet diplomacy.

IV.

With regard to their attitude toward the East-West conflict, the Middle Eastern countries may be divided into the Northern Tier (consisting of Turkey, Iraq and Iran³) and the Southern Tier (the Arab World, excluding Iraq⁴). The Northern Tier has formally declared its attitude toward the East-West conflict by organizing a defense arrangement in concert with the Western Powers. The countries of the Southern Tier have not only advocated neutralism in accordance with their declared attitude at the Bandung Conference (April 1955), but are also strongly opposed to the attitude taken by Iraq in joining the Northern Tier defense system. As the Middle Eastern countries are violently divided on the question of the regional defense system, the attitude of each camp must be explained in terms of its local forces rather than on ideological grounds.

Neither the Islamic doctrine of war nor the traditional attitude of the Middle Eastern people support a neutralist attitude, since the use of violence for the defense of Islam, no less than for achieving certain specific objectives, was not opposed by classical Islamic doctrine. Unlike the Indians, the Arabs of the Southern Tier have never believed in pacifism. In the past the Arabs of the desert have been in a constant state of warfare with their neighbors, and their habitual and favorite pastime was to engage in inter-tribal raids.

Arab neutralism, accordingly, is neither dictated by a religious creed, nor an expression of a traditional behavior pattern, since neither on doctrinal or emotional grounds do the Arabs refrain from the use of violence to achieve religious and political ends. We must, therefore, seek an explanation on other grounds.

³ Pakistan is included in the Northern Tier system, but is not a Middle East country for the purposes of this article.

⁴ Israel is obviously not in this bloc.

The neutralism of the Southern Tier seems to be the product of complex motives, which may be summarized as follows:

1. The Arabs are determined to eliminate the surviving elements of colonialism while the cold war is still going on, so long as both East and West are competing to win them to their side. The Arabs are trying to gain the utmost advantage from this contest.

2. The Arabs are keen to assert their newly won independence by deciding independently the attitude they should take. This wish has been reflected in the statements made by Arab representatives (except that of Iraq) at the Bandung Conference, and in Arab support of the Indian policy of creating a "third force" to maintain a balance between East and West.

3. The resurgence of nationalism with the objective of playing an influential role in international politics is evident in these countries. The Arabs have a nostalgic longing for their past history, and are keenly interested in playing the role of an equal partner in international relations, rather than being a pawn in the game of power politics among giant Powers. As a result, the idea of a "third Force" appeals to them, due to the role that the Arabs—led by Egypt—might play among equal partners, whether in the Afro-Asian front at the United Nations or in the Arab League (which has on the whole supported policies advocated by Egypt).

4. In the realm of practical politics, the Arabs are trying to play off the East against the West in order to gain certain concrete advantages from both sides. Inasmuch as Western arms had been given to Iraq, Egypt wished to demonstrate that she could have her arms needs satisfied by a Soviet satellite. The Arabs have been less successful in obtaining economic aid on their own terms from the West. This accentuated the political differences between them and the West. Whether in the long run such a policy will be advantageous to them will depend on how long the cold war continues and on how skilfully Egypt and her allies can avoid being trapped into an irrevocable commitment to either camp.

V.

Although the Arab countries have advocated a neutralist policy, their statesmen have again and again declared that they would strongly resist if they were attacked by a foreign power. In principle this seems to be what the Western Powers have been trying to impress upon the Middle Eastern countries. But the disagreement arose as to whether the Middle Eastern countries (outside the Northern Tier system) are able to defend themselves without support from the West.

In the past the Middle East countries were renowned for military prowess, but in modern times their relative strength has declined. According to the Arabs, the reason for this decline lay in the deliberate opposition of the West to the organization of effective Arab armies, because of the fear that effective Arab armies might be turned against the West. After the winning of independence the Arab idea that the West disapproved of organizing national forces persisted, although the reorganization and enlargement of such forces have actually been achieved. The problem that has remained unsolved is where to get the arms. When the Western Powers showed willingness to meet Arab State requests for military equipment disagreement soon developed over the political and technical conditions of Western support. Particularly, the conflict focused on the question of guarantees against possible use of the arms in a war against Israel. Thus, the Southern Tier looked elsewhere for supplies of arms and armaments.

There may be a justification for the West's apprehensions as to the possibility of an attack against the Arab's nearest enemy; the real danger, however, is not war against Israel, but the control of government by the military. Such control took place in Iraq four years after she attained independence, in Syria also four years after she had attained independence, in Egypt sixteen years after independence (including World War II and the Palestine war periods) and in Jordan five years after she had annexed Arab Palestine and attained a large measure of independence. The military experiences of these countries have indicated that once the army controls the government its main preoccupation is the management of internal forces in order to perpetuate the military control. The problem of defense necessarily becomes of secondary importance, since the army must first guard itself against internal opposition.

In the circumstances the West's reliance on local military defense, even with the support or guidance of a Western power, might be of little significance. Past experiences with military pacts and alliances between the European Powers and the Middle East have demonstrated how little value should be attached to them. The Axis Powers, by threat or diplomacy, neutralized or dissolved all previous pacts and alliances during the Second World War and the Western Powers had to re-enter the region by invasion. Should hostilities break out at the present moment, the existing pacts and bilateral agreements—except perhaps the Mediterranean flank of NATO—would be of doubtful military significance. There are, however, certain advantages of non-military character which the West might derive from these agreements.

First, the military preparedness of the Middle East has a certain psychological value; it demonstrates that this region is not wholly a

political vacuum, but ready to resist when attacked. If the Arabs were supported by the West, the Soviet might be discouraged from possible intervention in the Middle East. Moreover, military forces might help create internal stability and counteract subversive activities. One of the purposes of the Baghdad pact, it seems, is to coordinate the work of its signatories against the spread of communism among the Kurds (since Kurdistan is divided among Turkey, Iraq and Iran).

Second, should the Middle East suddenly be attacked by the Soviet Union, the initial resistance of the Northern Tier system might enable the Western Powers to counter-attack and enter the area before its complete occupation by Soviet forces.

Third, in the event of hostilities, agreements between the West and one or more Middle Eastern countries would provide legal justification for taking measures to deny the Soviet Union access to the area's human and natural resources.

Fourth, legal commitments might in the long run help to prepare the population for possible collaboration with the West if the advantages of such commitments were clearly explained to it, as was the case in Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact. But an effective Middle East defense system should be broad enough to include most (if not all) of the Middle Eastern countries; for any dissension among the Middle Eastern countries (in particular the Arab countries) would greatly weaken the real significance of any such defense system. The present division of the area into the Northern and Southern Tier systems has rendered the Northern system almost valueless militarily, as the Soviet Union (as shown in her recent activities by supplying arms and technical advice), might be able to sabotage the Northern Tier from the south without much difficulty.

The Arab League, designed to coordinate the relations among the Arab countries, proved to be too weak to organize an effective regional defense system. Under threat from Israel an Arab Collective Security Pact, designed to implement the Arab League Pact, was signed in 1950 by the Arab League states for defense against foreign aggression; but when Iraq proposed to associate this Pact with a broad defense arrangement with the West, the other member-states—led by Egypt—objected on the grounds that the Arab Security Pact was designed to protect the collective interests of the Arabs (i.e., against Israel), not to serve the interests of the Western Powers. Thus the Arab League, dominated by the Saudi-Egyptian bloc, tended to oppose the policy of cooperation with the West and, as demonstrated in its full support to Egypt in the abrogation of her treaty with England in 1951 and in the recent cancellation

of the Suez Canal concession, to promote the policy of the Southern Tier Arabs against the Northern Tier system. Neither the Arab Collective Security Pact nor the Baghdad Pact seems to be adequate for the defense of the Middle East; the internal forces and rivalries have produced such a complicated set of problems that no defense structure would ever have real value unless these problems are first resolved.⁵

⁵ When this article was already in the press, President Eisenhower, on January 5, 1957, made a special address to the Congress of the United States in which he asked for authority to employ the armed forces of this country to repel threatened Soviet aggression against any country of the Middle East willing to accept American aid. Assuming that Congress grants the request, the success of the approach will depend, *inter alia*, upon how this seemingly flexible policy is explained by the governmental mission to be sent to the Middle East, the reaction in the area itself after further consideration and the negotiations on details which will presumably follow. This "Eisenhower Doctrine" may help to reduce the more immediate tensions which the re-introduction of Russian interest and power has helped to create. But many of the fundamental intra-area problems set forth above will remain to be solved.

THE IMPACT OF URBANIZATION IN ISRAEL

Bernard D. Weinryb

ISRAEL is one of the most highly urbanized countries in the world. Over four-fifths of the Jewish population live in cities and urban settlements, with about three-fourths of these in and around the three big cities: Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem. The first has a population of nearly one-half-million and the other two have about 200,000 and 150,000 respectively. Taking the classifications of the *World Urban Resources Index* as a guide, Israel appears to be highly "overurbanized." It is more urbanized on the 100,000-plus level than any country with a comparable proportion in agriculture,¹ and has a great deal more urbanization than the degree of economic development would lead us to expect (about twice as much in the 100,000-plus level as the United States).

This spread of urbanization to a comparatively underdeveloped region resembles, to some extent, the process of urbanization in "new" areas—America, Australia—where it was unhampered by a slow cityward movement from the country. It also stems from the urban heritage of the Jewish settlers. In Palestine-Israel the city also became the most feasible means of assuring absorption of the incoming immigrants. A poor country, with meager natural resources and exhausted land, offered few possibilities for agricultural development. The city thus became "an efficient mode of human settlement because . . . production can be concentrated in small space."²

Immigration to Palestine-Israel in the post-World War I era came mostly in waves lasting a few years each, and each wave almost doubled the Jewish population. At the time of the 1922 census there were 83,780 Jews in Palestine. In the next few years (1923-26) over 67,000 new immigrants entered the country, almost doubling the Jewish population. The 1931 census recorded 175,138 Jews in Palestine. In the following 5 years 173,860 Jewish immigrants were admitted. During the first 4 years of independence (census Nov. 1948: 716,678) over 700,000 immigrants arrived, again doubling the population.

The rural population increased in numbers after each big wave of immigration and in the 1930's and after 1948 even in percentage. The

¹ Cf. Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz Golden, "Urbanization and Development of Pre-industrial Areas," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, III, No. 1 (Oct. 1954), p. 8. Only Australia, with 15.6% in agriculture, has 50.5% in cities with 100,000 population.

² Davis and Golden, *ibid.*, p. 23.

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rural population was almost doubled during the years 1922-1931, and was trebled in 1948-1954. But these numerical increases furnish only "crude" data, which do not give a full picture. With the growth which comes in a period of large immigration many rural places were engulfed by the spreading cities, becoming in reality either suburbs of the metropolitan areas or independent urban units without, at least temporarily, being classed as such. In fact, at the end of 1954, the actual rural population amounted to 286,425, or 18.8% of the total population (instead of the official classification of 23.7%).

The plans and policy of the Israeli government, fortified by investment of comparatively large sums, for diffusion of the population—both for strategic and for economic reasons—have met with little success. About three-fourths of the population is concentrated in the narrow strip of coast between Haifa and Tel Aviv, comprising about 11% of the area, whereas the Southern District, with over 70% of the area, has only about 4% of the population.³ Almost the whole Coastal Plain, from Haifa in the North down to Tel Aviv-Jaffa, is slowly evolving into one metropolitan area. The intermediate and surrounding agricultural settlements are losing their formerly rural character and becoming urban centers (with a population of 20,000 and more) either independently or in conjunction with the two big cities. Thus one metropolitan area, with a population of over a million, is being formed. Again, a great part of the rural population is made up of recent immigrants, largely Oriental Jews. A recent study (*Stat. Abstr. of Israel*, p. 16) shows that as of September 1953 about 70% of the rural population consisted of immigrants of the years 1948-1953. And, whereas about 40% of the Iraqi, 35% of the Yemenite, and 33% of the North African Jews settled in rural areas, only 20% of the Rumanians and 13% of the Polish-Russians did so.

The cities in Israel combine, by and large, the characteristics which Bert F. Hoselitz ascribes to industrial cities of the Western type and those called "central cities,"⁴ with the characteristics of cities which have sprung up in countries of modern immigration (Buenos Aires, Melbourne, Sydney, New York, San Francisco). Municipal self-government, attachment of the population to an urban mode of life, growth associated with employment opportunities, city-consciousness, rationalistic tendencies,

³ A. Brutzkus, "Economic Planning for Population Diffusion." *The Economic Quarterly* (Hebrew: *Rivon Lekalkalah*) III, No. 9-10 (Oct. 1953), pp. 7-24; *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1954-55*, No. 6, p. 9 (the latter is also the source of the figures introduced later unless otherwise indicated.)

⁴ "The City, the Factory and Economic Growth." *American Economic Review*, XLV, No. 2 (1955), pp. 168 ff.

cf. also Edward L. Ullman, "A Theory of Location of Cities" in Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe 1951), pp. 123 ff.

achievement oriented norms, are all present or developing in different degrees. At the same time there are to be found, as in the cities of immigrant countries, heterogeneous loyalties and separate "clusters" of different groups, with resulting ethnic tensions.

The central numerical position of the large urban centers in Jewish Palestine-Israel and the fact that they grew up not as centers for the surrounding countryside, but as centers of foreign immigration gave urban characteristics to the economy and social structure of the whole country. The urban economy, which has become a dominant factor during the last two decades, was based mainly on capital imports and the know-how of individual immigrants, and showed most of the characteristics of a capitalist market economy. Private initiative and capital, middle-class immigrants with their urban occupational heritage and way of life, helped develop Palestine-Israel along the lines of an urbanized society.

The end result was a considerable growth in industrial production, trade and services, which far outdistanced the pace of immigration. Industrial production, for instance, increased 18 times from 1922 to 1937;

	Occupational Structures in Israel ⁵ and Some Other Countries (%)				
	Israel 1954	Jews in Poland 1921	Australia 1947	England 1951	U. S. 1950
Agriculture	14.7	9.8	15.6	5.0	12.2
Industry, handicrafts, mining	23.5	32.2	26.7	41.2	28.5
Building constr.					
Public works	9.8	—	7.3	6.2	6.2
Trade, finances	12.6	35.1	15.0	14.1	18.5
Transportation	6.6	2.7	9.2	7.7	7.5
Liberal Professions,					
Public serv.	—	4.4	18.9	23.7	23.2
Other services	30.8	5.0	—	—	—
Others	2.0	10.8	7.3	2.1	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

the number of persons employed in industry rose from 4,750 in 1922 to 27,260 in 1937; 67,000 in 1947 and 120,000 in 1952 (growth 1922-1952: population 16 times, number of industrial workers 25-26 times). The number of those occupied in trade rose from a few thousand to 92,000

⁵ YIVO, *Schriften fuer Wirtschaft und Statistik*, I, Berlin 1928, p. 192; *Statistical Abstract of Israel* 1954-55, p. 118; UN *Statistical Yearbooks*.

in 1952. Still more spectacular was the rise in the number of people employed in the liberal professions, public service, and white-collar work (8,745 in 1931; almost 150,000 in 1954).

The occupational structure of Israel came to resemble those of countries or communities in advanced stages of urbanization and industrialization.

Only in countries like Australia, England, and the U. S., is the proportion of those occupied in primary and secondary occupations higher than in Israel. Comparing Israel's occupational structure with that of the former Jewish community in Poland, one finds that in both, service occupations employ more than one-half of the labor force (52% in Israel; 58% among Jews in Poland). Among the tertiary (service) occupations themselves there is a higher proportion in Israel of public service, whereas in Poland a higher proportion was employed in trade. This situation is explainable by the discrimination in the professions and public services from which the Jews in Poland suffered. The percentage of those employed in agriculture is also a little higher in Israel. But agriculture itself is changing its character more and more in Israel.

TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

From the outset, farming in Palestine turned out to be far from easy for the Jewish immigrant. Palestine did not prove to be the "land flowing with milk and honey." Much of the land had been badly damaged by ages of misuse, neglect, and soil erosion. Water was scarce, the rainfall scant and concentrated in the few winter months, leaving the long summer rainless. Productivity of land was small, smaller even than in the neighboring Arab countries, where productivity amounts to about one-half that of Eastern Europe. In addition, land in Palestine was scarce and expensive. Arab nationalistic propaganda hampered sales to Jews, and when such sales were made prices were high. Every wave of immigration created a great demand for land and a land boom which left its mark even after the immigration had subsided. In general, in the inter-war years, the price of an acre of agricultural land was 4-5 times higher in Palestine than in the U. S., for far less productive land. At the same time the competition of the Arab farmer in Palestine and in the neighboring countries, and of the grain imports from overseas, precluded an eventual rise of agricultural prices beyond a certain limit. Farming along traditional lines met with the adverse realities of the country. The reaction to this situation was in two directions: first, search for a cash crop (wine and almonds in the earlier period, later tobacco and citrus) which would give the Jewish farmer the possibility of attaining a more acceptable standard of living; second, making of farming a national enterprise. Land

was furnished by the Jewish National Fund, equipment and loans by the Jewish Foundation Fund, and manpower came from the ranks of the pioneering youth, the *Cbalutz*, who were prepared to make personal sacrifices in terms of living standards for the sake of helping the Jews to take root in the soil.

Even so, grain farming could hardly offer the agriculturist the possibility of making a living, while the expanding urban market created a demand for the more expensive protective foods—dairy products, poultry and eggs, vegetables and fruits—so that Jewish agriculture began to concentrate around these branches of production. In the early 1940's, for instance, dairy products accounted for 38.7% of the output of Jewish agriculture, poultry and eggs for 20.5%, vegetables, potatoes and fruit for 23.2%, while wheat made up only 7.6%. (These figures of the war years do not reflect any abnormal changes attributable to the times, but signify, rather, the pattern of development.)

Since there is no significant natural pasturage in Palestine, and it has proved cheaper to import feed than to produce it domestically, the cattle and poultry were fed in sheds and coops with feed which was for the most part imported and which frequently cost about one-half of the end product. Agriculture thus turned from production of basic foods for consumption by the producer and his family to a commercialized business enterprise producing for the market. It became somewhat comparable to truck, chicken and dairy farming around the metropolitan areas in the U. S.

During the Second World War diminishing imports and growing demands for food, plus the added requirements of the Allied Armies in the Middle East, caused a steep rise in agricultural prices. Shortages in manpower brought partial mechanization, a trend which was continued after the foundation of the State in 1948. Jewish agriculture ceased being entirely a deficit enterprise, maintained by Jewish national institutions and self-sacrifice of the settlers, and became, in part, a profitable venture. This same trend continued generally during the post-war and post-independence years. Scarcity of food, rationing, black markets, and, on the positive side, availability of land and the import of machinery, gave the Jewish farmer a chance to expand and develop, in many cases through government subsidies granted with a view to inducing production. The Israeli Government attempted—as a result of lack of foreign exchange and for the purpose of achieving economic self-sufficiency,—to change the direction of agriculture toward production of basic foods. But this attempt was only partially successful—to a considerable degree because of the vested interests of the older settlers.

The nature of Jewish agriculture in Israel remained largely a com-

mercialized one, dependent on urban markets. This trend, combined with the physical encroachment of the expanding city, contributed toward the transformation of the farmer, his attitudes and outlook. In fact, farming became, for the most part, a business enterprise with the profit motive as an important factor, and the farmers—except for those in the new settlements in desolate areas, mostly Oriental Jews—following in part, urban patterns in their mode of living, behavior, needs, recreation, culture traits and attitudes.

IMPACT

All these trends precipitated by the rapid, unplanned urbanization are in line with the general development of Western society. The cultural lag created in Israel, however, and the tensions arising are of a somewhat different character from those of other countries.

Jewish Palestine, and hence the State of Israel, is a planned society—a society born of a theory, or a dogma. At first it was Zionism, and later a combination of Zionism and Socialism, which laid the ideological foundation for Jewish Palestine. Rural bias, over-evaluation or idealization of manual labor, a return to frugality and a pristine simplicity of life, anti-capitalist and anti-urban leanings, hopes of building a new, better and egalitarian society formed the main tenets of this ideology, parallel with the ideas of "return to the land of the forefathers" and the foundation of an independent political state.

The rural bias, the anti-capitalist bent and social reformism, were a part of similar trends among intellectuals in Europe during the time in which modern Zionism was maturing, namely, the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Some leading Zionists were in the forefront of these trends of thought, such as Max Nordau and Theodore Herzl. Anti-capitalism was, of course, re-emphasized by Socialism and the influence of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 which also fostered egalitarianism. Zionism itself—return to Palestine—was motivated both by negation of European—and Jewish-European—society based mainly on urbanism and service occupations, and by the romantic ideal of a return to the life of Biblical times. A Hebrew writer of that generation, J. Ch. Brenner, expressed this trend when he asserted "Only when we have learned the secret of [manual] labor and committed to memory the hymn of those settled on their own soil shall we have deserved the title man." All this led to an idealization of farming, of the village and a more primitive way of life on the soil, making it the basis of the renaissance of the Jews in Palestine. Professor S. Bergman, one of the intellectuals who participated in the movement in the post-World War I years said:

"Our yearnings for the village, our striving to make it the central point of our renaissance, did not come from economic reasons only. Taking roots in the soil meant for us more than physical rooting. Also the Jewish spirit sought to be rooted in the land. The village was given the task of materializing this taking root. And from the village this spirit was supposed to spread out and influence the city."⁶

In accordance with all these motivations and attitudes, Zionist work in Palestine in the pre- and post-World War I period concentrated mainly upon agricultural settlement. Two principal types evolved: the communal settlement (*Kibbutz* or *Kvutza*) and the cooperative settlement (*moshav ovdim*—workers' or smallholders settlement). In both types the land is furnished by the Jewish National Fund on a long term lease, and equipment is supplied by Zionist funds. In the communal or collective settlements there are no individual incomes; the settlement owns and operates everything, and all the needs of the members are filled by the group. In the smallholders' settlements, the individual manages his own enterprise and his consumption is within the framework of his family unit, while he enjoys a great deal of cooperation and mutual help in purchasing, selling and other walks of life.

These two types, comprising the great majority of agricultural settlements in the pre-state era, were founded on the principles: "To work by ourselves without the help of others." "No hired labor is to be considered." The settlements were to be based on self-sufficiency—"settlements which produce first of all . . . materials . . . which are needed by man . . . and not materials which have to go to market and be exchanged for money," their task was "to create for ourselves the possibility to become the regulators of our life" . . . "to create a form of life with economic equality." A broader aim of the *Kvutza* was to "build the country through the creation of a general commune of the Jewish worker in Palestine . . . where the central treasury and the centralization of the supplies will assure the equalization of living conditions."⁷ In both types it was believed that with the abolition of private property and the introduction of production for consumption instead of for the market, competition and greed, passions and appetites distorting social relations, would disappear and a new, harmonious community would emerge with total equality for all.

⁶ S. Bergman in *Hakefar Haibri Be'eretz Israel* (Jerusalem, 1946) p. 20.

⁷ Y. Bussel in *Hapoel Hatzair* 1918-1919; reprinted in *Pirke Hapoel Hatzair*, VIII, 2 (Tel Aviv 1936), p. 140; Eliezer Yaffe, "Moshavei Ovdim," *ibid.*, p. 187; S. Kushnir, *The Village of Ezekiel* transl. by Fr. France & R. Goldstein, Boston 1933, p. 19; *Gdud Haavoda al Sbem Joseph Trumpeldor*, Tel Aviv 1932, pp. 23, 68.

These two settlement groups—the collective *Kvutza* and the cooperative *Moshav Ovdim*—have been affiliates of the General Federation of Labor (*Histadruth*) since its foundation in 1920. The Labor Federation was based on values and approaches similar to those of the agricultural settlement groups: the striving for absolute social and economic equality, and building Jewish Palestine as a labor commonwealth based on co-operative foundations. For this purpose the *Histadruth* organized enterprises of its own such as a contracting agency, purchasing and selling agencies (*Hamashbir* and *Tnuva*), a bank, loan and savings associations, an insurance company. It also organized transport, producers' and other cooperatives. As an overhead organization and a holding company of all these cooperatives and agencies the "Jewish Workers' Commonwealth of Palestine" (*Hevrath Ovdim*) was created, which is a counterpart of the *Histadruth*, and is supposed officially to serve as an organ of the labor commonwealth for control of all these enterprises.

These schemes were all conceived in the years before and immediately after the first World War, when the settlers were young, the group small, their ideals fresh, and seeming, in their simplicity, to conform with the environment—an underdeveloped, primitive country being built up by the endeavor and sacrifice of small groups of young idealists with little or no capitalism and urbanization.

The developments since the second half of the 1920's, and particularly since the 1930's, combined economic growth with urbanization, industrialization, and a capitalistic market economy. Production became, as we have seen, divorced from consumption.

The rural bias is, in practice, disappearing although it is still a part of the official creed and efforts are made by government circles to increase agricultural settlement and production. Manual labor generally is now no longer so highly evaluated, and service occupations have in practice become a more and more vital factor in national income:

"The manual laborer has been removed from his high place and is constantly losing in prestige, as is manual work in general . . . the official, the businessman, the manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the white-collar worker are gaining in recognition . . . the urban resident is more and more admired . . . urban ways of thinking and behaving together with urban amenities and luxuries, are spreading more and more into the country. The ideal of the simple life is disappearing."⁸

⁸ Samuel Koenig, "Immigration and Culture Conflict in Israel" *Social Forces*, XXXI (Dec. 1952), p. 146.

The frugality and simplicity of life advocated and promulgated by the pioneers are on the wane. In the collectives an increasing demand for "comfort" and "luxuries" is making itself felt, with some members trying to acquire these things without necessarily caring much whether or not their comrades will have them. Egalitarianism as well as the anti-capitalist trends and the efforts toward attainment of social justice are on the decline and are being replaced by individualism, acquisitive tendencies, and competition, on a small scale of course, as a result of the limited opportunities in a small country.

The cooperative movement, which has been regarded as an instrument paving the way toward a social utopia, has, under the impact of the developing market economy, become but one rung in the ladder of the capitalist trend. Development and growth have made of many cooperatives big concerns with vested interests. Such agencies as the purchasing and marketing organizations of the Labor Federation (*Histadruth*) *Hamasbbir* and *Tnuva*, or the construction concern "*Solel Boneh*," have become large corporations seeking profits, amassing capital, and building new concerns, "exploiting" their workers no less, sometimes even more, than private enterprise. Although they are officially the property of the Workers' Community and are controlled by its Board, in actuality they are no more the property of the workers, serving their interests, than are the nationalized enterprises in fully socialist (or communist) states in connection with their workers.

Again, cooperatives such as the transport cooperatives, hold a virtual monopoly in transportation, dictate prices, and make huge profits. "The yoke which the cooperative monopolists place on the public"—states a semi-official government report—"is much heavier than that of any private enterprise." The bus drivers turned their cooperatives into private companies, employing hired labor, paying them low wages but themselves drawing salaries higher than those of a supreme court judge or high government official, as well as pocketing other incomes and benefits. All efforts on the part of the Labor Federation, which originally organized these and similar cooperatives as nuclei of a future socialist society and in theory still controls them, to minimize hired labor and its exploitation by cooperative members, have been of little avail. More recently, in August 1956, there was a sharp clash between Government-*Histadruth* on the one hand and the transportation "cooperative" monopoly on the other. The latter demanded that fares be raised considerably. After a transportation strike of nine days duration a settlement was reached which, in fact, fulfilled the main demands of the bus owners.

The *Kvutza* has been selling over 50% of its agricultural produce on the urban market, thus competing with other producers. This called for

better management, rational division of labor, mechanization, and efficiency. It also meant that the economy of the *Kvutza* had to be conducted within the scope of profitability. Even though the profits are neither divided among the members nor transformed into private property belonging to individuals, such management is bound to resemble that of a capitalistic enterprise, with the instinct of private property passing from the individual to the group. That this acquisitive mentality is no less apparent among collectives than among other groups is shown by the fact that in the days of austerity and rationing some of them were selling produce on the black market, on a par with private agriculturists.

Having increased in size and having now to rely on good management, efficiency, expert handling of financial matters, rationalization and specialization, the collective was bound to take on many characteristics of a capitalist society. If generally in a cooperative situation the presence of an outside competing group changes the social form of the behavior and the performance of the cooperators the collective group of the *Kvutza* was also subject to the impact of the "outside competing group" (urban market).

The managers of the different branches of agriculture, the financial secretary, the specialists in the diverse fields of agriculture, the tractor drivers, and other skilled workers, must have special knowledge or experience in order to be able to fulfill their complicated tasks. They can neither be easily replaced nor sent in rotation to other tasks. The managers and "technocrats" have thus become a group or a class apart from the unskilled workers even though they do not receive higher pay or better facilities. They do enjoy more prestige and standing in the collective than the unskilled workers, since their activity is regarded as more essential and more profitable.

This stratification is the more pronounced since the general assembly, officially the highest authority of the collective, at which every member had an opportunity to express his views and make the most vital decisions, has degenerated, for the most part, into a mere formality. The whole organization is more complex, membership larger, the problems more complicated and a few specialists are the only ones who are familiar with the details and have an expert opinion on the main factors within and outside of the collective. In this way the membership loses interest in the general meeting and even ceases to participate. In some collectives less than one-half of the membership appears at the general meeting. The "managerial" group thus becomes the one to run the show, to appear as the "boss" whose word and opinion are decisive. From here stems the feeling of dependency among other members which is an expression of the developing inequality and the social stratification with-

in the collectives. Inside the *Kvutza* this feeling among the members of dependence has been regarded both as a threat to equality and a cause of grave problems for the entire system.

"A man [in the *Kvutza*] is dependent on the treasurer, on different committees. . . . The feeling of being dependent upon others . . . brings bitterness and anger for which it is hard to find a solution."⁹

This social stratification and the differences between the various strata within the collectives, the rivalry and the feeling of humiliation and dependence among those members who have no specialized jobs, is enhanced by the fact that it is from among the managerial group that politicians, party secretaries, emissaries, and officials are often recruited for the labor parties, the *Histadruth*, other institutions, and partly the government. Thus the "class" stratification becomes more pronounced, the influence and importance of the "managerial" group and its prestige is strengthened. A political or managerial post outside the collective, membership in the *Knesset* (parliament), secretaryship of a labor-union, or a trip abroad becomes in this way a reward for the "upper class" in the collective to which the "lower" group can never aspire. Another problem is the existence of hired labor in many collective settlements. All the resolutions of the controlling overhead organizations to eliminate this breach of socialism by "exploitation" have proved of little avail. These changes which created a chasm between creed and fact precipitated a crisis in the collective settlements.

Since the 1930's, when the pace of urbanization quickened in Israel and the *Kvutza* began to produce more for the market, the internal publications of the settlements have begun to reflect signs that the "idyllic period" was on the wane, and that social problems were also inherent in this type of community. Such publications "discovered" the existence of a trend toward bureaucratic leadership, social problems in the relations of the individual to the community, competition within the *Kvutza*, and a lack of true equality.

In the 1940's a Hebrew novel, *Maagalot* (English translation entitled "Young Hearth"), by David Maletz, long a member of Ain Harod, one of the older and more important communal settlements, was published. This novel depicts the tensions between the individual and the group and the inequalities which arise from the impact of organized communal "equality." It shows how the more passive members are being pushed around by the pressures and customs governing such a settlement, and also the social differences among the members stemming from the

⁹ Haadam Babityashvutb, Ain Harod, 1948, pp. 28, 71.

"status" of those with specialized jobs. The major issues of the novel are those which are apparent in any non-socialist society: social status, love and marriage, education, sickness and invalidism, etc. The special problems of the communal settlement which are mirrored in the novel are the loss of close intimacy in a large group and the perversion of the democratic and egalitarian principle into oligarchic practice, where the average member loses his say in vital decisions.

Since then a considerable number of studies have appeared which point out the internal stratification process and social tensions in the commune.

What is true of the *Kvutza* is also partially true of the older cooperative settlements (the smallholders settlements). The individual members of such settlements, even more than those of the collectives, have acquired the air of wellbeing and the attitudes of acquisitiveness. Both groups have become institutionalized, and have adopted many attitudes stemming from vested interests and motivated by the desire for (private or group) profits.

In the last years, for instance, the government of Israel—partly under the influence of foreign advisers—has formulated an agricultural plan aiming to increase the production of staple agricultural products, and at decreasing production of poultry, eggs and milk, more costly in terms of foreign exchange. This is regarded as one of the more important steps toward improvement of the financial situation of the State. The established collective and communal settlers, who are the most devoted to the wellbeing of the State, have at the same time, generally opposed such changes, fearing a lowering of their incomes. In practice the pressures exerted by these groups are causing modification—or abandonment—of these plans. The seven-year plan formulated a few years ago is being turned into a new four-year plan with changed goals.

Egalitarianism in wages and salaries in Jewish organizations is giving way to a broadening salary gap between low and high officials—a gap approaching that of some capitalistic countries.

The General Federation of Labor prides itself on being the principal builder and mainstay of the State. Most of the members of the Cabinet—and the President—are former leaders of the *Histadruth*, some of them still exerting a strong influence on the latter. The great majority of the membership would undoubtedly be ready to defend the State with their lives, and to make sacrifices in a time of emergency. But in normal times they follow the now prevailing trends—acquisitiveness, achievement-oriented norms, demands for more consumption. As a trade union organization the *Histadruth* is bound to follow these trends. As a result it is out not only to maintain the escalator clause

for wages and salaries, although it admittedly causes a systematic rise of the inflationary spiral, but has recently decided on a 5-15% wage increase despite the opposition of the government. The Finance Minister, Mr. L. Eshkol (himself a former labor leader) and his advisor Prof. Abba Lerner (protagonist of the welfare state), have warned that any wage increase would have serious inflationary effects on the economy, would further decrease the possibility for export and thus increase the already huge trade gap. Nevertheless the *Histadruth* persists in its demands. At the last conference of the Mapai—the moderate socialist party of Premier Ben Gurion—held at the end of August 1956, the differences between the leadership which is responsible for the Government, and the trade-union leadership, became clearly observable. The members responsible for trade-union policies—particularly those coming from Haifa—put up a stiff fight against a resolution sponsored by leaders responsible for government affairs that the party should advocate a change in the escalator clause and the wage policies. At the same time great importance was attached at this Conference to the discussions concerning the report of a committee investigating digressions from the social creed, from frugality, egalitarianism, and democracy, spreading among members and leaders alike.

CONCLUSIONS

Palestine-Israel has experienced a rapid process of urbanization. In a comparatively short space of time the country became highly urbanized, surpassing the ratio in more highly developed countries. Urbanization was accompanied in Israel by phenomena similar to the ones appearing in other countries: significant changes in agriculture and rural life, division of labor, specialization, industrialization, mechanization, growth of market economy and competition, rationalistic tendencies, achievement oriented norms, demand for more consumption and for luxury goods. Economic growth has "given people greater satisfaction of fundamental needs; thence a striving to satisfy secondary needs, and the identification of additional desires."¹⁰ Here, too, there arose a need for new hierarchical relations, implying stratification and inequality which intensified as the population became concentrated in space and the economy grew.

From the vantage point of a highly urbanized society such as the American, where change and innovations are ever present factors, all the trends observable in Israel would not only appear normal, but might be lauded as a sign of vitality of the system—or ideology—which found

¹⁰Einar Thurstud, "The Social Consequence of Technical Change from the Psychological Standpoint." *International Social Science Bulletin*, VI, No. 2 (1952), p. 308.

it possible to adjust itself to the changing realities. In Israel, however, the lag of the anti-urban egalitarian ideology after the urban reality is causing tensions which are not unlike those occurring in other countries with urbanization, ensuing imbalances and their effect on traditional social structures. The difference in Palestine-Israel is that here neither an age-old ingrained peasant population was thrown out of its traditional way of life with its sets of values disrupted, nor were traditional handicraft workers displaced, or an actual natural environment of society changed. The "natural environment" was here rather a hope, a seeking for Utopia, for a society which was thought to be an evaluational one, the rural and anticapitalist set of values and the attitudes of simplicity and primitiveness of which were based on ideology. Probably for this reason the "disruptive forces" are able to accomplish their work more easily and in a shorter time. There nevertheless remains a weakening of the social fabric, a cultural lag between the evolving material culture and the growth of ideas connected with it and the ideologies, beliefs, and dogmas which served as basis of the theories leading to the establishment of the State. And, there are the tensions evolving from unfulfilled expectations and from the social change accompanying a rapid pace of urbanization.

THE JAMA'AT-I-ISLAMI OF PAKISTAN

Freeland Abbott

THE Jama'at-i-Islami (Community of Islam), a religious party in Pakistan, is similar to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt or, on a lesser scale, to the Servants of Islam of Iran. While not adverse to scientific development, its leaders maintain that true progress can only be achieved by following a particular path, and that only those well-versed in Islamic law are competent to supervise that path. The future of Muslims, it is held, lies in reclaiming their group consciousness, and that can only be done by reclaiming their past: Muslims were victorious everywhere so long as they remained faithful to their religion—when faith waned so, too, did their glory. The spirit of Islam cannot be divorced from the forms of Islam, for only by observance of the forms can the spirit be attained. There is nothing new in this interpretation; it has long been held. Only recently, however, have its supporters, who in every Muslim country include most of the conservative leaders, begun to promote and defend it through political organizations.¹ The Jama'at in Pakistan is an interesting example of the stresses that accompany Muslim thought and leadership in the process of transition from a resigned minority in a non-Muslim world to an active force in a Muslim state. From the point of view of an intellectual historian, the Jama'at illustrates some of the difficulties posed by a scholastic approach to present-day problems; from the point of view of a social historian, it illustrates the confusion in the eastern mind between the basic concepts of the west and its more spectacular non-essentials. Perhaps in one sense, at least to western eyes, it represents an attempt to regain self-respect and self-confidence by holding that what is western cannot be Islamic.

The leader of the Jama'at-i-Islami is Maulana Abul 'Ala Maudoodi, a publicist and scholar whose initial reputation was gained as a "liberal" Muslim, advocating the regeneration of Islam by throwing off medieval shackles.² Maudoodi, of an old Delhi family, was born in Aurangabad,

¹ Perhaps the first such organization was the Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928, although it was not until 1938 that its program was developed. See remarks of Werner Caskel in von Grunebaum, ed., *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 345.

² This paper is concerned with the Jama'at as a political party, and no attempt is made to assess one interpretation of Islam in relation to another.

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Deccan, in 1903. His father was a lawyer, but managed to teach his son Arabic and Persian; when Maudoodi was fifteen his father died. The boy drifted into journalism, and eventually moved to Hyderabad-Deccan, where in 1932 he founded an Urdu monthly, *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* (Interpreter of the Qur'an). Maudoodi's writings attracted the attention of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the great Indian Muslim poet, who in 1937 suggested that Maudoodi move to a recently established *waqf* at Pathan Kot in the Punjab. This *waqf* consisted of sixty-five acres, and included buildings and a printing press.

The career of Maulana Maudoodi really begins at Pathan Kot. Whether these new surroundings had an effect on Maudoodi's outlook, or whether his thought followed a natural line of development, it is true that at Pathan Kot much of his earlier liberalism seemed to rub off. His opponents delight in pointing out that it was at this time he began to grow his beard.

In political matters—and in pre-partition India it was difficult to avoid politics!—Maudoodi consistently sought a religious, rather than a purely political, emphasis. A Muslim, he maintained, should never lag behind a *kafir* in the arts and sciences, "but their angles of view, and consequently their *modus operandi* will be widely different."³ For the Muslim is a moral, God-fearing man, one who cannot live in humiliation or stand the abasement of subjugation. "He will always be dominant, ruling and governing, for no earthly power can subdue the qualities and the spirit that Islam inculcates in its adherent."⁴ Few were the Muslims of India who could not agree with this; few are the Muslims of Pakistan who would not agree with this. Maudoodi went further, however, and defined a Muslim in terms of obedience to form (although the Jama'at member would say "obedience to God"). To achieve this height of character it was necessary to follow to the letter the code of Islam as revealed in the Qur'an, and as elucidated by those who, for over a thousand years, have mulled over the Scriptures, studying them, trying to live them.

Only by achieving, so far as is possible in these times, the society of the early caliphate, can Islam be achieved—for that life, that selflessness of purpose revealed in the early days when the Prophet remained a living memory, *is* Islam. More than a spirit is involved here; man is a whole, and every departure from the whole, no matter how small, can be of tremendous consequences. In an Islamic State, perfectly achieved, the

³ Maudoodi, *Towards Understanding Islam* (Lahore: Tarjumanul Quran, 1948), p. 16. With the exception of the three-volume study, *Muslims and the Present Political Struggle*, all works of Maudoodi cited in this paper are from English translations prepared by the Jama'at itself.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

life of the early Muslim, his laws, his punishments, his mores, are also achieved. This, of course, is but another voice crying out for a rule of saints. But Maudoodi cries with the general agreement of many of the *'ulama* behind him, and from the framework of a tightly organized political party. He speaks authoritatively in terms of a single dogmatic approach in a world—and a country—in which dogma is increasingly questioned.

In Pakistan today some are searching for new emphases in Islam; Maulana Maudoodi is defending the old emphases, although perhaps in a new way. He maintains, for example, that the Qur'anic injunction "There is no compulsion in religion" would be more accurately translated to read, "There is no compulsion in respect of adopting the religion." Unless this interpretation is adopted, he insists, the various penalties and prohibitions found in the Qur'an are meaningless; if they are not meaningless, then compulsion is practiced on the believer.

The logic of Maudoodi is close to faultless. He and his followers present the most neatly packaged arguments and the most closely reasoned thinking on socio-religious subjects to be found in Pakistan today. But it is basically scholastic thought, concerned with precise definition, and with deductions made from dogma. That this is not quite the mood of Pakistan is reflected in the most frequent criticism of him—that he is taking the life out of the religion, that it is the bones, not the spirit, that appeal to him. But these critics are not scholastics. The future of Maudoodi, and perhaps of the religious conservatism he represents, depends upon whether or not scholasticism can be made to appeal to the masses, sold as true Islam, not to be confused with the loose thinking of westernized Muslims who have abandoned Islam by succumbing to the attractions of the West. On his side lie the tradition and inertia of centuries; the tentative support of many of the *'ulama* and the *imams*, with their hold over the masses; and his reputation for sincerity and scholarly study. Against him are the independent spirit Islam seems to propagate; a Government representing a social group not likely to relinquish power, and a group not interested in, and fearful of, Maudoodi's religious interpretations; and a slowly growing sense of national feeling in Pakistan, accompanied by an improving economic position for many whose interests become less and less identified with the political ideology Maudoodi represents.

There is no room for nationalism in Maudoodi's concept of an Islamic State. In a speech before the Aligarh Muslim University before partition, he emphasized that the Muslim "Freedom Movement," under the leadership of the Muslim League, did not represent a step towards the creation

of an Islamic State, but rather a step in the opposite direction.⁵ For, he argued, the basis of this movement is a spirit of nationalism, and nationalism is incompatible with Islam. "What is selfishness in individual life is nationalism in social life. A nationalist is naturally narrow-minded and niggardly."⁶ Moreover, Islam forbids the practice of imitating, and the adoption of western nationalism is out-and-out imitation.⁷

The steps by which Maulana Maudoodi reached his conclusions concerning the "Freedom Movement" are indicated in his three-volume Urdu study, *Muslims and the Present Political Struggle*, published at Pathan Kot. In the first two volumes Maudoodi criticized territorial nationalism and the Indian National Congress, insisting that should the Muslims accept this type of nationalism by joining the Congress they would be annihilated and assimilated into the Hindu majority. In the third volume he criticized Muslim nationalism and the Muslim League in favor of a new, purely Islamic party. This party was, in fact, founded by Maudoodi himself in 1941—the Community of Islam—*Jama'at-i-Islami*.

The reasoning that led Maudoodi to these conclusions was clear and consistent. But, of course, it also set him apart from the political activity of the Muslim League. On the other hand, the arguments used by the Muslim League at this time were distinguished more by their fervor than anything else, and must have been painful to a mind as logical as that of Maudoodi's. For Maudoodi, however, the political considerations of the problem were secondary. His interest was in achieving an Islamic State, and he saw no advantage in creating anything less. Maudoodi thus felt that the Muslim League leaders were in fact leading the Indian Muslims away from their goal. The nature of the State, he said, "is wholly determined by the nature of the circumstances which underly its birth and formation."⁸ A strong Muslim state would of necessity be based on the Islamic way of life. Its citizens would zealously espouse that life. But Maudoodi saw few leaders in the Muslim League he could classify as good Muslims. He believed that lacking the proper type of leader, the Islamic state could not be achieved. It was not enough to substitute an insurance company run by Muslims for one run by Hindus; what was required was the establishment of a state based on Islamic ideology.

Thus Maulana Maudoodi and his party could not bring themselves to support the Muslim League movement for partition. As late as 1947

⁵ Maudoodi, *Process of Islamic Revolution* (Pathan Kot: Maktabe-e-Jama'at-e-Islami, 1947), pp. 22-23.

⁶ Maudoodi, *Nationalism and India* (Pathan Kot: Maktaba-e-Jama'at-e-Islami, 1947), p. 28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁸ Maudoodi, *Process of Islamic Revolution*, p. 2.

—the year of partition—Maudoodi maintained that he would not fight for Pakistan, that he did not believe in Pakistan, for it was not Islamic.⁹ At the time of the Kashmir affair Maudoodi refused to give an opinion—despite the desires of the Government—that the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen and army was a *jihad*, maintaining, in fact, that it was not Islamic, so long as the Government officially declared that it wished to solve the dispute by negotiation. In October 1948 he was arrested, to remain in jail until May 1950.

With the creation of Pakistan Maudoodi's position became unenviable. He elected to leave his Pathan Kot *waqf* in the East Punjab and move to Pakistan. Making his headquarters in Lahore he proceeded to reorganize his party and attracted, besides those who had previously shared his religious convictions, others who, like Maudoodi, had never supported the Pakistan idea, but who had moved to Pakistan upon its achievement. To these people—anti-Muslim League elements—the *Jama'at-i-Islami* seemed to offer a position from which to criticize the Government. It is not surprising, then, that the Government should look with suspicion upon the party.¹⁰

Political considerations such as these, however, are not enough in themselves to explain the position of the *Jama'at-i-Islami* in Pakistan today. After all, neither the Ahrar Party, now incorporated within the Muslim League, nor the Ahmadiyyah, nor most of the conservative *'ulama*, supported the movement for partition, either. But none of these groups was so fervently anti-nationalistic as was Maudoodi. In short, Maudoodi's concept of an Islamic State, even more than his distrust of Muslim League leadership, served to arouse the watchfulness of the authorities in Pakistan, for the result of the undeterred consistency of Maudoodi's thought was something that to them seemed to resemble treason. If to believe in nationalism was un-Islamic, as Maudoodi argued, and if one is a Muslim only so long as he upholds the Islamic viewpoint in every concern of life, then was it not un-Islamic to believe in Pakistan?¹¹

This distrust on the part of the Government was increased because, even if many of the *'ulama* did not support the idea of Pakistan before partition, the mass of the Indian Muslims did, and largely on the basis

⁹ Mr. A. T. Chaudhri, Research Officer at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, in a conversation with the author, January 11, 1955, reported that Maudoodi had personally spoken to him in this manner.

¹⁰ It is not to be supposed, however, that all such groups flocked to the Jama'at. The personal element in all sub-continent politics is too strong to permit such a thing. Some non-supporters of the Pakistan idea found refuge in the Government, others in different parties. In addition, there is no evidence that such individuals became actual members of the Jama'at, but they certainly swelled the number of followers.

¹¹ Maudoodi, *Nationalism and India*, p. 9.

of religious feeling. Maulana Maudoodi has identified himself more completely than any other individual with the idea of an Islamic State, and the Jama'at has effectively spread his ideas. Whatever the ability of the Jama'at to capture votes might be, there can be no question that Maudoodi himself elicits a great deal of respect from the Pakistan masses, and is generally accepted as a leading, if not the leading, Islamic scholar in Pakistan. It is some indication of the character of Maudoodi that he should have won this reputation with little formal schooling.

The development of the Jama'at as a political party in Pakistan was dependent upon removing the onus of questionable citizenry. This could be done in two ways—either by definitely establishing that the Jama'at's point of view was that of the majority, or by satisfying the Government that the Jama'at was a strictly constitutional party, and did not believe in revolution. The Jama'at has tried both of these solutions, but has not been successful in either.¹² Its efforts in elections have been uniformly disappointing, except, perhaps, in Bahawalpur. The Pakistan peasant still votes in terms of his *zamindar* or *pir*, who are near at hand, rather than in terms of a political party whose office is in far-off Lahore. One Jama'at candidate out of fifty-three was elected to the Punjab Assembly in the 1950 elections; two out of four were successful in Bahawalpur.¹³

It is against these election results that one must view the Punjab riots of 1953. There can be no doubt that Maudoodi was and is sincere in his condemnation of the Ahmadiyyah sect. The creation of an Islamic State in Pakistan, as the Jama'at saw things, was immediately impossible on two counts—the nature of the leadership, and the inclusion in full citizenship of a group considered to be Muslim imposters—the Ahmadiyyah. Little could be done against the Government, but perhaps by taking advantage of the Ahrar-inspired attacks against the Ahmadiyyah it would be possible for the Jama'at to help achieve the elimination of one obstacle to the Islamic State, and at the same time create a groundswell of public opinion lending strength to the Jama'at. Doubtless there was religious feeling stirring the Jama'at in this instance, but there was a touch of political opportunism as well. Indeed, in the political life of the sub-continent, opportunism is almost the staff of life of any opposition party.

¹² Thus the *Report of The Court of Inquiry . . . to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* (The Munir Report), reads: "For the achievement of this ideal it [the Jama'at] believes . . . in the acquisition of political control by constitutional means and where feasible by force." P. 243.

¹³ It must be noted, however, that the Jama'at contested these elections at a considerable disadvantage, not only because of official restrictions (arrests, banning of papers, etc.), but also because of its limited finances. Of the fifty-seven candidates from the Punjab and Bahawalpur who received Jama'at approval in the 1950 elections, only twenty-seven were members of the Jama'at.

In joining the attack against the Ahmadiyyah, Maudoodi, having accepted Pakistan even though it had begun on the wrong foot, was carrying out his policy of perfecting it as an Islamic State. His pre-partition position against Pakistan was taken, it was emphasized, "when neither the division of the Punjab and Bengal was envisaged in the schemes of partition, nor . . . when anyone had in his mind any scheme for the transfer of the population."¹⁴ The achievement of partition, then, and the creation of a Pakistan that was 86% Muslim, removed Maudoodi's fundamental doubts. Early in 1948, speaking before the Law College at Lahore, he said, "If, now, after all these sacrifices, we fail to achieve the real and ultimate objective of making Islam a practical, constitutional reality which inspired us to fight for Pakistan, our entire struggle becomes futile and all our sacrifices meaningless."¹⁵ Perhaps any lingering doubts he may have had were silenced by the passing of the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949, which resolved that the Constituent Assembly would draw up a constitution under which Muslims might live "in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the *Sunna*."¹⁶

The conversion of Maudoodi to acceptance of Pakistan, despite such arguments as these, seems as much predicated on the fact that he was now living in Pakistan as anything else. Before partition he could deplore Muslim League leadership, and question its Islamic character, pointing out that even more than the Muslim League he was leading the fight against the nationalism of the Indian Congress; after partition he could just as eloquently cite those same leaders to support the contention that Pakistan was meant to be an Islamic State. In this instance, at least, the consistency of Maudoodi's logic breaks down, but here political pressures offered him no alternative. Indeed, the nature of the arguments and slogans advanced by the Muslim League leaders before partition provide political bait far too tempting for any hopeful politician to ignore—especially in a country where religious feeling is strong. Nevertheless, Maudoodi must realize that what the Qaid-i-Azam meant by Islam is some removed from what he himself means by Islam; he certainly understood this well enough before partition.

The record of Maulana Maudoodi for logical consistency also suffers from the Punjab riots affair. It is hard to interpret the Jama'at's role in this instance as little else than political opportunism—unless we can ascribe to it an incredible naiveté. By article ten of its constitution the Jama'at forswears for itself resort to any method which might lead to

¹⁴ Jama'at reply to the Inquiry Report, English translation by the Jama'at, typescript, p. 15.

¹⁵ Maudoodi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Karachi: Jama'at-e-Islami Publications, 1955), p. 17.

¹⁶ *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, 12th March 1949, p. 100.

disorder in seeking to achieve its objectives. Yet in March, 1953, when the ill-feeling against the Ahmadiyyah had been stirred to fanatical heights, Maulana Maudoodi chose to publish his pamphlet, *The Qadiani Problem*, likening the Qadianis to "a cancer eating up and gradually consuming the Muslim Society."¹⁷ Whatever might be the merits of the arguments expressed in the pamphlet, and however much it may have been intended as a challenge to a rational discussion of the issue, its publication at this particular time could have had no other effect than to increase the tension. It may be that Maulana Maudoodi, swept by distaste for the Ahmadiyyah, who have long been active opponents of the Jama'at, and visualizing an opportunity to achieve their expulsion from Muslim society, never thought in this manner. He was really addressing the Government, trusting that sufficient argument and agitation would convince them that there existed a great majority in opposition to the Qadianis, and that, therefore, the Government should immediately accede to the demands of the agitators. If this incident does nothing else, it indicates the nature of the concept of democracy entertained by Maudoodi, and indicates as well his lack of knowledge of the nature of governmental problems. Nevertheless, Maudoodi should have realized he was playing with a highly volatile mob—not to have done so was sheer irresponsibility.¹⁸

The Punjab riots, however, did impress on the Jama'at the necessity of moving slowly. The attempt to outlaw the Qadianis was revealed as hasty; the party, however, could find some solace in recalling the principle of *tadrij*, or gradual development, one of the basic principles of *fiqh*, and itself derived from the Qur'an. Many of the decisions of the party since this time have revolved around the question of just how gradual gradual development should be. The fact that few, if any members of the Central Working Committee—or of the party—have had any practical government experience, that no more than two or three members of the party have ever traveled abroad even briefly (with the exception of taking the pilgrimage to Mecca), represents a distinct disadvantage in framing solutions to such questions.

From the Government's point of view, however, the activity of the Jama'at during the riots had definitely established it as a party not loathe to utilize force when force was available. Because of the fear that Maudoodi might be able to exercise leadership over the *mullas*, and

¹⁷ Maudoodi, *The Qadiani Problem* (Lahore: Markazi Sho'ba-e-Nashr-o-Ishaat Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan, 1953), p. 33. The English edition is apparently milder than the Urdu edition. The Ahmadiyyah sect, founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1901, split in 1914 into two branches, the Qadianis and the Lahoris; the branches disagree as to whether Mirza Ahmad was a prophet or only a reformer.

¹⁸ The Jama'at have expressed their case in a reply to the Inquiry report, cited earlier, and shortly to be available in English.

through them perhaps over the masses, the position of the Jama'at after the riots—even with Maudoodi in jail for a second time—became more suspicious than ever. Indeed, it seems no exaggeration to say that the Jama'at is looked upon as Public Enemy No. 1; it is reported that no government worker may attend any Jama'at meeting, and that many Jama'at members employed by the Government, if not all, have lost their jobs. Various nuisance techniques have been adopted to keep the party from gaining power, ranging from raids on its central offices to devices making more difficult the collection and sale of goat skins following 'Id-al-Adha, the proceeds of which represent an important item in the income of the party.¹⁹

The persistent needling of the Government, designed to keep the party off balance and on the defensive, gives some indication of the light in which the Jama'at is viewed. Yet the total membership of the *Jama'at-i-Islami* is apparently stabilized at approximately one thousand! Every member, however, is active. Each turns in a weekly report of his activities to his local branch, and if any reason for dissatisfaction is found, the member is reported to the Center through the District and Divisional branches. If it is decided the member is not prepared to fulfill the minimum requirements of membership, his membership is cancelled, and he is advised to work as a sympathizer of the Jama'at. Thus monthly losses are high—perhaps averaging one to three—and total membership is low. New members are selected on the basis of religious principles, and there seems to be no lack of replacements for those released by the party. New members are admitted on probation, and the probationary period may extend from one month to two years.

The membership ballots by mail to elect the twenty-man Central Working Committee, which advises the Amir on matters of policy. This organization—Amir assisted by an elected Working Committee—is continued down to the smallest unit. At the top level, however, the Amir is assisted by a secretary, nominated by him, and approved by the Committee.

The party finance department is controlled by a standing finance committee responsible to the Amir, the Working Committee, and accountable before the general members of the party as well. The contributions of party members—there are no fixed dues, but each contributes as he can, although it is expected that party members will pay their *zakat* to the party—make up the principal source of income. Funds

¹⁹ In 1953 the Government started its own collection and sale of skins for charitable purposes; the Jama'at maintains that in March 1955 the Karachi Chief Commissioner interpreted the 1953 Charitable Funds Regulation of Collections Act (XXXI of 1953) in such a way as to deprive the Jama'at of its income from the sale of skins.

from the sale of goatskins (all of which go into the Social Service Section of the Jama'at) come next. There is some income from the sale of party literature which, according to the Jama'at, reaches into five figures annually. Some support, too, is received from sympathizers who are not party members; it would be impossible to estimate this sum, which must certainly fluctuate, but it should be pointed out that the strength of the Jama'at lies not in its members, but in its sympathizers—those who agree with the Jama'at, or who have confidence in its leadership.

Most of the Jama'at income is spent on publications and social work. Its most positive program consists of the free—or in some cases, almost free—medical care it has offered since February 1952. Fifty fixed dispensaries are maintained in both wings of Pakistan, serving over 130 centers; five of these are in East Pakistan. The party claims that all methods of medical cure are used in these dispensaries, but for the most part the *unani* system is used, and a factory to manufacture *unani* medicines is maintained in Karachi. In addition, eleven mobile dispensaries are maintained, visiting three to four centers daily, and each center on alternate days; two of these are in East Pakistan. In 1954-55 the party spent about 260,236 rupees on medical aid through these dispensaries; in 1955-56 the sum so spent totaled 303,325 rupees, and aid was dispensed to 1,837,430 persons.

This represents a heavy drain on the revenue, however, and reduces the amount of other social work the party is able to support.²⁰ Needless to say, each dispensary is lined with posters advertising the Jama'at, and Jama'at circulars appeal for funds to help support "the health of the nation under the auspices of the *Jama'at-i-Islami*." It would be unfair, however, to indicate that the medical schemes exist purely to spread Jama'at political propaganda. Undoubtedly they also exist because the Jama'at feels that its role as an Islamic party requires it to support social welfare in every way possible.

II.

The Jama'at, thus, had failed in two attempts to establish itself as *persona grata* in Pakistan by demonstrating the power it represented. Following the Punjab riots only one course was open to it—to try to rebuild by emphasizing that it was a strictly constitutional party, maintaining its mulla-associations by supporting them against attacks of

²⁰ The Jama'at reports that in 1954-55 it spent over 86,100 rupees on flood relief in East Pakistan, 25,000 rupees on flood relief in the Punjab, over 7,100 rupees on earthquake relief in Quetta, besides distributing clothes, food, and medicine. It currently maintains about 300 Reading Rooms, and holds weekly meetings at nearly 250 places for the propagation of its views.

government spokesmen, and by creating a favorable public attitude toward the party through social work and publicity.²¹

The Jama'at never failed to state its approval or disapproval of the various draft constitutions that had been prepared from time to time. It maintains that most of the fundamentally important amendments it had proposed were accepted by the Constituent Assembly and made their appearance in the Constitution itself. Thus the minimum requirements of an Islamic Constitution were met. The party realized that Pakistan could not develop into much of anything—Islamic or not—without an established form of government, and until a settled electoral procedure was effected it had little chance of improving its position among the electorate. In a press statement of March 18, 1956 the Jama'at announced that the long struggle between the Islamic and anti-Islamic trends in Pakistan had been "finally and unequivocally settled" in favor of the former. For the first time since the fourth caliphate "the governmental authority of an Islamic State has passed into the hands of the common people instead of Royal families."²² Despite this bright side, the Jama'at noted "a good many" objectionable features such as preventive detention, or the complete suspension of fundamental rights during an emergency. The new constitution also disqualifies from election to the Assembly any person who has been sentenced to two years or more imprisonment, for a period of five years from the time of his release.²³ Inasmuch as this clause effectively eliminates many members of the Jama'at from candidacy in the forthcoming elections, one can easily understand why it would be considered objectionable in its present form.

These defects, the statement emphasized, are not enough to warrant rejecting the constitution, "especially as the method provided for amending the Constitution is quite easy." An Islamic Constitution, the party says, has now been achieved—but the real object is the achievement of an Islamic Order. Thus as much work lies before as behind, for unless the Constitution works as a successful Islamic Constitution, and unless the masses of Pakistan develop an ability to elect the right type of persons for translating it into action, the constitution is useless.

In short, the position of the Jama'at is so far little changed as a result of the passing of the constitution. The punitive powers of the

²¹ The Jama'at, of course, does not represent, nor have the support of, all the *mullas*. Some have their own schools of thought and organization—such as that of Raghīb Ahsan in East Pakistan, and are opposed to the Jama'at. The ultra-conservative *mullas*, indeed, often publish pamphlets and posters against the Jama'at.

²² Press statement, Majlis-e-Shura Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan, Lahore, March 18 (1956). Mimeographed in English. Pp. 1-2.

²³ Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Schedule, (Article 217), Part II, 4f. In an earlier draft, with which the Jama'at was in agreement, this had been limited to those imprisoned for crimes of "moral turpitude."

Government have not been substantially changed, and the establishment of the Islamic Order has been referred to a commission for study. It may be that in return for the establishment of regular elections, the Jama'at has lost some of its best debating points.

Nevertheless, the Jama'at remains an opposition party, although it has had to operate in a much quieter manner since the 1953 riots. It continues to support the mullas when that group is attacked. So long as Jinnah was supported only by modernist elements, a Jama'at writer asserts in one argument, the Muslim League had no mass backing. Nevertheless, Jinnah never gave anything to the religious people; he gave everything to the modernists—thus the vested interests in the country are not the religious people, but the modernists, who want a social polity in which they occupy the positions of Brahmins. All the modernists fight for jobs and the spoils of office, but the mulla draws abuse and imprisonment. This, the writer asserts, and perhaps accurately, is giving some status and position to the mulla.

It is not the mulla who represents a threat to the country, he maintains, but those who are opposed to the *Sunna*, and who, therefore, cannot solve the economic problems of the common man. These problems can only be solved by the application of Islamic principles, and any other method will lead to failure, thus pushing the people into the arms of communism and atheism.²⁴

These are strong, well-expressed arguments, and do not admit of an easy reply. Indeed, this is frequently true of arguments springing from the *Jama'at-i-Islami*. The Pakistan Government has not yet found a mouthpiece comparable in argument and expression to the publicity of the Jama'at. The party has a well-developed, well-expressed, logical philosophical expression of its position on almost every subject, from women to economics. Maulana Maudoodi, incidentally, is reported to be a master of Urdu style, and even where his ideas do not attract, his writing style is found appealing. In addition, the Jama'at maintains an excellent publicity department to insure the distribution of these opinions.

But if the Jama'at consistently advances more consistent and logical arguments than almost any other group in Pakistan, it must be remembered that it has to. It has very little else to offer. Unable, because of governmental restrictions, to move very far, and looked upon with considerable suspicion by many of the merchant class, the Jama'at has little left for it except argument and debate—persuasion. It can appear more

²⁴ Naeem Siddiqui, "Sunna aur Tajaddud" (Sunna and Modernizing Tendencies), *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*, March 1955, pp. 36-64. This article was in reply to a newspaper article in the *Pakistan Standard* and does not represent, of course, more than a specific reply to the article concerned.

consistent and logical because it is able to operate from a much more narrow base than the Government. Essentially, its arguments proceed from Maudoodi's scholastic foundation, while the Government must bear in mind that it represents everyone, and not just a determined and self-assured party.

Despite its line of argument and its publicity department, the Jama'at has not been spectacularly successful in persuading the Pakistan public as to the validity of its arguments. It has suffered, too, from the successes of the anti-mulla campaign, and in the popular mind its members are associated with the mulla. The Jama'at is identified with the beard—and, consequently, with everything else so associated. "The Jama'at?" I was frequently told, and by non-governmental people: "They want to make us like Afghanistan." The greatest single factor working in the Jama'at's favor is the corruption in Pakistan, for the members of the Jama'at have a reputation for honesty and genuineness that the party is careful to cultivate.

In a sense, then, the future of the Jama'at depends upon a period of waiting. Will Pakistan development improve the standard of living of the people of Pakistan fast enough to weaken any attraction the Jama'at and its program might have? The Jama'at offers to make everyone happy by creating an Islamic—that is, a perfect—State. But this is predicated upon a particular interpretation of the Qur'an and the masses have never been indoctrinated in any given interpretation. Indeed, the character of religious education in the sub-continent guaranteed the absence of definite opinion on this matter. To be sure, there is a general tendency to be conservative—most people are conservative; the tendency to accept without question whatever opinion might be advanced by the mulla is weakening, however, and, it would seem, must continue to weaken with the spread of education. The fact remains that to most Muslims in Pakistan Islam represents that which is good: Islam stands for self-respect and decency, for a fair living with food and shelter. If the Government can make substantial progress along these lines the attraction of the Jama'at will weaken; the people will tend to identify the Government with things good, and thus Islamic. If the Government fails, then the arguments of the Jama'at must become more meaningful.

Viewed in this way, the success or failure of religious conservatism, as presented by Maulana Maudoodi, seems dependent in part upon financial aid to Pakistan. The Jama'at feels that it stands to gain with the departure of foreign funds and foreign technicians, for it is unlikely that Pakistan could maintain its technological improvements without such aid. Thus the presence of western assistance is a barrier to power. It is also a corrupting influence on the people, leading them away from

the true concepts of the Islamic State. The Jama'at, consequently, has a bevy of arguments—each not without some validity—as to why western influence should be withdrawn. The people, for example, tend to identify an assisting western power with the Government, but the Government is corrupt. Thus, by trying to help Pakistan, the western power only receives adverse publicity. Or again, it is argued that pre-partition conditions are being re-created in Pakistan, with the westernized Muslim taking the place of the Hindu. There is the same monopoly of jobs, the same governmental control that existed in undivided India—and in each case the "orthodox" Muslim is left out. The root of this trouble lies in the West, and the Jama'at consequently adopts what amounts to be an anti-western policy without, however, denying the advantages of scientific discoveries. That this might lead to complete isolation means nothing to the party. Indeed, the moral standards of the West are such that one should isolate himself from them. This, the party would argue, is neither new nor novel. Soviet Russia ignores with impunity the standards of western international society, and that without replacing them by higher standards. The Islamic State envisioned by Maudoodi and the Jama'at would operate on the highest possible moral standards: those revealed by God through His Prophet in the Qur'an. Western man has made himself independent of God, and has been able to find no alternative basis upon which to build his moral life. He cannot, for the only correct basis for morality is that supplied by Islam.²⁵ It is a basis that can be achieved only by abandoning western standards.

Three factors thus emerge in assessing the *Jama'at-i-Islami*. In the first place, as an opposition group and as a religious party, it has to be somewhat negative in character. To be pro-Islamic requires it, as we have seen, to align itself apart from the west, or against other interpretations of the Qur'an. Secondly, because it is a political party, and because politics do require some opportunism, it has been led to contradictions of doctrine. And thirdly, it has to compete with the percolation of new ideas into Pakistan. This is a gamble between the extent of western aid to Pakistan and the degree to which conceptions that inevitably come with such aid sink into the Pakistani mind.

Despite the Muslim emphasis on the absence of any distinction between the religious and the secular, such a distinction is made—and as much the fault of such thinkers as Maulana Maudoodi as anyone. For their emphasis becomes dogmatic and theological; their position becomes dependent upon one particular approach, and they deny the validity of any other; their arguments aim toward making the world like them.

²⁵ Maudoodi, *The Ethical View-point of Islam* (Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jama'at-e-Islami, 1953), pp. 28-30.

But diversity of thought is as strong in Islam as anywhere else, and the absence of clergy reinforces this diversity. To many Muslims in Pakistan Maudoodi is just another commentator; to others he is a commentator-turned-politician. To all, however, he does reflect and represent the value of Islam, the spiritual importance of a faith that will not be abandoned, however differently individuals might interpret it. In this lies his strength.

THE KURDS OF IRAQ

C. J. Edmonds

I.

KURDISTAN is the country inhabited by the Kurds as a homogeneous community. It is divided between Turkey, Persia and Iraq with small overlaps into Syria and the Soviet Union, and its boundaries do not coincide with any international frontiers or internal administrative divisions.

Iraqi Kurdistan is bounded on the north and east by the Turkish and Persian frontiers, where the population on both sides is almost entirely Kurdish. On the south-west the internal ethnical boundary lies approximately along the railway from the Syrian frontier to Mosul city on the Tigris and thence a straight line to Mandali on the Persian frontier. The majority of the Kurds are thus concentrated in the four liwas which in Ottoman times constituted the vilayet of Mosul: Mosul (35% of the total population), Arbil (91%), Kirkuk (52%) and Sulaimani (100%). Kurds also have a majority in the two adjacent *qadhas* of Khanaqin and Mandali. Other than the Kurds, there are villages of Chaldean Christians near Mosul city to the north and east, and about 10,000 Assyrians compactly settled in the highlands of the Amadiya region: there are also colonies of Turkomans in a string of towns, large and small, along the great highway leading from Mosul through Arbil, Altun Köprü, Kirkuk and Kifri towards Baghdad. On the other hand there are islands of Kurds outside these limits, the most interesting being the Jabal Sinjar, west of Mosul, where most of the inhabitants are Yazidis, the people often misleadingly described as devil worshippers.

The Kurdish population of Iraq can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy, on the basis of the census of 1947, at about 900,000 or nearly one fifth of the total for the whole country. No statistics are available for Persian Kurdistan but a similar figure would be a reasonable guess. The Turkish census of 1945 gives the number of persons whose mother tongue was Kurdish as one and a half million; there is reason to think that the real number of Kurds is higher, perhaps two millions. The religion of the great majority of the Kurds in all three countries is Sunni Muslim; the mystical dervish orders have adherents in all parts of Kurdistan.

Of the larger towns Sulaimani is entirely and Arbil predominantly Kurdish. Smaller townships in which Kurds form the whole or the large

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majority of the population are Khanaqin, Kifri, Koi Sanjaq, Ruwandiz, Aqra, Amadiya, Dohuk and Zakho. Kirkuk city is very mixed but contains a large Kurdish element. The professional and intellectual classes, as well as the larger land-owners, tend, as would be expected, to collect in the towns, and there is always a steady drift of these out of Kurdistan to Baghdad.

The rural element consists for the most part of settled villagers; the nomads, once numerous, now form only a small proportion of the whole. Though not all villagers are in fact tribesmen, the organization of society outside the towns may be said, for all practical purposes, still to be essentially tribal, with groups of villages owing a kind of feudal allegiance to a landlord, a Shaykh of one of the dervish fraternities, or a tribal Agha who may have imposed himself on the village by force. With the progressive consolidation of the authority of the administration, and with the spread of education, the villagers have not unnaturally begun to refuse to submit to the impositions, sanctioned by ancient custom perhaps but not enforceable at law, by which these barons, especially the Aghas having no title to the land, were accustomed to maintain their position. In many parts of the country the old social organization is breaking down.

II.

The south-western boundary of Iraqi Kurdistan runs for most of its length across the plain. But immediately to the north-east of the line the ground begins to rise, first as a maze of foothills, and then in a series of long, parallel, limestone ridges running from south-east to north-west, each loftier than the last, up to the main chain of Zagros, which over much of its length marks the Persian frontier. In the extreme north-west these ranges merge into the eastern extension of the Taurus system. On the Persian frontier there are many peaks of over 10,000 feet. It follows that there is a great variety of climatic conditions. The country is traversed by three important affluents of the Tigris, the Great Zab from Turkey, and the Little Zab and the Sirwan (Diyala) from Persia.

A railway from Baghdad following closely the line of the old high road through Kifri and Kikruk to Arbil serves Kurdistan south of the Great Zab; the main line up the right bank of the Tigris links Mosul directly with Baghdad and, as already mentioned, skirts the Kurdish districts of the extreme north-west. Most of the market towns are now accessible by automobile. Transportation in the remoter highlands and between villages is by mule and donkey; oxen are still used by the nomads as beasts of burden.

The economy of Kurdistan is primarily pastoral and agricultural. The nomads in particular are rich in sheep and goats, and their wool, goat-hair and dairy produce are always in demand. Rough carpets and cloth for the national costume are woven both by the nomads and in the villages. The principal winter crops are wheat and barley; wheat from the Arbil plain and the Mosul district is reputed to be the best in the whole country and commands a high price; in most years there is an exportable surplus, but there is always a danger of drought and famine. In summer wherever there is water the villagers persist in growing rice for their own needs in spite of official discouragement and the grave prejudice to health from malaria which is directly traceable to it. Minor irrigated summer crops are maize, millet and lentils. The most valuable money crop is tobacco, of which enough (9,000 tons in 1954) is produced for the needs of the whole country, and to spare. Other local products are walnuts, oak-galls, gum tragacanth, and sumac. Timber for building is floated down the major rivers, and, on the Little Zab in particular, rafts of inflated skins called *kalak* still carry grain and other north-country produce more cheaply than other forms of transport. Recent introductions to Kurdistan which are doing well are cotton and sugarbeets. Baghdad is almost exclusively the market for all these commodities. Raisins and dried mulberries from the highlands are generally taken to some nearer point in the plains to be bartered for wheat and barley.

Apart from the great oil industry which has grown up round Kirkuk since the first gusher was struck nearby in October 1927, there has so far been little industrial development. But many Kurds have been trained by the Iraq Petroleum Company in various branches of engineering, and large technical and industrial training colleges established or projected at Mosul and Kirkuk are well placed to attract Kurdish students. Private enterprise may thus be expected to supplement in due course an ambitious governmental programme.

This programme has been made possible by the enhanced and steadily increasing oil royalties which have accrued to the government since 1952 (\$250 millions in 1955) and from which the northern *liwas*, like the rest of the country, have already derived great benefit: foreign experts have been engaged to advise on improved methods of cultivating and processing tobacco; a second experimental farm has been started near Sulaimani; artesian wells are being brought in for stock watering and for irrigation where suitable; old roads are being metalled and new roads opened up; rivers and streams are being bridged; municipal housing, electricity and water schemes are being subsidized; particular attention is being paid to schools and hospitals; a cement factory is nearing completion near Sulaimani; a power station with an initial capacity of 60,000 Kw. (and an ul-

timate capacity of 150,000 Kw.) is to be completed in 1958 at Dibis on the Little Zab to serve all northern Iraq.

Two of the most widely advertized major projects of the development programme, the great dams at Dukan on the Little Zab and Darband-i Khan on the Sirwan, are located in Kurdistan and are bringing some temporary benefit to the neighbourhood in the form of wages for labour. But their purpose is first and foremost the protection of Baghdad from flood, and the secondary benefits from storage of water will accrue to the lands down stream. Up stream considerable areas of agricultural land will be submerged and many villages are doomed to destruction. The government is understood to be fully alive to the necessity of tackling the delicate problem of compensating and finding new land for the dispossessed cultivators with foresight and generosity, and of balancing these large spectacular works with lesser projects in the upland valleys which will be of more direct and permanent value to the local people. Failure in this regard might well lead to unrest.

III.

The Kurds have not remained unaffected by the rising tide of nationalism that has swept over the countries of the Middle East since the turn of the century; and to understand the attitude of the Kurds of Iraq to the central government of Baghdad we must cast a brief glance backwards over the history of the region both before and after 1918.

In spite of the centralizing policies of the Ottoman and Persian governments a number of quasi-autonomous Kurdish principalities survived in both countries until about the middle of the 19th century. Two of the princely families are intimately connected with the development of Kurdish nationalism: the Badr Khans of Bohtan (still in Turkey) with their capital at Jazirat ibn Umar (now Cizre), and the Babans of Sulaimani. It is not easy to fix on any particular date or circumstance as marking the beginning, or even a turning point, in the development of Kurdish nationalism in the modern sense. Throughout the 19th century, both before and after the suppression of the principalities, there were of course frequent revolts against the central authority in which the leaders did not fail to appeal to racial sentiment in order to rally their followers. Modern nationalism, unlike earlier manifestations of a similar spirit, tend to attach tremendous importance to language. It would be tempting then to suggest that some particular significance attached to the year 1892, when members of the Badr Khan family began the publication of a newspaper called *Kurdistan*, numbers of which appeared at intervals until 1902 in towns as far apart as Cairo, London and (of all unlikely places) Folkestone, England. But in 1892 Hajji Qadir of Koi (*circa* 1817-1894),

whose patriotic poems in Kurdish are still recited with approval, was already seventy-five years old and thus formed an unbroken literary link with the days when the Baban principality was, in the words of another poet, 'neither subject to the Persians, nor slave-driven by the House of Osman.'

The first Kurdish political club was founded at Constantinople in 1908 by Amin Ali Badr Khan and General Sharif Pasha of Sulaimani. There was a revival of literary activity during the brief honeymoon after the Young Turk revolution of 1909, when periodicals, anthologies and the like were published at Constantinople in both the northern dialect of Bohtan and the southern dialect of Sulaimani. The preeminence in the south of the language of Sulaimani, which has since established itself as the standard vehicle of literary expression not only in Iraq but also on the Persian side of the frontier, is probably due in part to the patronage extended to letters by the later Baban princes, and in part to the foundation at Sulaimani by the Turks of a military school, cadets from which went on to the academy and staff-college at Constantinople, and so reached a level of education denied to other Kurds;¹ these same officers naturally supplied the intellectual element indispensable for a nationalist movement.

A fresh fillip was given to Kurdish aspirations by the military defeat of Turkey in 1918, and by point 12 of President Woodrow Wilson's 'programme of the world's peace' enunciated in January of that year, which stipulated that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be 'assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.' Sharif Pasha headed a Kurdish delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris and secured the insertion in the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August, 1920) of provision for the creation in the north-eastern vilayets of Turkey of an independent Kurdistan which the Kurds of Mosul vilayet would have the right to join.

IV.

When the armistice between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Mudros on 30 October, 1918, the British forces pursuing the defeated enemy up the Tigris were about 40 miles south of Mosul city; they were also in occupation of the line of little towns on the high road between Kifri and Altun Köprü. The Turkish troops were required to be clear of the whole of the Mosul vilayet within a fortnight. British policy, dictated by military considerations but nevertheless in full accord with

¹ It was at Sulaimani in 1918 that Kurdish was first made the official language of the administration; a consequence of this was that a large proportion of the officials in the other Kurdish districts later on were Sulaimani men.

the idealistic spirit of the time, was at first to avoid commitments in the hills by setting up one or more semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces, to be loosely attached to whatever regular administration might eventually be established in the plains. Even before the armistice contact had been established with a certain Shaykh Mahmud, head of the leading Sayyid family of Southern Kurdistan, who was informed that any Kurdish groups or tribes in the three *liwas* of Sulaimani, Kirkuk and Arbil which might wish to accept his leadership would be allowed to do so. It soon became evident, however, that the Saykh had overestimated his popularity, and his province was eventually restricted to little more than the *liwa* of Sulaimani. No similar initiative was taken in regard to the Kurdish districts in the *liwa* of Mosul, where there was no articulate Kurdish opinion.

This first experiment in Kurdish autonomy under modern conditions was not a success. Within six months the Shaykh, resenting the limitations placed on his freedom to do exactly as he liked, rebelled. After a short military operation he was captured and deported, and the *liwa* was brought under the direct administration of the Occupation Authority. But quite apart from Shaykh Mahmud's personal ambitions there was always present at Sulaimani, among all classes of the population, an abiding conviction, rooted in their history, that the place contained the germs of a revived and extensive Kurdish state of which it was the pre-ordained capital. The belief had little justification either in its physical appearance and commercial importance or in the academic attainments and political experience of its citizens, but it was always in the air. The proposal that Sulaimani with the adjacent districts should once more become an autonomous territory, therefore, had not come to the people as anything strange.

For the other political leaders the fall of Mahmud was thus no reason for renouncing the glittering prize brought so near by the Treaty of Sèvres. Assurances had been given in the British Parliament that the Kurds would not be forced to come under an Arab government against their will, and when the Provisional National Government of Iraq was formed in November, 1920, Sulaimani remained under the direct control of the British High Commissioner. Kirkuk (which then included Arbil) did accept a *Mutasarrif* (Governor) nominated by the new government, but he, like all the other officials, was a local man, and Turkish, the language of the educated urban classes (but not of the majority of the inhabitants), continued to be used for official purposes. When in June, 1921, the Amir Faysal arrived in Iraq as the candidate sponsored by the British Government for the throne Sulaimani refused to participate in the referendum; Kirkuk did participate but accounted for most of the

negative votes cast. No representative from either *liwa* attended the accession ceremonies.

A difficult situation had been further complicated by the promulgation in January, 1920, by the Turkish Cabinet of a manifesto known as the 'National Pact' which, while conceding the right to self-determination of the Arabs south of the armistice line of 1918, refused to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul vilayet. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the representatives of the Sultan nine months later, was never ratified. For the next five years the Kurds were subjected to a campaign of intensive propaganda from Turkey: threats of invasion, clandestine correspondence with urban and tribal leaders, open incitements to rebellion, warnings to 'traitors,' and pervading all, the religious appeal for loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph (until the Caliphate was abolished in March 1924). Small bodies of uniformed Turkish troops actually crossed the border at various points in support of the restless tribes. The administrative boundary in Arbil and parts of Mosul was withdrawn to the edge of the plains, and in September, 1922, the whole of Sulaimani was evacuated. Shaykh Mahmud was brought back in return for an undertaking that he would secure the expulsion of the Turks from the *liwa* and that he would refrain from interfering in the neighbouring *liwas* of Kirkuk and Arbil. But in the intoxicating mountain air these promises were soon forgotten: in November the Shaykh proclaimed himself 'King of Kurdistan,' claimed the whole country down to the Jabal Hamrin as part of his 'Kingdom,' and so far from expelling the Turks sought to use their presence as a lever to press his ambitions. In December the British and Iraqi governments, hoping to rally the more moderate Kurds to resist the aggressor, made a joint communication to certain friendly leaders recognizing 'the right of the Kurds of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government' which should send responsible delegates as soon as possible to discuss boundaries and political and economic relations; but there was nobody capable of taking advantage of the offer, which lapsed.²

The prevailing uncertainty and unrest were actually aggravated by the signature at Lausanne in July, 1923, of a Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey, for it specifically excluded the Mosul question from the settlement. In August, 1924, the dispute was referred to the League of Nations. A Commission was sent to examine the problem on the spot, and, in December, 1925, the Council awarded the vilayet to Iraq subject to guarantees that regard would be paid to the 'desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed

² The activities of Shaykh Mahmud necessitated a series of air and military operations in the years that followed; Sulaimani town itself was reoccupied by the Iraqi Army in July, 1924; but the Shaykh continued to harry the administration until June, 1927, when he submitted. He took up arms again in 1930 in sympathy with the imprisoned intellectuals (see below) but gave himself up in 1932.

for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the language of all these services.' The Turkish government at first refused to accept the decision but, by a tripartite treaty between the United Kingdom, Iraq and Turkey signed at Ankara in June, 1926, finally renounced its sovereignty over the Mosul vilayet. The administration of the three *liwas* was then assimilated to that of the rest of Iraq except in the matter of the official language and the race of the officials.

The Turkish menace was hardly out of the way when the approach of the end of the Mandate for Iraq roused misgivings among the leaders of Kurdish opinion as to the value of the guarantees. Petitions to the League were treated as treason, and in 1930 and 1931 many highly respected Kurdish intellectuals were imprisoned. When the application of Iraq for admission to the League came up for consideration in 1932 the Council required and received from the Iraqi government a written Declaration, which was to rank as part of the Constitution, reaffirming its undertakings in regard to the minorities. A special law was enacted defining the areas within which Kurdish and Turkish should be the languages of the local administration, of the law courts, and of primary education.

For the next few years there was little manifestation of political nationalism in Iraq. The hard logic of facts seemed to have persuaded the leaders, some sooner, some later, that their hopes were impossible of realization; most of them settled down quietly, salving their patriotic consciences, perhaps, with the vague idea that one day another world cataclysm might give their sons or grandsons their opportunity and that in the meantime any agitation would do more harm than good.

During the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War there were indications that the German Legation in Baghdad was spreading propaganda, especially among young men of the official classes, that the Kurds had been grossly betrayed by Britain at the end of the last war but that a victorious Germany was ready to create an independent Kurdistan after the next. But after the actual outbreak of hostilities the elder realists remained convinced that neither side was likely to alienate the Arabs for a small and internationally unimportant people like the Kurds, and preferred to take no initiative. In the spring of 1941, when Rashid 'Ali staged his *coup d'état* against the Regent and the lawful government of Iraq, Shaykh Mahmud escaped from Baghdad, where he had been living in honourable exile, and did indeed obtain some support from the younger generation and among the tribes for the idea of a revolt based on the belief that, 'the unreliability of the Arabs' having now become manifest, the Allies would no longer hesitate to give the Kurds

their 'rights'; but with the restoration of the Regent, a staunch friend of the Allies, the movement, such as it was, lost all momentum.

V.

'Do as you would be done by' is not a maxim that seems to have appealed very much to the various formerly subject peoples, in Europe or in Asia, who have been liberated since 1918, and it was hardly to be expected that the Arabs of Iraq would prove an exception. Even in Ottoman times the three vilayets had been considered as constituting a single unit, Turkish Arabia in British official parlance, and any scheme of partition on racial lines to meet the aspirations of a minority was as unpalatable as similar ideas have been to majorities elsewhere. Against any suggestion that the central government should make a special effort to conciliate the Kurds by recognizing their existence *qua* Kurds and not merely as individuals enjoying the ordinary civil liberties like anybody else, it was at first argued that since the greater part of Kurdistan lay outside Iraq any concession in this direction could only encourage the separatist tendencies of the Kurds of Iraq and that it would lead to demands for similar privileges from other racial or religious groups.

On the Kurdish side, quite apart from the initial unwillingness to accept subordination to the Arabs who had been a subject race like themselves, it was felt that the guarantees given to the League in 1925 and again in 1932 were being either ignored or at any rate grudgingly implemented. Statistics could be adduced to show that the Kurdish districts were not getting their fair share of the social services or development projects. Particularly bitter were complaints that the schools were inadequate in both quality and number, that failure to prepare and distribute school-books in Kurdish was making a mockery of the promises regarding the language instruction, and that Kurdish students were not being accepted for institutions of higher education or educational missions abroad. The big-spending Department of Irrigation was not represented in the north at all. In the sphere of Public Works there were complaints that all the emphasis was on police posts, and it was indeed the fact that even the construction of roads was for some years held back by the defeatist strategy of a Ministry of Defence which regarded them as facilities for an invader rather than a means of consolidating the administration and benefiting the population. The claim, made at the League of Nations and elsewhere, that the Kurds were always adequately represented in the Cabinet was denounced as disingenuous, since the Ministers in question, even if they could claim remote Kurdish origin, generally belonged to families long expatriated and were Arab rather than Kurdish in sentiment.

Insofar as these grievances had some foundation in fact enough has already been said to show that the prevailing state of affairs was due, in part at any rate, to political circumstances beyond the control of the government, and in part to the restlessness of the Kurds themselves which for long periods had brought the administration in a large part of Kurdistan to a standstill. Some of the neglect, too, was undoubtedly due not to malice but to a tendency, not unknown elsewhere, for the higher authorities to take more thought for the parts of the country near the center than for the distant outposts.

However that may be, the result was that just when the earlier agitators were developing into elder statesmen who, sobered by experience, no longer regarded separation as feasible or desirable there was growing up a new generation nurtured on a sense of grievance and frustration. Resentment was further embittered by insulting references to the minorities not infrequently made by pan-Arab orators in moments of fanatical exaltation. In all the countries of the Middle East the western Powers are regarded as the supporters of the old reactionary Beys and Pashas who have retained most of the political power in their own hands (the charge is unfair but it would prolong this paper unduly to examine it here). It is only to be expected, then, that disgruntled youth (and especially young Kurds with a racial added to a social grievance) should look to Russia for its inspiration. The Russians have long been the neighbours of the Kurds through the Caucasian provinces, and, as we have seen, a small part of Kurdistan lies within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Even before 1918 Kurdish malcontents in Turkey and Persia were accustomed to seek support from the Russians. For the Russians exploitation of Kurdish unrest would be nothing new, indeed something of the kind has been seen comparatively recently at the time of the short-lived 'Kurdish Republic' of Mahabad in Persian Kurdistan, and again in 1947 when Mulla Mustafa of Barzan, a fugitive rebel from Iraq, was welcomed in Soviet Armenia, given high military rank, and encouraged to broadcast in Kurdish from Erivan.

But with every year that passes any concerted armed revolt becomes more improbable. The mercantile classes, realizing as they do that economically the Kurdish north is bound hand and foot to Baghdad, have never shown any enthusiasm for anything but the mildest form of nationalism, and the programme of development now in hand must have the effect of binding the whole country together more closely than ever before. The old loyalties to religious Shaykhs and tribal Aghas have been too deeply undermined for any self-appointed leader to command a serious measure of support in any violent adventure. The complexity of modern weapons has given the government an overwhelming advantage

over tribesmen armed only with rifles and limited supplies of ammunition, and, with the advent of aircraft and new types of mechanical transport suitable for rough country, even their former advantage of superior mobility has passed to the forces of law and order. In any case, those of the old stormy petrels who are still alive have been softened by a growing dependence on the amenities of the towns and on modern luxuries brought within reach by improved communications, while their sons, most of whom have been educated in government schools, are tending to become dependent, like the rest of the new middle class, on regular employment in the army, the civil service, or the professions. Nationalistic agitation might perhaps seek to profit from any agrarian unrest, but apart from this it is likely to express itself in little more than the clandestine circulation of leaflets by societies calling themselves 'communist' or occasional localized riots by students and bazaar loafers.

Whatever the mistakes and short-comings of the past, Iraq is the one country where the existence of the Kurds as such has come to be officially recognized. In Sulaimani and Arbil especially not only is Kurdish the official language but the whole atmosphere of the administration is Kurdish. The sense of being at the mercy of an uncomprehending bureaucracy in a distant capital has been mitigated by a recent measure of devolution applying to the whole country, the Provincial Administration Law, whereby funds are placed at the disposal of, or may be raised by, the local authorities to be spent in accordance with policies locally determined. In spite of earlier handicaps Kurds have risen to the highest offices. One of the intellectuals imprisoned in 1931 has since held the portfolio of Education, and all the necessary books for the primary classes are now available in good, idiomatic Kurdish. A son of Shaykh Mahmud and one of the Shaykh's principal lieutenants, an officer of great ability, have been Minister of Social Affairs in different Cabinets. For two or three years past the Minister of the Interior (a key office, second only to that of Prime Minister) and the *Mutasarrif* of Mosul (the senior provincial governorship) have been Kurds born and bred in Sulaimani. Fair numbers of students are now being sent to Europe and America. If there was ever any justification for the old fear that the Kurds of Iraq would look north or east for their salvation, there can be very little in it now. The present Prime Minister, General Nuri al-Sa'id, has a comprehending and liberal approach to the Kurdish question. It is still too early to say that all the old wounds have been healed, but there seems to be a new spirit abroad that augurs well for the future.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

The Visit of King Sa'ud

THE visit of King Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz of Saudi Arabia to this country is one of the good omens for future Arab-American relations. Without any attempt to divine the nature of such understandings as may be reached in the conversations to take place, the truism that international amity is fostered when men of good will sit down to discuss their mutual problems surely holds. That the King was willing to make the visit at this time is not the least reason for these hopes.

While Americans will welcome the visit, not many of them, unfortunately, will have the opportunity to learn anything substantial about the man himself and his country. The American press has devoted no little space to the personality of the King and to Saudi Arabian *vignettes*, but the quality of the information has in general been deplorable. In reading one article of two columns in a newspaper published in this capital, where there is an abundance of accurate sources, the writer counted thirteen errors of elementary fact. The number does not include the invidious remarks. Other articles concentrate on an aspect of the King's life—that of his family—which might, as an act of courtesy to a pious Muslim, be ignored. If the King, like some international figures, lived his private life in public, there might possibly be some justification for expatiation on these things. But he does not.

Cultural differences, of course, often create international problems. Perhaps the King will evaluate our customs with more charity.

The Middle East in the United Nations

Not since the sessions of 1947-48 has the United Nations taken such a prominent role in

the many difficulties of the Middle Eastern scene. With much more unanimity than then, the UN has taken a stand, not so far to solve the questions, but to restore a deteriorated situation to the *status quo ante*. The preliminary results of this stand are to be examined in the Documents section of this issue of the JOURNAL.

The same events which have made an early settlement more necessary than ever have also rendered the prospects of that settlement more unlikely. These events have tended to coalesce the Palestine and Suez questions, sufficiently difficult in themselves, into one, and thus to make both less susceptible of rational examination. They will certainly not be solved in any grand, over-all *coup*, but at least the necessary disentangling process has begun.

Morocco and Tunisia

In the two newest independent nations of the Maghrib the winds of change blew more favorably than they did elsewhere in the Middle East. Social and political evolution, which began with French recognition of Moroccan and Tunisian sovereignty in March, accelerated during the quarter.

The evolution was most pronounced in Tunisia. The Government made a huge slash in the Bey's household allowances, from 1 billion francs to 90 million, and removed royal immunity from all members of the royal family except the Bey himself and the Crown Prince. The Bey was retitled King, in keeping with Tunisia's intent to shape herself as a constitutional monarchy. Control over the budget and the new standing army passed to the Constituent Assembly. There was significant evidence of democratization: suffrage for women (they had not voted in the March election), replacement of the shari'a by a civil code applicable to all

Tunisians in all legal matters, including personal status, and a strict ban on polygamy. The first three *villages d'enfants*, self-governing municipal centers for Tunisia's orphans, opened, and a program was set in motion for the rehabilitation of *babous* territories, idle tracts formerly administered by the *waqf*. Premier Bourguiba visited the U. S. in December and spoke of his country's intense desire to move among the family of modern nations yet without paying the price of adherence to any pact.

In traditionally religious Morocco the pace of social evolution was slower. Distribution of 83,000 hectares from government lands to landless peasants began in September, but the major change was the establishment in November of the first National Consultative Assembly. The members were chosen by the Sultan from lists submitted by each political party and profession; factional divisions within the Government made it essential for the Sultan to exercise his influence in this manner.

The key question for the future of both countries was the relationship with France. In October the Sultan arranged for 5 Algerian nationalist leaders to be flown from Rabat to Tunis for conferences with Premier Bourguiba toward establishing a basis for renegotiation

with France. The French diverted the plane to Algiers, arrested the five, and charged them with high treason, as French citizens. North Africa called it an act of piracy and a violation of the laws of hospitality. Riots broke out in many areas, and leaders of both governments halted talks with France.

Sober realism in Morocco and Tunisia militated against a complete break with France, however. Economic interdependence was a visible fact. In December the Sultan granted the first audience to a French official in two months. Subsequently French payments of 32 billion francs to Morocco and 16 billion to Tunisia to make up their budgetary deficits were made, and talks resumed on settlements of all questions between the nations.

U. S. interest in Morocco and Tunisia at first took the form of sympathy with their aims. In December this was amended to include an agreement in principle to extend American aid. An American mission visited Rabat and Tunis for a first-hand look at their problems. There remained no possibility that the U. S. would replace France in the Moroccan-Tunisian economic picture, but every expectation that agreements would be concluded offering economic and technical assistance.

Chronology

SEPTEMBER 1—DECEMBER 31, 1956

General (Suez)

1956

Sept. 1: The International Cooperation Administration reported that five South Asian nations, Afghanistan, Ceylon, India, Nepal and Pakistan received \$193 million in nonmilitary U.S. aid during the year ending June 30, 1956.

Sept. 2: French Foreign Minister Pineau stated again that France would use force if necessary against Egypt in the Suez Canal dispute. He also castigated the USSR for endangering world peace by its pressure on Egypt's President Nasir to reject all Western offers of mediation over the dispute.

Sept. 3: Leaders of the Trades Union Congress at its 84th conference at Brighton, England, approved a resolution opposing force to settle the Suez dispute.

Australian Prime Minister Menzies presented to President Nasir the 18-nation proposal for international control of Suez.

Sept. 5: Secret talks between the five-nation committee headed by Menzies and President Nasir over international control of Suez continued in a spirit of optimism. In London, the NATO Council received a report on the military "precautions" taken by Britain and France on the Suez situation.

Sept. 6: Prime Minister Eden summoned the British Parliament to an emergency meeting to discuss Suez.

Sept. 7: Australia's Prime Minister Menzies called an end to his committee's mission to Cairo, and said that Egypt's attitude left no room for an accord.

French officials said that President Nasir had shown no sign of making the slightest concession to the West in talks with the Menzies committee.

Sept. 8: The Menzies committee announced an extra meeting with Nasir in an effort to break the deadlock over internationalization of the Suez Canal.

Sept. 9: U.S. Secretary of State Dulles said he was not surprised at Nasir's description of the plan for international control of Suez as a "provocation."

French Premier Mollet said his government favored international operation of Suez by force if necessary.

The Suez Canal talks between the Menzies committee and President Nasir ended in deadlock. Nasir declared that any attempt to impose international control over its operations would plunge the area into turmoil.

Sept. 10: Egypt proposed a special negotiating body to work out a settlement of the Suez dispute. The body would meet to work out agreements covering the rights of all states concerned in navigation.

British and French officials met to coordinate their policies on the second phase of the Canal dispute with Egypt.

Sept. 11: Britain and France agreed to promote a mutual

economic campaign against Egypt to force her to accept international control of Suez. The first move was for the Suez Company to order its pilots to leave their jobs on the canal.

President Eisenhower ruled out any possibility of U.S. participation in any Anglo-French military action against Egypt "under present circumstances."

Sept. 12: The U.S. agreed to join Britain and France in sponsoring an international association of users of the Canal to protect their rights. The association would collect tolls from ships using the canal, use its own pilots, and pay Egypt for use of facilities provided by her. Prime Minister Eden stated that if Egypt refused to accept the association or interfered with it, Britain and other countries would be free to act "under the UN Charter or by any other means."

Sept. 13: India's Prime Minister Nehru warned the West that it risked a war with its new Suez plan.

Answering Opposition criticism, Eden said that Britain would go to the UN and not use force in the Suez dispute.

Soviet Premier Bulganin urged France to negotiate and use moderation in the Suez crisis. Yugoslav President Tito accused Britain and France of obsolete "sabre rattling" tactics against Egypt.

Sept. 15: The first Soviet pilots for the Suez Canal were reported to have arrived in Egypt. In the first official Soviet statement on the crisis, Moscow accused Britain and France of planning to seize the Canal by an act of aggression.

A resolution by the Liberal International called for a supranational regime controlling Suez similar to the European Coal and Steel Community.

Sept. 17: The Arab League Political Committee endorsed Egypt's nationalization of Suez.

The Suez Canal Company denied charges it had bribed French and British pilots not to work for Egypt.

Sept. 19: President Nasir convened a special session of the Cabinet to report on Suez developments. In Cairo the Association of Ulama of Al-Azhar University called for a political economic and cultural boycott of Western imperialist countries.

Five nations, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, announced they were opposed to an economic boycott of Egypt because of its effects on themselves.

Sept. 21: The Users' parley ended with a draft Suez plan that omitted any drastic action against Egypt.

Sept. 22: France decided to join the Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) "with reservations" and reserve freedom of action to seek full international control over the waterway.

Sept. 23: Britain and France took the Suez dispute to the UN Security Council for discussion.

Nehru criticized President Nasir for the way Egypt

had nationalized the Suez Canal. He said he did not object to Egypt's right, but felt that every country had a right to use the canal.

Convoys in the canal fell three hours late as a reduced pilot staff worked around the clock.

French Premier Mollet expressed anxiety and bitterness over Western disunity on Suez, and compared it to Anglo-French solidarity on the same issue.

Sept. 25: The U.S. Treasury Department disclosed that it was investigating whether regulations barring payment of Suez tolls to Egypt would apply to U.S. owners of vessels flying foreign flags. The effect would be to reduce the present 35-45% of tolls now received by Egypt in half.

The U.S. formally tied Egypt's Suez Canal authority that Soviet pilots would not be taken aboard U.S. warships passing through the Canal.

Sept. 26: The Security Council agreed to debate both the British-French complaint against Egypt for nationalizing the Suez Canal and Egypt's counter-complaint. The U.S. cast the deciding vote for inclusion of the Egyptian complaint on the agenda.

Egypt issued a stamp commemorating the July 26 nationalizing of the Suez Canal.

Secretary of State Dulles said that Egypt would eventually have to accept a reasonable settlement of the Suez dispute because economic consequences would automatically follow nationalization.

Eden and Mollet conferred toward a possible reversal to a "tough" policy on Egypt.

Sept. 27: British and French officials announced a policy of "complete unity" on Suez. They urged the Security Council to recommend international control.

Seven nations, Turkey, Italy, Holland, Australia, Denmark, West Germany and Pakistan accepted invitations to the third Suez parley called by the West.

A joint statement issued by India's Prime Minister Nehru and King Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia said that "political and economic pressure on Egypt would only retard" peaceful settlement of the Canal dispute.

Sept. 28: War risk rates on shipments through the Suez Canal were reduced 50%.

Sept. 29: A total of 10 American pilots were reported training for the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority.

Oct. 1: A Suez Canal Users' Association was formally inaugurated with a membership of 15 nations. Of the Middle Eastern nations, Pakistan and Ethiopia sent observers to the inauguration but did not join. Iran and Turkey became members. Three committees were set up under the association, one to prepare by-laws and regulations for a council to be composed temporarily of ambassadors of the member countries, one to study operational problems caused by any future failure by Egypt to maintain normal canal traffic, and one to plan financing.

The Egyptian Canal Authority said that 1,192 ships passed the Suez Canal in September, as compared with 1,197 for September, 1955.

Oct. 3: Dr. Hilmi Bahgat Badawi, chairman of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, arrived in New York for

talks with U.S. oil and shipping executives. He said his major objective was to seek a larger volume of traffic from U.S. sources.

Oct. 4: The Suez Canal Users' Association agreed to set its operating budget at \$140,000 for the first three months, with each member contributing equally.

Oct. 5: Secretary Dulles said that the U.S. would support the Anglo-French proposal for UN endorsement of a plan for international operation of the canal.

Oct. 7: Britain urged the U.S. to force American ships to stop paying canal tolls to Egypt.

Oct. 8: Egypt and the USSR rejected international operation of Suez in the UN, but said there was room for negotiation on an undefined amount of international participation.

Oct. 9: Britain, France and Egypt began talks to effect a compromise solution on the Suez dispute.

Oct. 10: R. A. Butler, leader of the House of Commons, said that the Conservative Party was "a bit critical" of U.S. policy in the Suez dispute.

Oct. 12: Britain, France and Egypt adopted 6 principles governing operation of Suez, but a deadlock ensued when Egypt rejected the insistence of the two Western nations for international operation. The 6 principles were general in nature.

President Eisenhower authorized the Office of Defense Mobilization to make a survey of U.S. tanker needs and if necessary construct more tankers to bypass the canal.

Oct. 13: A Soviet veto of a key section of the British-French resolution on Suez blocked Security Council action on the resolution, but the Council unanimously adopted the 6 principles for future talks.

Oct. 14: Britain asked the U.S. to join in getting the S.C.U.A. started immediately.

Oct. 15: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan said that all states, including Israel, should have equally free use of the Suez Canal.

Egypt's Foreign Minister Fawzi denounced Britain's suggestion of using force as a last resort over Suez. He said this contradicted the 3rd principle of the joint Anglo-Franco-Egyptian resolution that the canal should be "insulated from politics."

Oct. 16: India presented a revised Suez plan calling for Egyptian operation in cooperation with user interests. Disagreements between either group on payment of tolls or discrimination of users would be decided by arbitration or by the UN.

Secretary Dulles said the U.S. stood by its pledge to oppose aggression in the Middle East and to assist victims of aggression.

Oct. 17: A committee of the Council of Europe proposed a new international body to run the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Convention. Voting rights would be decided on the basis of shipping tonnage using the canal and the extent of dependence of a nation's economy on canal traffic.

France's Ambassador to the U.S. said that the dispute could be settled only by international operation, unless Egypt devised a more efficient system. He said

that an efficient system must apply the 6 principles, must be accompanied by a system of operation or sanctions in case of violation, must guarantee the rights of all powers concerned.

Oct. 18: The Arab League reaffirmed unanimous support of Egypt in the Suez dispute.

Oct. 19: Eyvind Bartels, Danish Consul-General in New York, was named Administrator of S.C.U.A.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov denied that his country was considering financing of the Aswan Dam.

France demanded an explanation from Egypt over the seizure off Algiers by the French of a ship allegedly Egyptian and loaded with arms for Algerian rebels.

Oct. 23: Britain and France agreed to reject vague Egyptian advances toward a reopening of the Suez negotiations, as having no real foundation.

Oct. 27: Aristotle Onassis, millionaire tanker fleet owner, presented the Egyptian Government with a formal application to lay a 120-mile pipeline along the Suez Canal from Port Taufiq to Port Said. The line would be capable of handling 150,000 bbls. of oil a day. According to Onassis the cost per ton of moving oil through the pipeline would be about 1/2 the present canal tolls for tankers.

The U.S. said it was continuing its \$40 million aid program for Egypt despite the Suez dispute.

Oct. 28: Britain denied that it had planned any exploratory talks with Egypt and France over the Suez crisis after the opening of the UN General Assembly.

Oct. 29: The U.S. asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to deal with the new threat of war in the Middle East caused by Israel's advance into the Sinai peninsula.

Oct. 30: The U.S. protested to Britain and France against their ultimatum to Egypt, and said it was prepared to stop economic aid to Israel until that state withdrew its troops from Egyptian soil.

Britain and France vetoed 2 separate U.S. and Soviet resolutions in the UN calling for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Egypt. The reason given was that the UN could not act quickly enough to deal with the conflagration.

The West German government asked its missions in Cairo, Damascus and Amman to evacuate German citizens from dangerous Middle Eastern areas.

Oct. 31: Israel accepted and Egypt rejected an appeal from France and Britain to cease hostilities. Israel agreed to withdraw 10 miles from the canal.

The French National Assembly approved by a vote of 368 to 182 the ultimatum to Egypt and Israel that was expected to lead to Franco-British occupation of Suez within a few hours.

The UN Security Council, by a vote of 7 to 2, called an emergency meeting of the General Assembly to debate "actions undertaken against Egypt."

British bombers attacked military targets in Egypt. An Egyptian frigate was sunk in the Gulf of Suez.

India's Prime Minister Nehru denounced Israel, France and Britain for their aggression against Egypt. He expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to keep the

war from spreading. The USSR also branded the three countries as aggressors.

The U.S. suspended plans to supply Britain and France with oil in the event their supplies from the Middle East were cut off.

Nov. 1: The U.S. proposed a ceasefire in Egypt and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the Egypt-Israel armistice line. The proposal was made at the opening of an emergency UN General Assembly session.

Prime Minister Eden said Britain would welcome eventual UN control of the Suez Canal. He hedged the statement by adding that he would endorse such action only after stabilization of the Canal area.

Britain was divided on the intervention in Egypt. Laborites and students bitterly attacked it. In other areas, Ceylon, Indonesia and India condemned Britain, while Australia called the move necessary.

Nov. 2: British and French warships closed in on the Suez Canal after an all-day pounding of Egyptian airfields by air fleets. More than 50 Egyptian aircraft were reported destroyed on the ground and 40 or more seriously damaged. French sources reported destruction of an Egyptian frigate. A blockade ship was sunk in the canal by the Egyptians in Lake Timsah. Total neutralization of the Egyptian air force was claimed by the Anglo-French forces.

French Foreign Minister Pineau hurried to London to consult with Eden on a way to complete the occupation of the Suez Canal before a UN ceasefire could go into effect.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution for a ceasefire in Egypt by a vote of 64 to 5. The Asian-African bloc then appealed to Secretary Hammarskjöld to deal with the situation.

Nov. 3: The U.S. offered a 2-part plan for peace in the Middle East to the UN. It called for 2 committees to be established, one to seek a "final settlement" of the Palestine dispute, the other to obtain immediate reopening of the Suez Canal.

British bombers turned from attacking airfields to ammunition dumps and depots of the Egyptian Army. In London, Anthony Nutting, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, resigned because of disagreement with the Government's intervention in Egypt. Prime Minister Eden announced Britain would guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli forces after the Anglo-French occupation of Suez.

Britain and France rejected the UN call for a ceasefire, and offered the General Assembly a counterproposal designed to bring their independent military action under UN authority. They gave 3 conditions for stopping their military operations; these were: 1) Israeli-Egyptian acceptance of the UN police force; 2) that the UN create such a force and maintain it until Israel and the Arab states agreed on a peace and until satisfactory arrangements were made regarding the Suez Canal; 3) that pending the creation of a UN force, Israel and Egypt accepted a British-French occupation zone between their forces in the name of the UN.

Egypt announced her forces had beaten off a British-

French invasion of the southern end of Suez. She claimed a total bag of 57 British, French, and Israeli planes since the beginning of the attack.

Nov. 4: Soviet notes to Britain and France accused the 2 countries of being aggressors and violators of international agreements, and protested their closing of parts of the Mediterranean and Red Seas to commercial shipping.

British and French bombers continued shuttle bombing of Egyptian military and strategic targets.

Nov. 5: Port Said fell to Anglo-French paratroops.

The UN rejected a Soviet suggestion that a U.S.-Soviet force be sent to Egypt to stop the fighting.

The U.S. warned the USSR that it would oppose any Soviet intervention by force in the Middle East.

Leaders of the Baghdad Pact countries, minus Britain, met in Tehran to discuss the Middle East crisis.

Nov. 6: The USSR warned Britain and France it was prepared to use force to restore peace in the Middle East. Israel also received the warning.

Nineteen Asian and African countries demanded a UN resolution ordering British, French, and Israeli forces out of Egypt.

Nov. 7: British and French troops ceased fire in Egypt and stopped their advance on the Suez Canal zone. Their troops were reported 30 miles south of Port Said.

The UN General Assembly by a 65-1 vote, with 10 abstentions, called for a British-French-Israeli withdrawal from Egypt.

Peiping Radio announced that 280,000 Chinese had volunteered for military service in Egypt. The USSR also was reported receiving volunteer requests.

Nov. 8: Egypt agreed to allow the entry of 10 UN observers to supervise the ceasefire. Israel also agreed to withdraw her troops from Egypt as soon as the proposed UN police force was organized.

Indonesia announced it would participate in the UN emergency police force for the Middle East.

Baghdad Pact members Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran condemned Israeli aggression and called on Israeli, British and French forces to quit Egypt.

France barred all Egyptians from leaving the country.

Nov. 9: Advance units of the UN police force, composed of Danes and Norwegians started for Egypt.

Britain said its ground forces would be redeployed in the eastern Mediterranean after withdrawal from Egypt.

Egypt agreed "provisionally" to formation of a UN police force for the Suez Canal.

Nov. 10: The USSR said it would permit "volunteers" to go to Egypt to fight "aggressors" if Britain, France and Israel refused to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory.

The UN voted to place the Middle East crisis before the regular annual session beginning Nov. 12 as a matter of priority.

Egyptian hospital officials in Port Said said that over 1000 soldiers and civilians were killed in the 2-day battle for the city.

Nov. 11: The first contingent of UN police forces for the Suez Canal arrived in Italy.

British and Egyptian forces exchanged fire south of El Cap on the Port Said-Ismailia road.

British estimates were that 50 ships had been sunk in the Canal. British sources also estimated that Egypt had received £150,000,000 worth of military equipment from the USSR in a little more than a year. This included about 50 Ilyushin bombers, 300 medium tanks, 400-500 field guns, and various types of naval craft. A comparable amount went to Syria.

British Foreign Secretary Lloyd advocated the creation of a permanent UN police force for peace.

Nov. 12: The UN opened its regular 1956 session.

The Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR said that more than 50,000 Soviet citizens had volunteered to serve with Egyptian forces.

UN Secretary Hammarskjöld said that Egypt had agreed to entry of the UN police force into Suez. Egypt demanded guarantees of its sovereignty, and said the force would have to be withdrawn if Egyptian approval were removed.

Britain announced it would keep the Suez Canal open after it had been cleared for the benefit of all nations.

Two photographers, an American and a Frenchman, were killed attempting to cross Egyptian lines in Suez.

The House of Commons rejected by 321 to 259 a motion of censure of the Government's Suez policy.

British casualties in the attack on Egypt totalled 113, with 16 dead and 97 wounded.

Nov. 13: Departure of the first contingent of troops for the UN police force in Egypt was postponed.

The Arab League met in Beirut for discussions. Egypt's Ambassador to London, 'Abd al-Hamid Ghalib, represented President Nasir, the Sudan, Libya and Yemen were represented by deputies. The other Arab league states were represented by their leaders.

Ten UN observers arrived in Port Said.

The USSR charged the U.S. with military preparations in support of the aggressors in Egypt. The U.S. warned that it would oppose any Soviet intervention in the Middle East.

Nov. 14: Egypt denied asking for Soviet volunteers.

UN Secretary Hammarskjöld left for Egypt to work out plans for the projected UN police force.

Nov. 15: The first two contingents of the UN police force, 95 men from Norway and Denmark, left for Suez.

Nov. 16: Hammarskjöld arrived in Cairo to oversee deployment of the UN police force. U.S., British and French officials agreed that the force should be stationed along the Canal and the Israel-Egypt border.

The USSR ended its threat to send volunteers to fight with Egyptian forces in the Suez Canal. The U.S. again warned against any Soviet intervention in the Middle East, and urged that Britain, France and Israel withdraw their troops immediately.

The Arab League concluded their discussions in Beirut with resolutions to act independently of the UN

Security Council in taking any necessary measures against France, Britain and Israel. They agreed that in case of further fighting in Egypt they would apply Article 2 of the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1952.

Nov. 18: Egypt asked the UN to assist in clearing the Suez Canal of obstructions. The UN police force was increased to 500 with the landing of 150 Scandinavian soldiers.

Nov. 19: The UN began investigating the first truce break, reported when Egyptians fired on Allied positions near El Cap. Egypt accused France and Britain of brutality against civilians in Port Said.

Canada decided not to send combat troops to Egypt but to provide ferry planes and administrative help.

Nov. 20: Hammarskjöld called on Britain, France and Israel to explain their failure to withdraw from Egypt in compliance with the UN-sponsored ceasefire.

The UN ordered a unit of its new Emergency Force to go to Port Said to "prevent friction" between the population and the British and French forces there.

Nov. 21: France informed the UN that it would withdraw French forces as soon as the Emergency Force could take over control of Suez. Foreign Minister Pineau said that one-third of French naval personnel in Egypt had been withdrawn. Britain announced that one of her battalions had left Egypt as a "gesture of good faith." Israel stated that its forces had withdrawn along the entire Egyptian front.

A crowd of about 20,000 Egyptians greeted the arrival of the first UN police force contingent in Port Said in a noisy demonstration.

Members of the Baghdad Pact, minus Britain, continued meetings begun Nov. 18. President Mirza of Pakistan left Baghdad, site of the meetings, for Saudi Arabia, to try to persuade King Saud to join the talks.

Nov. 22: Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns landed in Cairo to assume command of the UN Emergency Force. At the General Assembly, Secretary Hammarskjöld requested \$10 million to cover initial costs of the force.

U.S. representatives at the UNESCO conference in New Delhi opposed the Arab states' restrictions on travel of persons of Jewish faith engaged in non-political activities.

Brazil approved a law to authorize sending 1 battalion of troops to Suez for the UN force.

Two Egyptians were killed in disorders in Port Said following the arrival of Norwegian troops there.

Nov. 23: Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov demanded the immediate withdrawal of Britain, France, and Israel from Egypt. The Asian-African bloc in the UN supported him.

The Egyptian Government was reported to have begun deporting Jews on charges of collaboration.

The Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact declared they would take all necessary measures against subversion in the Middle East. They pledged they would work in harmony with the UN Charter.

Nov. 24: The UN by a vote of 63 to 5 called on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Egypt.

The Egyptian government confirmed that it was

deporting "Zionists" and British and French citizens.

The Egyptian governor of Port Said said that the 2-day war had cost 3,000 lives and £10 million in property damage. He gave the figures as rough estimates.

The UN authorized Hammarskjöld to appoint a committee to begin clearing the Suez Canal.

Nov. 25: Maj. Gen. Burns conferred with British and French commanders in Port Said, on the military and logistic aspects of further UN force movement into the Suez Canal area.

Nov. 26: The UN approved by 52 to 9 a resolution to appropriate \$10 million for the UN police force. Under the resolution each nation providing a unit would be responsible for all costs of equipment and salaries, while all other costs were financed outside the normal budget of the UN.

Britain charged that Egypt's expulsion of British and French nationals was in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention protecting noncombatants. Egypt denied the charge and stated that they had been placed in protective custody because of the people's anger, but were subsequently free to leave.

Nov. 27: Egypt informed the UN she would ask for sanctions against Britain, France and Israel if they did not give a satisfactory answer on the date they would complete withdrawal of their troops from Egypt. Egypt added that she was engaged in a full-scale buildup of defenses in Cairo and the Suez Canal zone because of suspicion of British and French intentions.

About one-third of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons assailed the U.S. and the UN for their attitude toward Britain in the Suez crisis.

The World Jewish Congress said that Egypt's chief rabbi, Hayim Nahum, had resigned in protest against treatment of Jews there.

Gen. Burns announced that the UNEF in Port Said would be increased to the size of a battalion. It would be stationed in Port Said and Port Fuad. The arrival of 160 Indian troops increased the unit to 1,415 men.

Nov. 28: Norway charged that Egypt had refused to permit 2 stranded Norwegian ships to leave the Canal. Egyptian authorities had described the ships as too big to pass an emergency channel opened by the British and French the previous week.

The American Jewish Committee charged in Paris that Jews in Egypt were being imprisoned, threatened with expulsion or internment, and faced with loss of citizenship.

British Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that the difference between Britain and the U.S. on Middle East policy remained unchanged.

Secretary Hammarskjöld said that within a fortnight the UNEF would have 4100 men in Egypt.

Nov. 29: The U.S. announced it would view "with the utmost gravity" any hostile move against the Middle East members of the Baghdad Pact.

Pakistan urged the UN General Assembly to set up a permanent police force to enforce the rule of law in international disputes.

Britain set the following terms for a phased with-

drawal of her troops from Egypt: an adequate UN force, speedy clearance of the Canal, and future negotiations to settle operation of the Canal.

The USSR suggested that Israeli troops who had invaded Egypt be tried as war criminals.

A Yugoslav force of 721 men for the UNEF reached Port Said.

Nov. 30: The French Foreign Ministry said that French citizens in Egypt were being treated in violation of the principles of international law. It said 65 French nationals were held in prison.

Danish troops of the UNEF took over British front-line positions in El Cap, to form a buffer between Anglo-French and Egyptian forces.

Dec. 2: The Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. urged that a UN "buffer" mission be established between Iraq and Syria to prevent hostilities.

British occupation authorities in Port Said gave an ultimatum to shopkeepers ordering them to open. Ninety percent of Egyptian shops had been closed for almost a month in protest against the invasion.

Dec. 3: Hammarskjöld ordered the UNEF to be ready to take over from British and French forces in the Port Said area by the middle of December.

The U.S. urged speed in clearing Suez. It said that clearance operations should begin immediately on the British-French promise to withdraw from Egypt. Both Britain and France promised to do so.

The General Assembly Administrative & Budgetary Committee approved by 41 to 10 a recommendation that the immediate cost of the UNEF be met by using idle cash in special UN accounts, such as the children's fund and the technical assistance program.

The British Admiralty suggested a 3-stage program for clearing Suez. Stage 1 would be clearance of a channel suitable for ships of 25-foot draft and 60-foot beam; stage 2, clearance of all remaining wrecks; stage 3, removal of debris from berths and dispersal of wrecks from the canal altogether.

Dec. 4: The Egyptian "shadow" administration in Port Said imposed a total boycott on Anglo-French forces.

India's Prime Minister Nehru denounced the British suggestion that a Suez settlement should be on the basis of the 18-nation proposal adopted in London in August. He said no settlement could take place until the foreign troops were withdrawn.

Dec. 5: British Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that UN failure to keep peace in the Middle East had led to Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. He declared the operation had halted a general war there and exposed Soviet infiltration.

The UNESCO conference in New Delhi ended with resolutions to promote better understanding between East and West and the carrying out of scientific research on arid lands.

The Ambassadors of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan proposed in Washington that the Baghdad Pact be linked to NATO. In Baghdad, Iraqi Foreign Minister Basha'yan urged that Egypt and the U.S. join the Pact.

Egyptians burned down the Port Said Woolworth store and continued the boycott of Anglo-French forces.

Dec. 6: The House of Commons endorsed the Eden Government's policy of intervention after 2 days of debate, by a vote of 327-260.

More than 1500 Europeans in Port Said prepared to leave Egypt.

Dec. 7: The U.S. Navy announced it would send a goodwill fleet to the Middle East later in the month.

About 3000 Egyptians paraded in mourning in Port Said for residents killed in the fighting.

Dec. 8: The British seized large quantities of arms smuggled into the Port Said area, and arrested 6 Egyptians.

Lt. Gen. R. A. Wheeler, named as aide to Dag Hammarskjöld to take charge of the Suez clearance project, arrived in Cairo.

The USSR withdrew its threat to send volunteers to the Middle East to fight with the Arabs. It said the British-French-Israeli pledge to withdraw from Egypt made the promise unnecessary.

Dec. 9: Egypt's Interior Minister Muhi al-Din said that 1452 out of a total of 18,000 British and French citizens had been expelled from the country.

Port Said was declared out of bounds for British and French troops as the UNEF moved in. The Egyptian boycott of allied forces ended.

Dec. 12: France and Britain protested to the UN of Egyptian mistreatment of their citizens there.

Sixty-four Jews deported from Egypt reached Israel.

Dec. 13: A British major in Port Said was injured by a bomb thrown in the window of his car. In an attempt to check all terrorist activity, the British command banned all bicycle traffic and limited motor traffic.

France asked the UN to take up Egypt's treatment of French residents in Egypt. The French said 740 French citizens had been arrested since the Nov. 7 ceasefire, and the 8000 French residents of Egypt told to get out by Dec. 18.

Britain said she would not allow salvage ships of the Royal Navy to be used for clearing Suez unless their crews were also employed.

Dec. 14: A Yugoslav contingent of the UNEF reported it had been halted by Israeli forces while on its way to the Gaza Strip.

One Briton was killed and 4 Egyptians wounded in terrorist bomb attacks in Port Said.

The 11 Arab states in the UN charged that Israel had applied a "scorched-earth" policy to Sinai before evacuating the peninsula. They also protested the Oct. 29 shooting of 48 Arab residents in Israel.

Dec. 15: UN troops opened fire on Egyptian guerillas in Port Said to break up an attack on a French jeep. In other actions, British troops set up a wire barricade separating the Arab quarter from the waterfront. UN chief Burns protested to Egypt over the attack.

Dec. 16: British forces turned over all but a narrow waterfront perimeter of Port Said to UN forces. In

riots throughout the night, 1 British officer and 25 to 40 Egyptians were killed and 100 injured.

Dec. 17: Britain criticized the UN delay in getting clearing operations in Suez underway. She said that if the safety of British crews and salvage equipment were not guaranteed by the UN, the salvage fleet would leave Egypt with the withdrawing troops.

A French Foreign Legionnaire was killed in ambush in Port Said.

UNEF commander Burns said that Israeli forces were making another token withdrawal of 15 miles in Sinai, putting them 50 miles east of the Suez Canal.

Dec. 18: A crowd of 2000 Egyptians demonstrated in Port Said over the arrival of Egyptian police reinforcements. There was no violence.

Dec. 19: Seven Swedish officers of the UNEF became temporary administrators of Port Said, taking over from the British to govern civil affairs through the last stages of the evacuation and pending Egyptian resumption of control.

Secretary General Hammarskjöld gave Britain and France the UN program for clearing the Suez Canal. He said that the crews of 6 British salvage vessels should be "neutrals" (i.e. not citizens of Britain, France, Israel or Egypt). He agreed to let Britain place 3 officers on each vessel as observers.

Dec. 20: The French National Assembly upheld Premier Mollet's Egyptian policy by a vote of 325 to 210. The vote followed 3 days of spirited debate.

A UN General Assembly committee approved by 57 to 8 a compromise plan for raising the first \$10 million of the cost of the UNEF in Egypt. Under the plan the cost would be prorated among the 80 members on the same basis as the regular budget.

Britain agreed to place her salvage vessels under the UN flag and protection in clearing the Canal.

Prime Minister Eden denied that Britain had had any prior knowledge of Israel's attack on Egypt.

Dec. 21: Hammarskjöld told the UN that Israel had promised to withdraw its troops from Sinai by January.

Dec. 22: British and French forces completed their evacuation of Port Said.

Dec. 23: Egypt banned participation by British crews in clearance of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian army entered Port Said.

The second phase of UNEF operations in Egypt began. Indian troops began moving east to follow up the Israeli evacuation of Sinai.

Dec. 24: Egyptians blew up a statue of de Lesseps in Port Said. In the UN, Egypt demanded "adequate compensation" from Britain, France and Israel for their attack. Two UN officials were assigned by Hammarskjöld to visit Cairo for consultations on clearing the Suez Canal.

Dec. 25: Egypt said that no work would begin on clearing the Canal until the last Israeli forces left Egyptian soil, including the Gaza Strip.

Dec. 26: Egypt announced that clearance of the Suez Canal had begun at Ismailia and Suez.

Israel asked the U.S. to use its good offices to stop

Egyptian-directed raids into her territory.

A Colombian officer of UNEF was killed in an auto accident near Qantara.

Dec. 29: President Eisenhower announced that the Administration would ask Congress for authority to use political, economic, and if necessary military force to oppose Soviet aggression in the Middle East.

UN salvage crews began actual work to clear the Suez Canal, at Suez on the southern end.

More than 400 Canadian soldiers sailed for Egypt as part of Canada's contribution to the UNEF.

Dec. 30: Egypt consented to the start of full-scale salvage work on Suez.

Dec. 31: The UN assured Egypt's President Nasir that it would exert the utmost pressure on Israel to speed up their withdrawal from territory occupied in their attack on Egypt.

Afghanistan

(See also General)

1956

Sept. 3: Kabul Radio announced that Afghanistan had contracted to buy arms from the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

Sept. 4: According to further reports from Kabul on the Afghan-Soviet-Czech arms deal, Afghanistan would pay for arms purchased from the USSR and the Czechs within 8 years by extending credits to these countries toward the purchase of Afghan goods. The deal was reported separate from the \$100,000,000 economic aid given to Afghanistan by the USSR in another deal.

Sept. 7: Dean Stephen Corey of Columbia University announced that a technical assistance team from Teacher's College had left for Afghanistan to begin the second phase of an English-language training program for Afghan secondary school teachers. The team, sent under a \$997,000 grant from the International Cooperation Administration, was to work with the Afghan Ministry of Education.

Sept. 12: The ICA announced that negotiations were underway between Pan-American Airways and Afghanistan for a contract giving Pan-American overall supervision of the pilot and ground crew training of Aryana Air Lines, the Afghan national airline. The \$2,500,000 contract would be part of a \$14,800,000 program announced in August for the development of commercial air traffic in Afghanistan, under which a \$5,500,000 airport would be constructed at Kandahar.

Sept. 21: Afghanistan formally lifted the ban on entry of *New York Times* correspondents imposed Aug. 21.

Sept. 27: The first installments of war materials from the USSR and Czechoslovakia arrived in Kabul.

Oct. 2: King Zahir Shah received a message from President Nasir of Egypt thanking him for Afghanistan's continuous support over the Suez Canal crisis.

Oct. 17: Premier Muhammad Da'ud received an elaborate welcome in Moscow on his visit to the USSR.

Oct. 25: The National Assembly ratified the Draft Agreement for trade exchanges between Afghanistan and

Poland. Under the agreement Afghanistan would export \$2 million in cotton, wool, hides and other commodities to Poland in exchange for machinery, textiles, and medical supplies. The agreement would run for three years from August, 1956. The Assembly also ratified an agreement for a \$5 million loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to develop civil aviation, and a gift of \$9,160,000 from the U.S. Government for the same purpose.

Oct. 28: The Afghan Air Force received 11 jet planes from the USSR.

Nov. 5: The Cabinet in extraordinary session reaffirmed the Government declaration of Nov. 1 calling the attention of the UN to the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt as a violation of the UN Charter.

Nov. 14: An electric generating plant and an electric-powered flour mill opened in Ghazni.

Nov. 16: The Afghan Embassy in New Delhi announced that Afghanistan had offered troops for the UN police force in the Middle East. It also said that thousands of Afghans were volunteering to fight in Egypt.

Dec. 2: A joint communique issued by the Afghanistan and Pakistan Governments following talks between their respective Premiers on the Pakhtunistan question stated that both Governments were prepared to continue their efforts to remove all causes of friction between their countries.

Part of 40,000 tons of wheat purchased by Afghanistan from ICA arrived in Jalalabad.

Dec. 8: A coal deposit estimated to contain 100,000 tons was discovered near Saripul, Mazar-i-Sharif.

Algeria

(See also General, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia)

1956

Sept. 2: Two Europeans were killed and 26 injured in a bomb explosion in downtown Constantine.

Sept. 3: French reports stated that more than 3000 civilians had been killed by Algerian rebels since the revolt against French control began Nov. 1, 1954. Of these 2700 were Algerian Muslims and 363 French.

Sept. 5: Lieut. Col. Marcel Bigeard, colorful leader of the "Red Berets," the 3rd Colonial Paratroop Regiment, was seriously wounded by an Arab terrorist in Bone.

Sept. 6: French Resident Minister Lacoste warned Algerians that France had the military means to end the rebellion. He said French losses were small compared to those of the rebels.

Sept. 8: Four Arabs were found with their throats cut near Lamoriciere. Notes pinned to each body said they had been sentenced to death by the "tribunal of the army of liberation."

Sept. 10: French troops destroyed a rebel hilltop fortress near Bordj-Menaïel.

France launched a 150 billion franc bond drive to support the Government's North African policy.

Ten masked North Africans raided a hotel inhab-

ited by North Africans in Mont Germeil, a Paris suburb.

Sept. 11: Eleven French soldiers were killed in separate ambushes near Colomb Bechar and Novi.

Sept. 12: France ended military government of the Tizi Ouzou mountain area east of Algiers.

Sept. 13: The National Liberation Front ordered a general boycott of all Algerian public schools, to begin this year. It urged the boycott to stigmatize the French "war of extermination," to express national solidarity with the rebels, and to complete the break in relations with French authorities.

Sept. 14: Minister Lacoste said his Government would announce its plan for a political settlement in Algeria within a month.

Sept. 18: French troops reported killing 61 rebels in 3 engagements near Bougie and Colomb Bechar.

Sept. 19: Forty persons, including 2 French doctors and several other Europeans, were arrested in Algiers in connection with the discovery of a secret Communist cell in western Algeria. The group, known as the Freedom Fighters, was described as planning to aid the National Liberation Front.

Sept. 21: A French unit was overwhelmed south of Palestro by a rebel ambush. Seventeen were killed.

Sept. 23: The French War Veterans Coordinating Committee in Algiers voted a motion rejecting proposals for a federal relationship between France and Algeria to solve the Algerian crisis.

Sept. 24: 'Abd al-Rahman Faris, former speaker of the dissolved Algerian Assembly and a champion of Algerian integration with France, came out in favor of the rebel cause.

Sultan Muhammad V of Morocco visited Oujda in eastern Morocco, on the Algerian border.

Sept. 25: Fifteen Asian-African nations asked that the forthcoming UN session consider Algeria.

Sept. 26: France postponed definition of a new status for Algeria, due to the Suez dispute.

Sept. 27: French troops killed 80 rebels and captured 8 near MacMahon in eastern Algeria.

Oct. 1: Arab children boycotted the Algerian public primary schools in Algiers, in response to a previous request of the National Liberation Front, but elsewhere in Algeria Arab attendance was normal.

Oct. 2: Fifteen Asian-African nations accused France in the UN of "genocide" in Algeria.

Oct. 3: The French Cabinet approved transfer of 200,000 acres in Algeria to landless rural families, mostly Muslim, on long-term loans and with the establishment of planting, harvesting, and marketing cooperatives to assist development of the lands. The acreage was taken from tracts granted to private development companies in the 19th century.

Oct. 5: Nine Algerians were killed in a bomb explosion on a bus in Algiers.

Oct. 6: Rebels killed 3 and wounded 24, mostly Europeans, in a raid in Bone.

Oct. 12: Hadj Messali, nationalist leader, called on France to consult with Algerian nationalists on Algeria's future.

- Oct. 17: The French National Assembly began a new debate on Algeria's future, but without new proposals.
- Oct. 22: A chartered plane carrying 5 leaders of the Algerian rebellion from Rabat to Tunis was brought down by French order in Algiers and the leaders were arrested. The leaders were enroute under protection of Sultan Muhammad V for talks in Tunis.
- Oct. 26: France appealed to the Security Council to take up her charges that Egypt had been supplying military aid to Algerian rebels.
- Oct. 28: The five Algerian rebel leaders were transferred to Paris for trial by a military tribunal.
- Oct. 29: The 5 rebel leaders—Muhammad ben Bella, Muhammad Khidr, Mustafa Lachraf, Muhammad Boudiaf, and Husayn Ait Ahmad—were formally charged with treason, of having carried on efforts "for the demoralization of the Army and the nation." As Algerians they are considered French citizens.
- Nov. 4: Ajoul Ajoul, a top rebel commander, surrendered to French authorities and urged his followers to rally to France. He called the conflict "profitless."
- Nov. 7: French troops wiped out 2 rebel bands north of Turenne in eastern Algeria.
- Nov. 10: French troops killed 56 rebels and captured 33 in a 3-day battle on the edge of the Sahara.
- Nov. 18: The French reported that the arrest of Hadj Ould 'Umar, political and military chief of the rebels in Oran Department, had broken the rebel chain of command in western Algeria.
- Nov. 19: French troops completed a 17-day sweep of the area between Djelfa and Bou Saada, south of Algiers. Rebel casualties were 1515 killed and 65 captured. The area was reported "open."
- Nov. 20: Four Europeans were killed near Tiaret.
- Nov. 23: The French Cabinet backed Algerian Resident Minister Lacoste's policy of suppressing the rebellion by force.
- Nov. 25: Eight French soldiers were killed and 10 wounded in an ambush south of Algiers. After seeing the bodies a French soldier ran amok, killing 2 Jews and an Arab and wounding 15 Arabs.
- Nov. 27: The French rounded up 28 more Communists in Algeria. Seven were expelled.
- Nov. 28: Eleven Frenchmen were killed and 30 injured in severe fighting along the Tunisian frontier.
- Dec. 5: The French Cabinet adopted decrees authorizing the dissolution of 333 Algerian municipal councils controlled by Europeans and creating new ones. European leaders in Algeria called the decrees unjust and unconstitutional.
- Dec. 8: The 4th French Mechanized Infantry Division killed more than 100 rebels in a sweep in the Jebel Amour Range between Aflou and Geryville.
- Dec. 11: The mayors of 82 Algerian cities and towns agreed to resign on the day the French Cabinet's new decree dissolving 333 municipal councils went into effect.
- Dec. 12: Minister Lacoste ordered an amnesty for about 600 political prisoners to take effect the end of December, as a goodwill gesture.
- Dec. 13: The mayors of Constantine Department decided to accept the decree dissolving municipal councils.
- Dec. 14: The French Assembly approved by 316 to 162 a bill to create a single administration for the Sahara region.
- Dec. 17: French troops killed 25 rebels in a clash in the Nemencha Mountains.
- Dec. 21: French forces reported 100 rebel dead after 3 days of fighting.
- Dec. 22: Following an appeal by French-Muslim societies for a truce over Christmas, rebels killed 3 in 6 attacks in Algiers, and French troops wiped out a rebel band in eastern Algeria.
- Dec. 23: India's Prime Minister Nehru asserted that conditions in Algeria were worse than in Hungary. French troops defeated a rebel band in the Tebessa Mtns. near the Tunisian border, and killed 47. French officials denounced Tunisian aid to rebels as one of their major difficulties.
- Dec. 24: Twelve persons were wounded by terrorist attacks in Constantine.
- Dec. 25: Muhammad Ait Ali, prominent pro-French Arab politician, was wounded in Algiers.
- Dec. 26: Moulay Merbah, Algerian nationalist leader who had fled to Switzerland from France earlier to escape arrest, left for New York to appeal to the UN. He was secretary general of the movement. A total of 85 persons were killed and 56 injured during the holiday weekend; 65 rebels were killed.
- Dec. 27: Moulay Merbah, arriving in New York, said he hoped the U.S. would adopt a more liberal policy toward Algeria's desire for independence.
- Dec. 28: Amedée Froger, president of the Algerian Association of Mayors and a champion of French sovereignty, was assassinated by a terrorist.
- Dec. 29: Frenchmen demonstrating at Froger's funeral killed at least 3 Arabs and wounded 40 others.
- Dec. 31: Masked raiders shot up a cafe in Paris frequented by North Africans, killing 3 and injuring 10.

Cyprus

(See also Turkey)

1956

- Sept. 1: An advance guard of 150 French soldiers arrived in Famagusta as part of the Anglo-French build-up in Cyprus due to the Suez Canal crisis. The mess buildings in the headquarters cantonment of Britain's Middle East command at Episkopi were damaged by bomb explosions.
- Sept. 2: The Cyprus print shop in Nicosia was badly damaged by a bomb.
- Sept. 5: The Orthodox Church protested the arrest of Nicos Kranidiotis, general secretary of the Ethnarchy, for alleged connection with rebel activities.
- Sept. 6: The main unit of 2700 French troops to be stationed in Cyprus arrived in Limassol. They included 1400 paratroopers and 1300 airmen.
- Sept. 7: Delegates to a Trades Union conference in Eng-

- land rejected a resolution calling for withdrawal of British troops from Cyprus.
- Sept. 9: French troops on Cyprus fought off an ambush on the Famagusta-Nicosia highway.
- Sept. 11: Governor Harding warned EOKA that failure to accept British surrender terms by midnight Sept. 12 would preclude any step toward political settlement and result in an all-out attack on terrorism. Police broke up an anti-British parade in Nicosia.
- Sept. 16: Greek Premier Karamanlis charged that Britain was avoiding responsibility for events on Cyprus.
- Sept. 17: The Greek delegate to the FAO accused Britain of having defeated FAO's objectives on Cyprus by "systematically" destroying 15000 cedar trees and citrus groves on the island.
- A British judge acquitted a 20-year-old Cypriote of an attack on Roy Garrett, a Briton.
- Sept. 19: British troops sealed off the central part of Nicosia following confirmation of death sentences on 3 Cypriotes for murders committed in March.
- Sept. 21: Executions of the 3 convicted Cypriotes were carried out. Greek Cypriotes went on an island-wide strike in protest. PEKA, a new underground organization, warned in leaflets that the strike would continue for 3 days.
- Sept. 25: Lord Radcliffe, British jurist charged with drafting a constitution for Cyprus, left Britain for his second visit to the island.
- Sept. 26: A British soldier was shot by terrorists.
- Sept. 27: One person was killed and 9 wounded in scattered violence. Cypriotes in Nicosia staged a 1-hour strike protesting Lord Radcliffe's return.
- The British Foreign Office published more extracts from the purported diary of Col. Grivas, linking Archbishop Makarios to terrorism.
- Sept. 28: Four Britons were killed and 3 wounded in new outbreaks of violence on Cyprus.
- Oct. 6: Col. Grivas, alleged leader of EOKA, chided Britain with "ungentlemanly" behavior in forging a diary in his name.
- Oct. 7: British planes dropped thousands of leaflets in Cyprus pleading for abandonment of terrorism.
- Oct. 8: A Greek Cypriote was the 11th to receive a death sentence for anti-British terrorism.
- Oct. 9: British troops threw a cordon around Lythrodhonda village in a search for arms and terrorists.
- Oct. 11: A ten-day sweep of the Kyrenia Mountains by British paratroops resulted in the capture of 6 men described as members of the "hard core" of EOKA, and 10 other suspected terrorists. Three of the men were said to be top lieutenants of EOKA leader Col. Grivas. One of these was Andreas Hajiharalambous, who had escaped from Nicosia Central Prison in June.
- Oct. 12: A plan to partition Cyprus into 2 ethnic zones was under consideration in Britain.
- Britain asked the UN to study the alleged promotion by Greece of terrorism on Cyprus.
- Oct. 13: Gunmen shot 3 Greek Cypriotes following circulation of leaflets warning against "traitors."
- Oct. 20: A professional gambler was killed in Nicosia.

Oct. 23: Governor Harding commuted the death sentence for a Cypriote gunman to life imprisonment.

Oct. 27: Greek Premier Karamanlis said that U.S. Ambassador Allen had failed fully to evaluate Greece's position on the Cyprus issue. The statement was in reply to Allen's speech in which he said that the British-Greek dispute could be solved only by negotiation.

Oct. 28: Two British soldiers were killed as Greek Cypriotes celebrated OXI Day, the 16th anniversary of Greece's rejection of Mussolini's surrender terms.

Nov. 4: A total of 7 Britons were killed in 24 hours.

Nov. 7: Censorship was lifted on Cyprus.

Nov. 11: A new curfew for Cypriotes up to 27 years old was set after a British civilian was shot in Limassol.

Nov. 12: Six British soldiers were given prison sentences ranging from 4 months to 1 year for having participated in a mutiny on Cyprus.

Two teenage Greek Cypriote girls went on trial on charges of carrying bombs. A total of 17 British dead and 14 wounded was reported for the week.

Nov. 16: Seventeen British soldiers were injured in an explosion at a British camp in Paphos District.

Nov. 17: All Cypriote youths were put under a house curfew.

Nov. 18: The death toll for Britons in November rose to 38, the highest on record.

Nov. 26: Governor Harding arrived in London for talks on a new constitution for Cyprus.

Nov. 28: Charles Foley, editor of the *Times* of Cyprus, was accused of printing an article "disturbing" to British security measures on the island.

Nov. 29: EOKA leader Grivas threatened in leaflets to plunge Cyprus into Turkish-Greek racial strife in an intensified war against Britain.

Dec. 2: Four persons were wounded in Nicosia terrorism.

Dec. 4: Ten members of EOKA were seized in a surprise search of villages in the Famagusta district.

Dec. 8: A British newsman, Peter Fox of *The Times* of Cyprus, was killed in Kyrenia.

Dec. 13: British Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd flew to Athens for talks with Greece on Cyprus' future.

Dec. 14: Greece unofficially rejected the new British plan for a constitution for Cyprus.

Dec. 15: Lennox-Boyd said that Lord Radcliffe's new draft constitution for Cyprus would be published Dec. 19, and appealed to Greek leaders "to suspend judgment on the proposals until they have a chance to study them."

Dec. 17: Masked gunmen killed 2 villagers in Polistipos, southwest Cyprus.

Dec. 18: Governor Harding announced the revoking of collective fines levied on Cypriotes for not resisting terrorism. Other concessions announced were release of 25 persons held under emergency regulations for political reasons; the elimination of a regulation allowing the whipping of males under 18 for certain offenses; and relaxation of laws providing for the suspension of newspapers critical of the British administration.

Dec. 19: Britain proposed limited self-government for Cyprus, under a strong governor. Other recommendations of a Government White Paper would provide for a freely-elected representative assembly and eventual self-determination. Colonial Affairs Secretary Lennox-Boyd told the House of Commons a new constitution would be introduced as soon as Britain was satisfied elections could be held without violence or intimidation. He suggested that partition of the island into Greek and Turkish areas might be the only ultimate solution. He said Archbishop Makarios would be released if he denounced the use of violence for political goals.

Dec. 20: The EOKA underground called for a 24-hour general strike to protest against Britain's offer of limited self-government to Cyprus. The call was made after leaders of the Greek majority and Turkish minority rejected the proposed new constitution. Greek objections were based on the fact that no date was set in the proposals for the granting of self-determination. Greece proper rejected the proposal, while Turkey's Premier Menderes said it contained certain suggestions which might lead to a solution of the island's problems.

Dec. 21: The strike called for by EOKA began, but there was no apparent observance of it in Nicosia, Limassol, and Larnaca. Gunmen described as "school-boys" killed a special policeman in Nicosia.

Dec. 22: Six members of EOKA were sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting against the government.

Dec. 24: Archbishop Makarios was reported to have rejected British constitutional proposals for Cyprus.

Dec. 25: Slight damage was caused by bomb explosions in several stores owned by Greeks in Nicosia.

Dec. 27: The U.S. issued a statement to the effect that it still hoped for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

Dec. 31: King Paul of Greece condemned British sovereignty over Cyprus in his New Year's message.

Egypt

(See also General, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Persian Gulf, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia) 1956

Sept. 2: President Nasir said that he would accept "any solution to the Suez Canal question that does not affect our sovereignty." He said that international control would infringe upon Egypt's sovereignty.

Sept. 3: One hundred French civilians arrived in Paris from Egypt. They said they had left Egypt upon recommendation of French consular authorities.

Sept. 4: Egypt said that it had received almost 200 offers from pilots wishing to work for the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority.

Sept. 5: The Suez Canal Company said that it was unable to retire some of its bonds or pay interest on others because of a freeze on its funds in Egypt.

The Netherlands protested orally to Egypt over the Egyptian refusal to release two Dutch dredgers that had completed their work in the Suez Canal.

Sept. 8: Egypt began advertising in Canada for pilots.

Sept. 10: The Greek freighter *Panagbia* returned to Haifa after 3½ months in Egyptian detention.

Sept. 11: Egypt announced that the ambassadors of all Arab, African, and Asian states in Cairo had expressed their support of President Nasir's proposal for new talks on Suez.

Sept. 12: Egypt said that the proposal for a users' association to operate the Suez Canal was a step toward war. Egypt announced she would abide by the terms of the 1888 Convention, but would not give up her legitimate rights or sovereignty.

The USSR newspaper *Soviet Russia* hailed Egypt's rejection of the 18-nation proposal for international control of Suez as "another blow against colonialism."

Sept. 13: Egypt declared that she could run the Canal without foreign help.

Sept. 14: Egypt began operating the Suez Canal alone as the last of about 400 foreign employees, including pilots, walked off their jobs.

Sept. 15: Egypt announced that 41 ships were moving through the Canal, 28 northbound and 13 southbound.

President Nasir said that Egypt would fight to the bitter end if the West attempted to force the proposed users' association on her.

Sept. 16: The Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions cabled the Egyptian Trade Union Congress supporting the Egyptian appeal for labor solidarity in the face of Anglo-French threats to stop the Canal from functioning.

Sept. 17: Egypt told the UN that the proposed Users' Association was a violation of the UN Charter and the 1888 Convention.

Sept. 18: Egypt decreed a ban on the activities of Christian missions and congregations, and declared a policy of trade boycott of the West, in retaliation for severe economic sanctions placed on her.

Sept. 21: Canada agreed to sell Egypt 250,000 tons of wheat worth \$20 million.

Sept. 22: President Nasir flew to Saudi Arabia for meetings with King Saud and Syrian president Quwwatli.

Sept. 24: President Nasir returned to Cairo with pledges of full support from Syria and Saudi Arabia in the Suez dispute. A joint communique issued by chiefs of the 3 Arab states demanded that the West negotiate with Egypt on control of the Canal.

Egypt filed a counterprotest with the UN Security Council on the Suez dispute, accusing France and the U.K. of endangering international peace.

Sept. 26: Five U.S. pilots arrived in Ismailia to work for the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority.

Sept. 27: The International Monetary Fund verified a loan of \$15 million made to Egypt the previous week to help her meet payments for wheat and other essential imports. The amount represented the approximate gold and dollar contribution made by Egypt to the fund.

Sept. 29: Egypt contracted for a second purchase of 200,000 tons of wheat from the USSR.

Oct. 4: Egypt cut off local currency issuances to British

shipping agents. Under new regulations all foreign currency transfers in Egypt were required to be approved by exchange control authorities.

The head of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority said that Egypt would not consider any arrangement with a consortium organized to improve the Canal, if the arrangement removed the toll-collecting function from Egyptian authorities.

- Oct. 3: India's chief foreign affairs advisor, Krishna Menon, met President Nasir to discuss Suez.
- Oct. 6: Twelve more foreign mariners, including 4 Russians, passed their final examinations as pilots on the Suez Canal, making a total of 36 accredited to the Canal Authority.
- Oct. 14: The secretary of the Arab League, 'Abd al-Khalik Hassuna, said that the 6-principle resolution adopted by the UN Security Council "could be the first acceptable basis for a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal crisis."
- Oct. 17: President Nasir said that the USSR was willing to give Egypt long-term loans to build the High Aswan Dam, but that a decision on the loans would be deferred until his projected visit to Moscow took place.
- Oct. 18: A leading British civil engineer said that if the Aswan Dam were built it would become a dwindling asset because of silt. He said that it would take more than 1½ years for water to rise to the dam's level and there would be no surplus water for driving silt downstream, as there was in the present dam.
- Oct. 24: Mahmud Yunis, Deputy Director of the Suez Canal Authority, said that 233 foreign pilots were working in the Canal, about 180 of them fully qualified and the rest in training.
- Oct. 28: A 24-hour general strike in Egypt protesting French arrest of 3 Algerian leaders halted all normal business, but no incidents were reported.
- Oct. 29: Egypt's high command said that no clash had taken place between Egyptian and Israeli forces.
- Nov. 1: Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and seized all their property.
- The sinking of an Egyptian troopship blocked the Suez Canal near the Firdan Bridge. Two persons were killed in an air raid on Alexandria. President Nasir ordered arms distributed to all Egyptians.
- Nov. 9: President Nasir said that the Egyptian Air Force was intact and that the army was prepared to continue fighting if the British, French and Israeli forces were not withdrawn quickly.
- Nov. 12: Egypt agreed with the plan of UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld for stationing a UN police force along the Israel-Egypt armistice lines in Sinai, but insisted that the force should have nothing to do with the Canal or its operations following the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces.
- Nov. 17: The Government announced that all British and French citizens remaining in Egypt would be placed in forced residence "for their own safety."
- Nov. 20: Egypt demanded that the UN set up a committee to investigate the "barbarous aggression" by

Britain, France, and Israel on Egypt. She charged the 3 nations with a conspiracy to attack Egypt.

Nov. 21: President Nasir said the Egyptians would never surrender their political and ideological freedom.

Nov. 22: Egypt said that her forces would resume fighting and accept foreign "volunteers" if the Anglo-French-Israeli troops did not leave quickly.

'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi, Rural Affairs Minister, was put in charge of clearing the Suez Canal.

Nov. 23: Nearly 20,000 French and British nationals prepared to leave Egypt after having been given a choice between expulsion and internment.

Nov. 29: A report of the apparent seizure of Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, Ltd., by Egypt, substantiated a Nov. 3 publication in the *Journal d'Egypte* of a military proclamation providing for sequestration of the company.

Egypt reported that 2 British Venom jet fighters strafed trucks and anti-aircraft guns east of Ismailia.

Nov. 30: Egypt said that British-French intervention in Egypt had forestalled a unified move by the Arab states to aid Egypt against the Israeli invasion.

Dec. 10: The British commander in Port Said protested to the UN against an Egyptian ambush of a British patrol. There were no casualties in the attack.

Dec. 11: The U.S. State Department informed Egypt of U.S. concern over reports of mistreatment of Jews there.

Egyptians kidnapped a British officer, Lt. Anthony Moorhouse, in Port Said.

Dec. 22: Schools reopened throughout Egypt, except for 50 British and French schools scheduled to reopen later under Egyptian control with Egyptian teachers.

West Germany's Foreign Minister said that he was urging his Government to stop paying reparations to Israel and pay them to Egypt instead.

Dec. 23: The dim-out ended throughout Egypt.

Dec. 27: President Nasir voiced a desire for closer ties with the USSR in a special message.

Dec. 30: Egypt began disarming civilians in Port Said.

Dec. 31: Egypt appealed to the U.S. to release Egyptian dollar assets worth \$50 million frozen in U.S. banks.

Ethiopia

(See also General, Sudan)

1956

Sept. 5: Voters in Eritrea went to the polls to elect 68 members to the Eritrean Assembly. It was the second national election since Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952.

Sept. 6: The results of the Eritrean elections showed a majority of the electorate in favor of federation.

Oct. 22: A leader of the National Front of British Somaliland declared that Ethiopia was trying to attach the Haud frontier region against Somali wishes and without any British effort to stop what he called Ethiopian expansionist policy.

Oct. 25: Emperor Haile Selassie arrived in India for a 3-week state visit.

Nov. 2: An Ethiopian provincial governor arrived in the U.S. to study the New York State election system, in preparation for Ethiopia's first national election, in June, 1957.

Nov. 26: Ethiopia asked Egypt to recall her military attache in Addis Ababa for alleged activities contrary to Ethiopian state security.

Dec. 2: The Emperor returned to Addis Ababa.

Dec. 27: The Eritrean Assembly passed a law increasing the number of Supreme Court judgeships from 11 to 19.

Iran

(See also General)

1956

Sept. 1: Iranian security forces arrested a Soviet Army major on charges of spying.

Sept. 3: A law was passed permitting importers to sell and transport their goods in any part of Iran.

Sept. 4: Iran protested a reported British statement that Britain recognized the Shaykh of Bahrain as a sovereign ruler and that only 7% of the population of Bahrain were Iranians.

Sept. 5: Iran signed a trade agreement with the USSR. Iran would exchange rice, cotton, fish and dried fruits for Soviet sugar, machinery, cars, paper, and chemical products.

Sept. 8: War Minister Vosuq stated that the bill on martial law to be passed by the Majlis would be necessary until the Ministry of Justice was strengthened by new laws and reforms to enable it to keep order.

Sept. 11: Foreign Minister Ardalan returned from conferences on the Suez Canal issue with President Nasir. He said that Iran would never agree to the use of force to settle the issue.

Sept. 13: A giant oil gusher at Qum was capped after it had spouted 2 million barrels in 456 hours. The capping was made by an American oil expert, Myron Kinley; it took 15 days.

Sept. 23: The Majlis resumed its sessions. Premier Ala said that the Qum oil discovery forecasted a glorious future for Iran.

Sept. 30: The Majlis passed the bill extending the period of martial law in Tehran and along the Trans-Iranian Railway right of way.

Oct. 6: The re-formed Iranian Supreme Court began its sessions with 9 new appointments.

Oct. 26: The Shah pardoned 64 Army officers sentenced in 1954 for taking part in a Communist plot to overthrow the Government.

Nov. 4: An earthquake in Luristan killed 350 persons.

Nov. 10: The Senate approved a bill calling for Iranian participation in the International Monetary Fund.

Nov. 11: Continuing earthquakes in the Lur region destroyed 25 villages and left 8000 homeless.

Nov. 27: Premier Ala urged the U.S. to join the Baghdad Pact.

Nov. 29: A spokesman for the Iranian oil consortium said that the effect of the closing of the Suez Canal

had not been felt. He said that it was expected that shipments could fall off as much as 25% in the next month, but that the drop would be temporary.

Iraq

(See also General, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

1956

Sept. 6: Baghdad ulama sent a telegram to Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali denouncing Pakistan's attitude on the Suez Canal problem during meetings of the London Conference.

Sept. 8: A state of emergency was proclaimed in the Mosul area, due to a strike of butchers against increased duties on meat. The government said the strike had been inspired by subversive elements engaged in smuggling sheep into Israel.

Sept. 10: Iraq sent an official protest to France over French troop concentrations in the Mediterranean.

Sept. 13: Iraq denounced recent Israeli aggression against Jordan, and pledged military aid under the 1947 treaty of alliance with Jordan.

Sept. 17: Premier Nuri al-Sa'id told the Cabinet he had warned Britain and France against setting up a Suez Canal Users' Association, and that Iraq would not accept any solution imposed on Egypt by the Western powers.

Sept. 27: Iraq said it would ask Canada to stop delivery of jet planes to Israel.

The Iraq Development Ministry announced an agreement with Hilton Hotels International to build a Hilton Hotel in Baghdad.

Sept. 29: Minister of Economy al-Pachachi said that Arab countries should not hesitate to reach agreements with oil companies in order to gain increased royalties for economic and defense schemes.

Iraq and Kuwait agreed to unify their oil policies.

Oct. 6: Iraq and Saudi Arabia raised their diplomatic missions to embassy level.

Oct. 8: In an interview published in the London *Times*, Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Sa'id appealed for a settlement of the Palestine problem by persuading Israel to negotiate with the Arab states on the basis of the 1947 UN partition proposal.

Oct. 10: Four Iraqi Communists who had recanted were pardoned by royal decree.

Two Iraqi transport planes carrying arms arrived in Amman, Jordan. The Iraq Embassy described them as the second consignment sent to Jordan under the 1947 treaty of alliance.

Oct. 16: Iraq held troops ready on the Iraq-Jordan border to enter Jordan in the event of any further Israeli aggression.

Oct. 23: A consignment of British arms and ten tanks arrived at Basra.

Nov. 1: Iraq ordered full mobilization following the declaration of martial law, in readiness for any Israeli attack on Jordan.

Nov. 9: Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with France.

Nov. 10: King Faysal flew to Beirut to attend a meeting of Arab rulers to discuss the Middle East crisis. Previously, on Nov. 9, Iraq had suspended diplomatic relations with France and decided to boycott any Baghdad Pact meetings attended by Britain.

Nov. 12: Iraq warned the Arab states to avoid any action that might lead to starting World War III in the Middle East, and particularly stressed the danger of inviting Russian technicians and advisors.

Nov. 13: The Government called for the elimination of Israel from the Middle East as "the only practical method to secure peace and order."

Nov. 20: Thirty-five Government officials were suspended by the Government Purge Committee.

Nov. 21: The Government declared the entire Kirkuk oil area a military zone, and barred outsiders from entering the Basra oilfields, in measures to guard oil installations.

Nov. 24: Iraq protested to Syria against Syrian allegations that large quantities of arms seized in Damascus had been sent to Syria by Iraq.

Two persons were killed in clashes between demonstrators and police in Najaf.

Nov. 25: The USSR accused Iraq of sponsoring an armed attempt to overthrow the Syrian government. Moscow claimed that the Syrian high command had seized a large consignment of Iraqi arms destined for the purpose.

Nov. 26: Finance Minister Khalil Kanna said that the Government did not intend to reduce salaries of any of its staff or suspend any development projects.

Iraq pressed the U.S. to step up arms deliveries. In particular it asked for anti-aircraft guns and airplanes. No reason was given for the request.

Nov. 29: Maj. Gen. Raghib, Military Commander of the Baghdad Martial Area, warned that strikers and instigators of disorder would be severely punished.

Nov. 30: Five opposition leaders were arrested. They included Kamal Chadurchi, a leader of the extreme left National Democratic Party, Faik Samarra'i of the extreme nationalist National Congress. The others were Husayn Jamil, president of the Lawyers Association, the dean of the Baghdad Law School, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz and Senator Muhammad Shabibi of the United Popular Front.

Schools in Baghdad were closed indefinitely due to unrest.

Dec. 1: King Faysal suspended Parliament and decreed martial law for all Iraq.

Dec. 6: Iraq warned Israel that the Arab world stood solidly behind Egypt and President Nasir on the Palestine issue. Iraqi representative Fadhl al-Jamali told the UN General Assembly that it had 2 alternatives: to restore Arab rights to their homes in Palestine and end the Israeli danger to the Middle East, or let the situation drift in such a manner as to endanger world peace.

Dec. 8: Iraq announced the removal of its troops from Jordan, sent in on Nov. 3. Meanwhile a number of Jordanian organizations sent telegrams to King Faysal

demanding the removal of Premier Nuri al-Sa'id and Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

Dec. 11: Rashid Mahmud, Director-General of the Ministry of Development, said that Iraq's development program had not been affected by loss of oil revenues. He said that program had unspent balances of \$280 million, and cash reserves sufficient to keep the program going for more than a year if the emergency continued that long.

Iraq said that its troops had been withdrawn from Jordan because the Jordan Government had demanded they be put under Egyptian command.

Dec. 15: Iraqi Minister to Syria al-Rawi left for Damascus to discuss repairing the oil pumping stations blown up by the Syrian Army.

Dec. 16: Premier Nuri al-Sa'id defended Iraq's policy of consistently demanding eradication of Israel. He said that 13 months ago Egypt's President Nasir had tried to initiate a final peace settlement with Israel. He blamed Egypt for weakening Arab unity.

Dec. 17: A report approved for publication in all Baghdad newspapers said that Parliament would propose Iraq's annexation of Jordan.

Dec. 18: Foreign Minister Bash'ayan said that Pakistan had offered more than once to send forces to help Arab armies repel aggression from Israel.

Dec. 19: The Government announced that 5 opposition deputies had been court-martialed—Kamal Chadurchi, former Minister of National Economy and Transport, was sentenced to 3 years hard labor. Suspended sentences were given to 4 others.

The accusation against Chadurchi was based on a telegram he "and non-Iraqi personalities" sent to the Senate Nov. 14 in the name of the Liaison Committee of the Arab Popular Congress, criticizing those who allowed "Arab oil to flow from Iraq to Haifa to be used by Israel against the Arab nation."

Dec. 21: A revolt of peasants at Kut al-Hai, south of Baghdad, was quelled by police, after 6 policemen were reported killed.

Dec. 23: Premier Nuri al-Sa'id declared that Egyptian President Nasir was a dictator, and that the Baghdad Pact was Iraq's business, not Egypt's.

Dec. 24: Iraq called on the U.S. to become a full member of the Baghdad Pact to help assure peace and security in the Middle East.

Dec. 26: A number of Jordanians working in Iraq were deported by the Iraqi Government.

Israel

(See also General, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria)

1956

Sept. 2: The Israeli Cabinet appointed a committee to investigate recurrent Sabbath riots in Jerusalem that culminated in the death of 1 man Sept. 1.

Sept. 5: Israel sent a letter to the UN Security Council charging Egypt with pretending to guarantee free shipping on the Suez Canal while resorting to a "brazen blockade" of Israeli-bound vessels.

Sept. 10: The Greek freighter *Panagbia*, which had been prohibited from passing the Suez Canal with a cargo of cement for Elath, returned from Port Said to Haifa.

Sept. 13: Israel hailed the Western plan for an Association of Suez Canal Users.

The U.S. agreed to sell Israel \$10,700,000 worth of farm products.

Sept. 19: Former Foreign Minister Sharett left Israel on a 2-month goodwill tour of Asia on behalf of the Israeli Government.

Sept. 21: Canada announced she would sell 24 Sabre jet fighters to Israel. The U.S. said it had no objections to such a sale. State Department officials made it plain that U.S. policy regarding such shipments was unchanged; that the U.S. opposed both an arms race in the Middle East and any serious imbalance of armed strength there.

The Soviet press attacked Israel for siding with the West in the Suez dispute and declared that Israeli leaders sought only to "profit by the crisis."

Sept. 26: The eighth oil-producing well in the Heletz area began spouting oil.

Sept. 30: A Polish delegation arrived in Israel to renew the trade agreement between the 2 states.

Oct. 2: Israel exported 6000 tons of cement to Brazil, the first ever carried there by Israeli freighter.

Oct. 3: Mary Frances Hagan, an American journalist, went on trial in Israel on charges of espionage for Syria.

The Herut Party convention ended after reelecting Menahem Begin as chairman.

Oct. 8: Israel accused Egypt in the UN of having barred the Suez Canal to 103 ships from 14 different countries. The list included 45 British ships blocked as of February, 1956, 8 U.S. ships under Panamanian registry, and smaller lists from other countries including Sweden, Greece, and Morocco.

Oct. 9: Israel released 80% of the blocked bank accounts of Arab refugees. It was announced in a report to member states from the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Oct. 10: Israel received her first cyclotron, a 100,000-volt model, from Cornell University.

Oct. 11: The Export-Import Bank announced plans to send a team of experts to Israel in connection with an Israeli request for a \$75 million loan.

Mary Frances Hagan was convicted of spying for Syria and sentenced to 1 year in prison.

Oct. 14: Israel demanded equal rights with other nations in any project for revision or reinforcement of the 1888 convention covering transit of the Suez Canal.

Israel expressed "alarm and amazement" at Britain's warning that she would act under the 1948 treaty with Jordan if Israel entered Jordanian territory. Israel objected to threatened British military intervention if she opposed the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan.

An Israel military court sentenced an Egyptian commando captured in April to be hanged.

Oct. 15: Premier Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that Israel reserved "freedom of action" if Iraqi troops

marched into Jordan. He denounced the appeal by Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Sa'id for an end to the Palestine dispute on the basis of the 1947 partition proposals as "a disguised attack on the integrity of our borders." He appealed for U.S. arms.

Israel and Poland signed a 1-year trade agreement.

Oct. 17: Ben-Gurion called Egypt's President Nasir Israel's number one peril, in a speech to the Knesset. The Knesset voted down resolutions to commit Israel to military action in the event of Iraqi troops entering Jordan, and a Communist one to force the Government to stop reprisal actions. The Premier received a 76-13 vote of confidence.

Oct. 18: Israel signed a contract with Canadair, Ltd. to purchase 24 Sabre jets, at a cost of about \$7,200,000, including spare parts.

Oct. 19: Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir told American Jewish communal leaders that the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan would be a new and grave threat to Israeli security.

Canada's Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent told the Canadian Jewish Congress that Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion had reaffirmed that jet aircraft to be sent to Israel from Canada would be used for defense purposes only.

Oct. 21: The trial of Alexander Yulin, a former Soviet Army officer accused of spying for Egypt against Israel, began in Tel Aviv.

Oct. 23: Israel pledged the UN that she would not start a war with her Arab neighbors. But she also warned she would not "sit back and suffer the consequences of a unilateral Arab belligerency."

Oct. 28: Israel mobilized Army reserves on her borders.

President Eisenhower warned Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion against taking any "forceful initiative" in the Middle East.

Oct. 30: Israeli forces were reported within 20 miles of Suez on a 70-mile front. Capture of Qusayma was announced.

Nov. 7: Premier Ben-Gurion rejected stationing of the UN police force or any foreign troops in Israel.

The Knesset supported him by 88-3 on the stand.

Nov. 16: The Army returned municipal administration in Gaza to civilian control.

Nov. 18: Israel announced plans for an oil pipeline from Elath to Haifa, on the Mediterranean.

Nov. 19: Israel reported 171 dead, including 30 officers, in the Sinai campaign. Egyptian losses were estimated at 3,000.

Israel offered to repatriate 27 Egyptian prisoners.

Nov. 20: Minister of Development Bentov disclosed that Israel planned a railway line to link Elath in the Negev with the national railway net. It would be connected with construction of a deepwater port there.

Nov. 21: Israel admitted the presence of French planes and pilots in the recent Sinai campaign.

Nov. 25: Israel announced the withdrawal of 2 infantry brigades (7-9000 men) from Sinai, and the evacuation of an area extending up to 30 miles from previous Israeli Army positions.

Nov. 26: Israel said that Jordan guerillas had crossed her border and laid mines northeast of Tel Aviv.

Nov. 28: Premier Ben-Gurion charged Egypt with imposing a "reign of terror" on Egyptian Jews. The Knesset adopted a resolution demanding action by the UN to halt persecution of Jews in Egypt.

Nov. 29: Motor vehicles were barred from Israeli roads once a week to conserve fuel.

Dec. 3: Israel announced that postal service would be started in Gaza as part of the regular Israel service on Dec. 4.

Dec. 4: Twenty-nine Jews expelled from Egypt arrived in Haifa.

Israeli Army reports stated that Arab infiltrators had blown up part of a rail line near Eyal.

Dec. 5: Israel disputed Egypt's President Nasir by declaring that Israeli forces had encountered about 2 Egyptian battalions at Sharm al-Shaykh in South Sinai during the Israeli invasion.

Dec. 10: Schools in the Gaza Strip reopened.

Dec. 11: Israel informed the UN she would withdraw further from the Sinai Peninsula and turn the area over to UN forces.

Foreign Minister Golda Meir said that while Israel would withdraw from Egypt, the Gaza Strip was a special problem.

Dec. 16: An Israeli watchman was killed in an attack on an estate in Tel Mond, 16 miles from Tel Aviv.

Israel declared that her forces had captured sufficient gasoline on Sinai to supply the needs of the entire Israeli Army for several months.

Dec. 18: Premier Ben-Gurion said that Israel would not allow Egypt to return to the Gaza Strip. He advocated demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and the Strait of Tiran, which leads into the Gulf of Aqaba and gives access to the port of Elath.

Dec. 20: Alexander Yulin, a former officer in the Israeli Army and veteran of the 1948 war against the Arabs, was sentenced to 5 years in prison as a spy for Egypt.

Hayim Nahum, chief rabbi of Egypt, said that no foreign government, especially not Israel, was authorized to speak on behalf of the Jews of Egypt. He denounced the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression "against our dear motherland Egypt."

Dec. 24: The Government set an annual budget of £1850 million for 1957-58, exceeding the current budget by £180 million.

Dec. 25: Premier Ben-Gurion refused to debate a possible withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, on the ground that it was not in the public interest. A motion to debate the issue introduced in the Knesset by Menahem Begin, leader of the Herut Party, was defeated by 52 to 18.

Dec. 26: The Red Cross said that reports from Cairo claiming that Israeli troops had ransacked the St. Catherine monastery on Mount Sinai were untrue.

Dec. 27: Israel officially opened a naval base at Elath, following the arrival of the Israeli frigate *Miznak* after a six-week voyage around Africa.

Dec. 31: Premier Ben-Gurion credited French coopera-

tion with having prevented the annihilation of Israel by Egypt.

Jordan

(See also Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

1956

Sept. 2: The British Government advised wives and children of personnel stationed in Jordan to begin leaving the country.

Jordan received 125,000 dinars from Iraq as Iraq's share in the proposed Arab Potash Company.

Sept. 4: King Husayn invited President Chamoun of Lebanon and President Quwwatli of Syria to join him in a conference on current Arab problems.

The first group of British dependents, 14, left Amman by air for England.

Sept. 6: Jordan sent a delegation to meeting of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Damascus. The meeting was called to determine measures to be taken by the Chambers of Commerce in the event of British or French aggression against Egypt.

Sept. 10: A Jordanian military invasion led by Gen. 'Ali Abu Nuwar returned from talks in Saudi Arabia.

The Arab Refugees' Conference ended in Jerusalem with recommendations that the only solution to the refugee problem, itself a basic part of the Palestine problem, was repatriation.

Sept. 12: A school building blown up by Israeli soldiers retreating from Jordan was described by Jordanian Army authorities as one built with U.S. aid for the benefit of Bedouins in the area.

Sept. 16: An Iraqi military mission arrived in Amman to discuss military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq, as an outgrowth between the previous meeting of King Husayn and King Faysal at Habbaniya.

Sept. 17: The first shipment of arms to Jordan under the terms of the Riyadh conference began.

Two leftwing candidates for parliament were arrested on grounds their activities were "harmful to the present situation." They were 'Abd al-Rahman Shuqayr and Sayyid Jawdah Shanwan.

Oct. 2: Jordan's Foreign Minister, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, left Baghdad for Amman after 5 days of talks with Iraqi officials on military aid to Jordan.

Oct. 6: Jordan announced she would withdraw existing permits allowing foreign consuls to pass from Jerusalem through Mandelbaum Gate to Israeli-occupied Jerusalem for a week, after which consuls entering the Israeli portion of the city would have to apply for entry permits. The step was taken to prevent consuls from carrying unauthorized material into Israel, according to authorities.

Oct. 10: Jordan expelled Archbishop Nersoyan, the second-ranking prelate of the Armenian Church in Palestine, for allegedly engaging in "politics."

Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Hadi arrived in Cairo to discuss strengthening of Jordan's armed forces.

Oct. 12: Britain reaffirmed her pledge to honor the

Anglo-Jordanian mutual defense treaty. After an emergency meeting of the Jordanian Cabinet Oct. 11, King Husayn renewed a request for military aid from Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.

Oct. 16: Jordan Chief of Staff Nuwar said that British jet aircraft and Iraqi troops were available immediately if Jordan needed them against any Israeli aggression. In talks with an Iraqi military delegation concluded Oct. 15, all points of disagreement on the terms of Jordanian-Iraqi cooperation were ironed out, according to Maj. Gen. Nuwar.

Oct. 17: Britain announced she would bring in her newest jet fighters to reinforce the RAF squadron stationed in Jordan.

Britain said she had made no new agreement with Jordan regarding use of RAF units in the event of an Israeli attack on Jordan.

Oct. 20: Authorities in Jordan warned the public that voting in the elections for Parliament Oct. 21 and thereafter would have to be peaceful. Voters were forbidden to carry arms, and told not to demonstrate or gather in groups after voting, but return to work.

Four new British jets arrived in Amman.

Oct. 21: Early returns from Jordan's voting showed a strong lead for anti-Western forces. Voting was generally quiet and orderly. Foreign correspondents and diplomats were allowed to observe.

Oct. 22: Results of the election of 35 out of 40 members of Parliament indicated that the majority would be anti-Western. At least 3 were Communists.

Oct. 23: Military leaders from Egypt and Syria arrived in Amman for talks with Jordan military leaders.

Oct. 24: Jordanian Chief of Staff Nuwar said that Jordan had accepted the principle of overall Egyptian command in case of war. He added that this applied only to overall strategic command.

Oct. 25: Jordan, Egypt, and Syria signed an agreement putting an Egyptian general in charge of their armies in case of war with Israel. Egyptian Minister of War 'Abd al-Hakim Amir was named commander, but only in the event of war. Egypt also gave Jordan 5 British-type jet fighters.

Oct. 26: A rumor of King Husayn's assassination proved to be false.

Oct. 27: King Husayn called on Sulayman Nabulsi, leader of the National Socialist Party and an anti-Western lawyer to form a new cabinet. The National Socialists gained 11 seats in the elections thus becoming the largest party in the 40-member House of Representatives.

Oct. 28: Demonstrators in Jordanian-held Jerusalem burned the French Consulate in protest against the arrest of 5 Algerian nationalist leaders.

Oct. 29: Premier Nabulsi formed a new cabinet as follows:

Sulayman Nabulsi—Premier, Foreign Minister

'Abd al-Halim Nimr (National Socialist)—Defense, Interior

Anwar Khatib (National Socialist)—Public Works

Na'im 'Abd-al Hadi (National Socialist)—Economy

Shafiq Irshaydat (National Socialist)—Education and Justice

Salah Mu'ashshar (National Socialist)—Health and Social Welfare

Salah Majali (Independent)—Communications

Sam'an Da'ud (Independent)—Reconstruction and Development

'Abd al-Qadir Salah (National Bloc)—Agriculture

Abdallah Rimawi (Arab Resurrection Party)—State Minister for Foreign Affairs

Salah Tuqan (National Socialist)—Finance

Oct. 30: Amid rising tension in Jordan over the Israeli attack on Egypt the French community in Amman moved to Beirut, British RAF personnel were moved to Mafraq. Jordan assured Egypt of support.

Nov. 1: Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with France. Premier Nabulsi also told Britain that Jordan would not allow British forces to use Jordanian bases for attacks on Egypt or any other Arab state.

Nov. 2: Syria and Iraq were reported moving troops into Jordan. Entry of Iraqi troops was confirmed.

Nov. 3: Strict censorship went into effect in Amman.

Nov. 6: The Grand Mufti of Jordan, Shaykh Abdallah Qalqili, urged a holy war against Britain, France, and Israel.

Nov. 8: The British Bank of the Middle East was damaged slightly by an explosion in Amman.

Nov. 10: Premier Nabulsi banned the import of all French goods into Jordan.

Nov. 20: Parliament unanimously recommended abrogation of the alliance with Britain and recognition of the USSR and Communist China.

Nov. 28: Premier Nabulsi told Parliament that Jordan would abrogate the 20-year treaty of alliance with Britain as soon as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria implemented their offer to replace the annual £12 million subsidy.

Nov. 29: The lower house of Parliament backed Premier Nabulsi's plan to terminate the Anglo-Jordan treaty.

Dec. 5: Jordan informed Britain of its desire to terminate the treaty of alliance.

Dec. 7: A 2-hour general strike was called in Jordan to protest Iraq Premier Nuri al-Sa'id's policy toward Syria and his detention of opposition leaders.

Dec. 11: Jordan announced a ban on the traditional Christmas diplomatic pilgrimage to Christian holy places in Jordanian-held Jerusalem.

Dec. 16: Premier Nabulsi urged an Arab federation of Jordan with one or more Arab states, as a solution to Jordan's problems. Commenting on a recent "purge" of Jordanian officials, he said only 4 persons were affected, and that those dismissed were "not sincere nationalists, corrupt persons, or not up to standards of efficiency."

Dec. 17: A general strike took place throughout Jordan in protest against the policies of Iraq Premier Nuri al-Sa'id and the arrest of Husayn Jamil, president of the Iraqi bar.

Dec. 27: A Jordanian political poster urging the election of Dr. Ya'qub Ziyadin (he was elected to Parliament on

the National Front ticket in October) was found pasted to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem.

Dec. 30: Premier Nabulsi rejected any suggestion he might call on the USSR for aid if financial assistance from the Arab states was not forthcoming.

Jordan reported that 2 shepherds were wounded when fired on by an Israeli patrol near the truce line.

Lebanon

(See also General, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

1956

Sept. 8: Officials from Communist China arrived in Beirut to supervise execution of the trade agreement signed between Lebanon and China August 20.

Sept. 13: Lebanon and Bulgaria signed a trade pact.

Sept. 23: Lebanon instructed its UN delegation to work for the inclusion of Algeria on the General Assembly agenda opening November 12.

Sept. 27: Lebanon rejected a proposal by IPC for arbitration on the oil company's tax dispute.

Sept. 28: Minister of State Sa'ib Salam said that Lebanon welcomed the proposed laying by Iraq of pipelines across Lebanese territory to the sea. He said diversion of the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline from Mafrak (Jordan) to Sidon (Lebanon) would be very welcome.

Sept. 30: Lebanon called for an immediate conference of the 4 Arab nations bordering Israel to coordinate defense measures against possible aggression.

Oct. 5: Opposition deputies in Parliament attacked the Government's "inept" policy of retroactive taxation of foreign companies, claiming that it was losing revenue for Lebanon.

Oct. 11: Most of the 2500 employees of IPC went on strike after 200 had received dismissal notices at the Tripoli refinery. The Company said the dismissed employees were not needed since the Lebanese Government's attitude prevented planned expansion of IPC there.

Oct. 13: Seventy engineers of the Ministry of Works ended a 3-day strike for higher salaries.

Oct. 21: The IPC said it had dropped its plan to build a pipeline to Tripoli, Lebanon, because of the Lebanese Government's refusal to arbitrate the tax dispute. It stated that work had already begun on a new link in Syria, to Banias, instead.

Oct. 31: Lebanon declared a state of emergency. President Chamoun invited all Arab heads of state to an urgent meeting to discuss Israel's attack on Egypt.

Nov. 1: Censorship went into effect in Beirut.

Nov. 3: National guard reinforcements were rushed to Tripoli after an oil pipeline there was cut.

Nov. 21: Beirut was reported under army control following violent anti-Western demonstrations.

An Egyptian military attache was linked to a terrorist campaign of bombing British and French buildings in Beirut. Almost 200 Arabs were arrested after a bomb attack on the house of former Premier 'Abdallah al-Yafi.

Nov. 26: Several new caches of arms were discovered in a roundup of subversive elements by security forces.

Nov. 27: Sami al-Sulh was named Premier of Lebanon, and formed a new cabinet.

Libya

(See also General)

1956

Sept. 14: A 10-day celebration of the centenary of the death of the Grand Sanusi, founder of the Sanusi sect, began at Benghazi.

Sept. 20: A British ship captain, said that Egyptian hiring agents had induced 16 members of the crew of his ship, the *Empire Chub*, to desert while the ship lay in Benghazi harbor.

Oct. 2: Italy and Libya signed a treaty settling certain mutual problems resulting from Libya's independence. The treaty set the pensions for Libyans employed by the Italian administration, and contained several other provisions on finance. Italy agreed to lend Libya £1,000,000 Libyan money within 3 months and to grant Libya £1,750,000 credits for purchase of Italian goods over a 3-year period.

Oct. 12: The Governor of the National Bank of Libya, Dr. 'Ali Nur al-Din 'Anaizi, returned to Tripoli from the last meeting of the Libyan Currency Commission in London. He said the National Bank of Libya had taken over all responsibilities and powers of the Commission.

Oct. 18: Libya told the UN Security Council that any Franco-British action against Egypt over nationalization of Suez would cause trouble in the Middle East.

Oct. 19: A conference of Arab chambers of commerce opened in Tripoli. Its agenda included a discussion of "the principle of nationalization."

Oct. 31: A royal decree announced a shakeup in the Libyan Government. 'Ali Sahili, former Minister of Justice, was appointed Foreign Minister. Minister of State Muhyial-Din Fikini was named Minister of Justice, 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Illan became the new Minister of National Defense, and Muhammad Abu Dajajah became Minister of National Economics, replacing Miftah 'Uraiqib, who became Minister of State. Tahar Bakyar replaced 'Abd al-Rahman Qalhud as Minister of Education.

Nov. 26: Premier Ben Halim told Parliament at its opening session that the Government was attempting to review Libyan obligations under the British-Libyan treaty in the light of new developments. He said Libya would support any Arab state in the struggle to protect independence.

Nov. 29: France approved a treaty with Libya providing for evacuation of French forces from the Fezzan.

Dec. 2: The French garrisons of 400-500 soldiers began withdrawing from the Fezzan.

Dec. 27: Britain announced agreement with Libya to review their current mutual defense treaty.

Morocco

(See also Algeria, Israel, Saudi Arabia)

1956

- Sept. 8: Former Riff leader 'Abd al-Karim sent a telegram from Cairo to Minister of State Lahcen Lyoussi supporting Lyoussi's campaign in the Middle Atlas area for national unity under the Sultan.
- Sept. 12: The Moroccan Government issued an order expelling over 50 French settlers who were members of the diehard French *colon* organization "L'union pour la Présence Française," previously implicated in a plot to incite Berbers to attack Moroccan Arabs.
- Sept. 13: Morocco notified France that henceforth visas would be required for entry by French citizens.
- Sept. 14: Finance Minister Benjelloun said that France had agreed to lend Morocco 24 billion francs to balance the Moroccan budget.
- Nine Frenchmen were arrested in Khorubga for protesting the previous expulsion of 54 French citizens as members of an extremist French group on Sept. 13.
- Sept. 21: U.S. Air Force Secretary Quarles conferred with Moroccan leaders on U.S. air bases in Morocco.
- Sept. 22: The Ministry of Agriculture announced a plan to grow green tea in Morocco. The experiments would be undertaken with the help of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, which Morocco recently joined.
- Sept. 28: Moroccan officials refused to comment on reports that the USSR had protested that it had not been invited to the Oct. 8 Tangier conference.
- Oct. 2: Preparation of a new *dahir* (decree) which would introduce trial by jury into Moroccan criminal courts for the first time in modern history was announced.
- Oct. 4: Foreign Minister Balafrej returned from Paris and said that lack of cohesion in the Moroccan government was a major obstacle to signing of a permanent convention regulating Morocco's relations with France.
- Oct. 7: The U.S. announced it had given up its extra-territorial treaty rights in Morocco. American residents, like all residents, would be subject to Moroccan justice.
- Oct. 8: The 8-nation conference on integration of Tangier opened in Fedala. Representatives of Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S. attended. Sultan Mohammed V in the opening address emphasized that the only purpose of the conference was to consult these nations on ways of safeguarding foreign as well as Moroccan economic interests in the exclusively Moroccan city.
- Oct. 15: France and Morocco agreed to draw up a new military agreement setting Nov. 12 for negotiations to give French troops a new status.
- Oct. 18: The Moroccan Foreign Ministry announced that the Tangier conference had unanimously accepted the report of its committee on concessions and communications in the Tangier zone.
- Oct. 19: The conference reached agreement on the status of Tangier civil servants and remuneration to civil employees displaced by the city's integration into the

Moroccan state. The only U.S. citizen affected was Juan Sedillo, a judge of the Court of International Jurisdiction, which was to be absorbed into the Moroccan judicial system.

The U.S. accepted the principle of Moroccan monopoly of communications in Tangier in a new formula which stipulated that existing installations, including the Voice of America relay station, could continue operations pending "regularization" of their status.

- Oct. 20: The Tangier conference reached general agreement on a formula for liquidating the zone's international status. It then adjourned. No agreement was reached concerning the economic status of Tangier.
- Oct. 21: Five major leaders of the Algerian revolt conferred with Sultan Mohammed V.
- Oct. 23: The Oct. 22 arrest of 5 Algerian rebel leaders by the French resulted in widespread rioting in Morocco.

Oct. 24: The U.S. announced that both Morocco and Tunisia were eligible for aid.

Sixty dead, mostly Europeans, were reported in Moroccan rioting. Seven French soldiers were killed and 24 wounded in 2 ambushes. It was the worst French military loss since Morocco's independence.

Oct. 25: More rioting swept Morocco and Tunisia. At least 9 Europeans were killed in Meknes, adding to the previous toll of 31. The French Ambassadors to both countries resigned.

French civil servants went on strike in mourning for the killing of 22 French persons in Meknes.

Oct. 26: Premier Bekkai's government resigned. The Sultan immediately called on Bekkai to form a new Cabinet.

Oct. 27: Premier Bekkai formed a new government. The Istiqlal Party took the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and National Economy. Total Istiqlal ministries was 8 out of 14; the remaining six ministries were given to independent or nonparty ministers. The opposition Democratic Independence Party was eliminated from the Cabinet.

Oct. 29: International control of Tangier ended with the signing of the formal act of the Tangier conference. Under the act the foreign powers attending the conference renounced all rights and left the Sultan to determine what special privileges, if any, would be enjoyed by foreign citizens.

Oct. 31: Jean Basdevant, special envoy from France to Morocco with the mission of trying to heal the breach between the two countries, left Morocco without having seen Sultan Mohammed V.

Nov. 7: Morocco became a member of UNESCO.

Nov. 12: The Sultan inaugurated the first Moroccan parliament, the National Consultative Assembly. He said his purpose was to establish a representative system within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, guaranteeing liberty, equality and justice for all individuals and groups. He said that royal nomination of all (76) members of the assembly must be replaced by their popular election. The assembly elected Mahdi

- ben Barka of the Istiqlal executive committee as its president.
- Nov. 25: The Atlas Construction Company, a U.S. concern working on American air bases in Morocco under a French contract, said that it would cease operations Dec. 31. Its contract had not been renewed by the Moroccan Government.
- Nov. 27: Settlement was announced of a labor dispute which had held up unloading of ammunition for U.S. forces in Morocco. The Moroccan Workers Union refused to unload the ammunition in Casablanca because the presence of French guards to protect the ammunition was an affront to Moroccan sovereignty. Settlement was arranged by having the Moroccan Army guard the wharf and French guards protect the ammunition after it had left the wharf.
- Dec. 3: 'Abd al-Rahman Bouabid, new Minister of National Economy, announced a series of severe measures to reduce Government spending in view of Morocco's precarious economic situation. The measures were: no new jobs to be created except those necessary for education, health and national defense; non-fulfilment of vacated public posts; reduction of Government salaries from 1 to 5% and special allowances of ministers 50%; reduction of ordinary expenses for material to a minimum. He said no new Government-sponsored construction would be undertaken.
- Dec. 4: France approved loans of 48 billion francs to Morocco and Tunisia, 32 billion going to Morocco and the rest to Tunisia. The vote was 315 to 252. A special provision to the loans was that part or all of the money would be spent to aid French colonists. The grant was accompanied by a warning that the 2 countries should adopt a friendlier attitude and co-operate more with France.
- Dec. 20: The Moroccan Government asked France to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court at The Hague to settle their dispute over arrest of 5 Algerian rebel leaders Oct. 22.
- Dec. 22: Sultan Mohammed V approved a prospective federation of North African labor unions. The federation would unite Moroccan and Tunisian workers with the Nationalist Workers Union of Algeria.
- Dec. 23: Foreign Minister Balafrej said that Morocco was ready to negotiate a military base agreement with the U.S.
- Dec. 27: Morocco protested to France against new French legislation for developing the Sahara regions.
- Dec. 30: Sultan Muhammad V granted the first audience to a French official since Oct. 22. Negotiations were resumed on a joint convention to formalize the distinctions already in practice regarding a personal status law for Europeans.

Pakistan

(See also General, Iraq, Saudi Arabia)

1956

- Sept. 4: Three persons were killed and 4 injured when police fired on crowds in Dacca demanding food.
- Sept. 6: A new cabinet was sworn in in East Pakistan.

Ataur Rahman Khan was named chief minister. The new cabinet ordered the release of all political prisoners, including suspected Communists.

- Sept. 8: Prime Minister Muhammad Ali resigned. He was asked by President Mirza to remain in office *protem* until the political situation could be reviewed. In his resignation statement the Prime Minister accused Muslim League leaders of breaking their political word.
- Sept. 10: President Mirza named Husayn Suhrawardy as Prime Minister. His Government would be a coalition of his own Awami League Party and the Republican Party. Suhrawardy declared that there was no reason why Pakistan should abandon her military commitments.
- Sept. 11: Dr. Khan Sahib, leader of the Republican Party in the West Pakistan Assembly, announced a coalition between his party and the Awami League.
- Sardar Abdul Qayyum was named president of the Azad Kashmir Government.
- Sept. 12: The new cabinet of Prime Minister Suhrawardy was sworn in. Awami League members were Abul Mansur Ahmad, 'Abd-al Khaliq, and Dildar Ahmad. Republican members were Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Ghulam Ali Tarpur, Amir Azam Khan, Mian Jaffar Shah, and Amjad Ali, former Minister of Finance.
- Sept. 20: The East Pakistan Assembly repealed the Public Safety Law under which persons could be detained without trial. The repeal was one of the election pledges of the United Front, composed of the Republican Party and the Awami League.
- Sept. 21: Karachi was paralyzed by a general strike protesting the killing of Muslims in India.
- Sept. 23: The Jama'at-i-Islami passed a resolution urging the Government to ask the UN Security Council to implement its resolutions on Kashmir within 3 months.
- Sept. 23: Pakistan sent a note to India protesting communal strife over the American book *Living Biographies of Religious Leaders*, and demanding that India protect her minorities.
- Oct. 6: President Mirza said that Pakistan would remain in both the Baghdad and SEATO Pacts.
- Oct. 14: Maj. Gen. Muhammad Musa was named to be the next Pakistan Chief of Staff.
- Nov. 16: The working committee of the Pakistan Muslim League, main opposition party, called on Pakistan to leave the Commonwealth.
- Nov. 19: Pakistan agreed to represent British interests in Saudi Arabia following the latter's rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain.
- Nov. 23: Pakistan agreed to represent Syrian interests in France and Saudi Arabian interests in Britain.
- Nov. 25: Pakistani leaders suggested to Afghan Premier Muhammad Da'ud, visiting Pakistan for an 8-day period of conferences, that Afghanistan might join the Baghdad Pact.
- Nov. 28: Pakistan complained to the UN Security Council that India was integrating the part of Kashmir which she occupied into her territory.
- Dec. 7: The provincial government of West Pakistan assumed control of the municipal government in Hy-

derabad because of the "alarming state of civil corruption and maladministration in the city."

Dec. 19: Prime Minister Suhrawardy said that Egyptian insults to Pakistan and Egyptian propaganda were dissipating Pakistani sympathy for Egypt.

Dec. 29: Pakistan asked the Security Council to discuss her dispute with India over Kashmir in January.

Palestine Problem

1956

Sept. 10: Six Israeli soldiers were killed in a clash with a Jordan patrol in the Hebron foothills.

Sept. 11: Egypt lodged a complaint with the UNTSO that Israeli raiders had killed 5 Egyptians and injured 1 in a clash inside Egyptian territory at El Kuseima. The attack came 24 hours after the blowing up of the Israeli railway line north of Beersheba.

Sept. 12: Israeli forces wiped out a Jordan police post, killing 19. UN Chief of Staff Burns called on both the Arab states and Israel to halt the new border conflicts.

Sept. 13: UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld called on the Arab states and Israel to honor their pledges under the Palestine armistice agreement.

Sept. 14: Jordan charged that a 1000-man Israeli force and 3 bombers wiped out another police post, this one 12 miles inside Jordan. The report said 10 Jordanians were killed, 4 wounded and 4 missing.

Sept. 17: The Israel-Jordan MAC censured Jordan for the Sept. 10 attack on Israel.

Sept. 18: Two Israeli soldiers were wounded in an attack on a patrol in the Lachish area.

Sept. 23: A Jordanian soldier went berserk and fired on Israeli delegates to an Israel Archaeological Society congress at Ramat Rahel near Jerusalem, killing 3 and wounding 15.

Sept. 26: Israeli troops attacked Jordanian positions and killed about 50 Jordanians at Husan, in Jordan.

The MAC censured Israel for an attack on a Jordan police post Sept. 13.

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir told UNTSO chief Burns that Israel would maintain its pledged ceasefire on the basis of reciprocity.

Sept. 27: The UNTSO requested an emergency meeting of the Israel-Jordan MAC to investigate the latest flareups along the border.

Sept. 28: Hammarskjöld told the Security Council that unless Israel and the Arab states showed a "will to peace" and acted to halt violence, the ceasefire would become a "dead letter."

Oct. 1: Israeli delegates to the MAC walked out of a meeting after the commission chairman had supported Jordan's version of the Ramat Rahel incident.

Oct. 3: Israel announced her intention to boycott further meetings of the Israel-Jordan MAC. The reason given was the failure of the MAC to distinguish between attacker and attacked.

Oct. 4: Five Israeli workers were killed in a truck ambush near Sodom on the Dead Sea.

Oct. 9: Britain renewed an offer made 11 months before to formulate a compromise settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The offer was based on a compromise between the 1947 UN partition plan and Israel's position at the time of the 1949 armistice.

Two Israeli citrus workers were killed near Haifa.

Oct. 10: An Israeli reprisal raid into Jordanian territory resulted in 48 Jordanians and 18 Israelis killed.

Oct. 11: An artillery duel between Israeli and Jordan border units in the Qalqilya area lasted for most of the night.

Oct. 12: Britain warned Israel that she was prepared to fulfill her obligations to Jordan under the 1948 treaty of alliance and mutual defense.

Oct. 15: Jordan asked the Security Council to meet on what she termed new "acts of aggression" by Israel.

Oct. 17: Israel submitted a counter-complaint to the Council accusing Jordan of "persistent" violations of the 1949 Palestine Armistice agreement.

Oct. 18: Hammarskjöld warned Israel she was endangering the Palestine armistice by taking unilateral action on border warfare with Jordan and disregarding the UN truce machinery.

Oct. 19: Jordan demanded that the Security Council apply diplomatic and economic sanctions to Israel as punishment for recent border attacks.

Oct. 21: Three Israeli soldiers were killed and 27 wounded in mine blasts on the Egyptian border.

Oct. 29: An Israeli force invaded the Sinai Peninsula allegedly to eliminate "fedayeen" bases, and spared to within 20 miles of Suez before halting.

Oct. 30: Israel claimed victory in an air battle and 3 Egyptian MIG-15 fighters shot down. Israel also reported capture of Qusayma, opposite the El Auja zone. An Egyptian frigate was seized off Haifa.

Canada decided to hold up shipment of 24 jet fighters to Israel until the UN decided whether or not Israel was guilty of aggression against Egypt.

Oct. 31: Fighting in the Sinai front neared Gaza.

Canada announced suspension of all shipments of arms to Israel. The West German Government debated halting all deliveries to Israel under the 1952 restitution agreement.

Nov. 1: Israel claimed her forces in Sinai had encountered 2 Egyptian divisions.

Nov. 2: Israel captured Gaza and sealed off the Gaza Strip. An Egyptian armored brigade was destroyed. Israel's Ambassador to Britain said that his country would not withdraw from Egypt unless it was guaranteed freedom from future Egyptian attacks.

Nov. 3: Israeli troops reached the Gulf of Suez at Tor, 156 miles south of Suez.

Nov. 4: An Emergency UNRWA team flew into the Gaza Strip to look after the 215,000 officially certified Arab refugees there. Israeli occupation of the Strip added 100,000 refugees previously living on Egyptian relief to Israel's population responsibility.

Israeli columns penetrated to the east bank of the Suez Canal in 3 places.

Israel published a list of "closed areas" between the

Gaza Strip and Elath. Special passes were required to enter these areas. Israel also warned the West she would not tolerate meddling in negotiations to end the Israel-Egypt war.

A British ship shot down an Israeli plane in the Gulf of Suez.

Nov. 6: Israel announced the end of the Sinai campaign and said all Sinai up to a 10-mile buffer zone before Suez was theirs.

Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan said that his forces had lost 150 dead in the Sinai campaign. He added that 2 Egyptian divisions and armored units had been destroyed and 5000 Egyptians taken prisoner.

Nov. 8: Israel claimed that Arab "fedayeen" from Jordan had crossed the border and attacked installations near Shaar Hagai.

Israel agreed to pull back her troops from Egyptian territory in response to a UN resolution, but did not mention specific territory such as the Gaza Strip and 2 islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Nov. 10: Foreign Minister Meir said that the Gaza Strip was an integral part of Israel, and that as far as the Strip was concerned, Israel had no intention of withdrawing to the 1949 armistice lines.

Nov. 13: An Israeli soldier was killed and 3 wounded in a "fedayeen" mine attack near the Syrian border. Foreign Minister Meir called for a round-table conference between Israel and the Arab states to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Nov. 14: The Knesset voted 66-13 against a motion of censure against the Government for its offer to withdraw troops from Sinai. The motion was introduced by the Herut Party.

Nov. 16: Shimon Peres, Director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry, listed 3 conditions for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. They were: requirements that the Strip not be used as a "fedayeen" base, guarantee that Sinai not be remilitarized as an invasion springboard, and free access by Israeli shipping to the port of Elath.

About 50 Arabs were killed and more than 25 wounded in food riots near the Gaza Strip.

Nov. 18: Israel rejected a Soviet demand that she pay damages to Egypt for invasion of Egyptian territory. Premier Ben-Gurion said that the invasion was fully justified by all Egypt's acts of aggression and violations of the UN Charter since 1948.

Dec. 6: Maj. Gen. Burns, commander of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), conferred with Israeli Chief of Staff Dayan regarding further advance of UNEF troops into Sinai and an Israeli withdrawal.

Dec. 12: Israel officially acknowledged the killing of 48 Israeli Arabs by Israeli border police in the village of Kafr Qasim on the Jordan border Oct. 29. He said those responsible would stand trial and compensation paid to the families of the victims.

Dec. 24: Walter Eytan, head of the Foreign Ministry, said that Egypt was continuing a policy of armed conflict in defiance of the Nov. 2 UN resolution.

Dec. 27: "Fedayeen" squads attacked 3 Israeli villages

in the Plain of Sharon. There were no casualties.

Israeli offered to exchange all Egyptian prisoners of war, a total of 3,581, for 4 Israelis captured by the Egyptians during the Sinai attack.

Dec. 29: A water pipeline was blown up in the Jerusalem corridor.

Dec. 30: Jordan charged that Israeli troops had ambushed a civilian transport vehicle between Qalqilya and Habla.

Persian Gulf

(See also Iran)

1956

Sept. 13: Ashraf Lutfi, official representative of the ruler of Kuwait, said that the oil shaykhdoms of the Persian Gulf would be forced by Arab public opinion to stop the flow of oil from their countries to the West in case of war with Egypt.

Nov. 1: Riots were reported in Bahrain.

Nov. 2: All public meetings, demonstrations, and strikes were banned in Kuwait. The order canceled a mass meeting called for Nov. 3 to seek removal of all British subjects from Kuwait.

A detachment of British troops arrived in Bahrain. A protest demonstration against the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt resulted in some damage to British business establishments.

Nov. 6: The National Union Committee in Bahrain was dissolved and 4 of its members detained.

Nov. 8: Shops in Kuwait began refusing to serve British and French customers. Schools were closed. Contributions totaling \$1,400,000 were made to the Aid to Egypt Fund.

Dec. 2: The first empty tanker to round Cape of Good Hope since the closing of the Suez Canal arrived during the weekend and left within 24 hours with 27,000 tons of crude oil. It was the *Failaika* of Liberian registry and owned by Gulf Oil Corp.

Dec. 11: A series of explosions in the Kuwait oil field set one well on fire and damaged pipelines.

Dec. 23: Three members of the outlawed Committee of National Union in Bahrain were sentenced to 4-year prison terms for plotting to kill Shaykh al-Khalifah, his family, and the Shaykh's British advisor, Sir Charles Belgrave. Two other members received 10-year sentences.

Saudi Arabia

(See also General, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan)

1956

Sept. 4: The Saudi Arabian embassy in Cairo said that King Sa'ud had asked Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to send military representatives to Riyadh for an urgent meeting on the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Sept. 7: The military conference at Riyadh opened. Discussions dealt with the question of providing Jordan with a fixed annual budget for its National Guard, in case of Israeli aggression, and providing it with the necessary equipment.

Sept. 9: The Riyadh conference ended with a declaration by those attending to implement the decision to supply and finance the Jordanian National Guard.

Sept. 11: The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions said it would protest strongly the Saudi Arabian anti-strike law recently promulgated by royal decree. The decree prohibited employees of concessionary and public utility companies from leaving or stopping work, with offenders liable to receive prison sentences.

Sept. 15: Saudi Minister of State Ibrahim Sulayman said that King Sa'ud supported Egypt and President Nasir wholeheartedly in every step they took.

Sept. 17: The Saudi Government denounced the formation of an international Suez Canal Users' Association.

Sept. 22: King Sa'ud ended meetings begun earlier in the week with King Faysal of Iraq. The meetings were described as designed "to consolidate fraternal relations between the 2 royal families."

Sept. 25: King Sa'ud met with President Nasir of Egypt and President Quwwatli of Syria at Riyadh for talks on the general world situation.

Oct. 1: A Saudi spokesman today denied reports that a Saudi delegation representing Saudi labor unions was among the Arab labor delegations that visited Peking recently.

Oct. 4: Amar Iqbal Qureshi, a Pakistani financial advisor to the Saudi Government, said that the Suez crisis had not led to any pressure in Saudi Arabia to make American oil companies pay higher royalties. He said he spoke as a private citizen.

Oct. 6: Iraq and Saudi Arabia raised their diplomatic representations to embassy level.

The company that received the bid to construct the Wadi Hanifah dam near Riyadh began preliminary work on the dam.

Oct. 13: A financial pact was signed between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Under its terms Saudi Arabia would receive \$15 million, to be used for buying Egyptian goods or investment in Egypt. The agreement would permit Egyptian investors in Saudi Arabia to transfer profits up to a 15% limit of the Egyptian capital invested there.

Oct. 14: King Sa'ud received HE Mahjub Makkawi, the first Sudanese Minister to Saudi Arabia.

Oct. 17: The al-Nasr Gypsum Manufacturing Company was granted a 50-year concession to mine gypsum in Najd.

Oct. 24: Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Japan were established.

Oct. 28: King Sa'ud sent telegrams to the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis expressing his concern over the arrest by French authorities in Algeria of five Algerian nationalist leaders on their way to Tunisia.

King Sa'ud contributed SR 1,000,000 for the families of Algerian victims. Committees were formed throughout Saudi Arabia to collect contributions for Algeria.

Oct. 30: As a result of the Israeli attack on Egypt, King Sa'ud ordered general mobilization in the Kingdom. King Sa'ud further called on all Arab heads of state

to do the same to prepare their armies to oppose the Israeli attack.

King Sa'ud sent a telegram to U.S. President Eisenhower thanking him for the announcement that the United States will stand by the country which is subjected to aggression in the Israeli-Egyptian fighting.

Nov. 5: Tapline, the oil pipeline running from Saudi Arabia to Sidon, Lebanon, remained in operation.

Nov. 6: Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Orders were issued to those concerned forbidding them to ship or supply oil to British or French ships or to ships that carry Saudi oil to these two countries.

Nov. 9: Saudi Arabia paid the second installment of money to the Jordanian National Guard in accordance with the decisions of the Arab Military Conference in Riyadh.

King Sa'ud issued his order to transfer SR 2,000,000 to the Egyptian Red Crescent Society to be spent on the victims of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt.

Nov. 11: King Sa'ud left Riyadh to attend the meeting of Arab heads of states scheduled to begin in Beirut on the next day.

Nov. 12: King Sa'ud urged President Eisenhower to take positive action in the Middle East to avert a world war.

Nov. 14: Employees of the Arabian American Oil Company collected more than SR 178,000 for the Egyptian Red Crescent Society. The Company agreed to pay an amount equal to that collected by the employees.

Nov. 21: President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan arrived in Riyadh on an official visit to Saudi Arabia.

Dec. 24: The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Egypt gave the Egyptian Government a check for £E 3,645, for the welfare of "Israel aggression victims."

Sudan

(See also General, Saudi Arabia)

1956

Sept. 5: A clash between Sudanese army troops and mutineers at Torit, Equatoria Province, resulted in a number of casualties on both sides.

Sept. 6: The Sudan and Ethiopia signed an air transport agreement.

Sept. 7: Ten were injured in a clash between supporters of the National Unionist Party and the Ansar sect.

Sept. 9: A Government order prohibited all processions, meetings and demonstrations in Khartoum and Omdurman.

Sept. 14: The Sudan expressed full support for Egypt in the Suez crisis, and opposed the SCUA formation.

Sept. 29: Airport traffic control officials threatened to boycott planes of any country taking part in any aggression against Egypt over the Suez Canal.

Oct. 10: The first consignment of Egyptian arms for the Sudan was brought to Khartoum.

Oct. 16: The Sudan returned Gambela, a frontier trading station on the Ethiopian border, to Ethiopia.

Oct. 19: Six persons were killed on the Sudan-Uganda border in another clash between mutineers against the

Government authority and the Sudan Defense Force.

Oct. 27: Isma'il al-Azhari, President of the National Unionist Party and former Premier, and Umma Party president al-Saddiq al-Mahdi, condemned French policy on Algeria.

Oct. 31: The Cabinet held an emergency meeting to debate the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt. Premier Khalil said that the ultimatum addressed to Egypt was a violation of international law.

Nov. 4: The Government declared a state of emergency following the Israeli attack on Egypt.

Dec. 13: Premier Khalil met with Egyptian President Nasir after arriving in Egypt Dec. 12 on a state visit. The two leaders conferred on ways to develop closer cooperation between their countries.

Syria

(See also General, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia)

1956

Sept. 1: An international trade fair opened in Damascus. The U.S. was officially represented for the first time.

Sept. 2: Syria and Egypt reached an economic agreement for industrial cooperation and the formation of joint companies with joint capital for economic projects.

Sept. 3: President Shukri al-Quwwatli accused the West of trying to instigate a third world war to block Arab liberation. He said any aggression against Egypt would be aggression against Syria.

Two men convicted of complicity in the 1955 assassination of Col. Adnan Malki were executed.

Sept. 4: A Soviet parliamentary delegation arrived in Syria.

Sept. 5: A Syrian politician and member of the Socialist National Party said that Leftist pressure had forced President Quwwatli to accept Soviet arms on condition that Communist and Socialist officers be assigned to key military positions in the army.

Sept. 9: Syria and Albania signed a 1-year trade pact to exchange Syrian agricultural products for Albanian coal and asphalt.

Sept. 10: Syria announced imposition of restrictions on the passage of American and British military planes over Syrian territory. 48 hours notice to the Ministry of Public Works was required.

Sept. 12: Syria charged Turkey with massing troops on her border as part of a Western plan to besiege Syria and Egypt.

Sept. 16: A Syrian patrol kidnapped 2 civilian water engineers, 1 an American.

Sept. 18: A conference of Arab national and political organizations opened in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies. According to Hamid Franiyah, leader of the Lebanese delegation and chairman of the conference, it was called to formulate practical measures to consolidate the Arab struggle against imperialism.

Sept. 19: Three Syrians were killed in a clash with Turkish border guards in the 'Ain al-Arab area.

Sept. 27: The Arab literary conference at Bloudan ended with an appeal to writers all over the world to support Arab national causes, including the Suez, Palestine, and Algeria.

Oct. 1: Premier al-Asali said that Syria would not accept an Iraq Petroleum Co. decision to transfer pipelines from Lebanon to Syria to evade the Lebanese retro-active tax law on foreign companies.

Oct. 3: The IPC said that its decision to divert a new pipeline to a Syrian instead of a Lebanese port was "definite and final."

Oct. 6: The Chamber of Deputies began its new session and reelected Nazim al-Qudsi President.

Oct. 11: The West German Minister told the Syrian Foreign Minister that West Germany would sever diplomatic relations with any country that recognized East Germany. The statement referred to a request for the opening of an East German consulate in Damascus.

Oct. 16: Syria announced the shipment of the first installment of heavy weapons into Jordan and alert troops under the Syrian-Jordanian defense pacts, in case of an attack by Israel.

Oct. 27: Bombs were thrown at the French Embassy and a French school in Damascus.

Oct. 28: Riots in Aleppo during a 24-hour protest strike against French policy in Algeria resulted in 1 dead and 29 injured.

Nov. 3: The USSR pledged its assistance to Syria to reinforce Syrian independence. The pledge was made during a reception in Moscow honoring President Quwwatli, prior to his departure from the USSR.

Nov. 4: President Quwwatli, returning from Moscow, declared that Syria had plenty of arms. He described his talks with Soviet leaders as "more than successful."

Nov. 8: France reported the presence of jet planes in Syria.

Nov. 17: The Syrian Army moved tanks into the outskirts of Damascus, but did not enter the city.

Nov. 19: Syria complained to the UN that British, French, and Israeli planes had repeatedly violated Syrian air space.

Nov. 21: Syria charged that British-French-Israeli forces building up along her frontiers were a threat to her independence.

Nov. 28: The U.S. informed Syria it was "concerned" over reports of substantial Soviet arms shipments.

Nov. 29: Foreign Minister Salah al-Bitar denied that Syria had bought Soviet arms since the start of hostilities in Egypt in October. He said Syria had been made the target of a vicious propaganda campaign as a preparation for subversion.

Dec. 1: Syria told the UN that Britain, France, Israel, and Turkey "and others" were preparing to attack her.

Dec. 3: A tour of Syria by American and other correspondents at the invitation of Foreign Minister al-Bitar showed no evidence of Soviet arms.

Dec. 7: President Quwwatli declared that Syria was the second major target after Egypt in an Anglo-Franco-Israeli plan to destroy Arab nationalism and partition the Middle East into spheres of influence.

Nearly 3000 students armed with Czech machine-guns paraded before President Quwwatli in Damascus.

Dec. 10: Lieut. Col. 'Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, intelligence chief of the Syrian Army and widely rumored to be Syria's new "strong man" said that Syria had bought arms from the Communist bloc because the West imposed impossible conditions. He denied that he was anything but "another officer."

Dec. 12: West German oil technicians began intensive exploration in northeast Syria, along the Iraq-Turkish borders, under a concession granted by the Syrian Government.

Dec. 18: Syria rejected U.S. and Italian requests for emergency repairs on the pipelines carrying oil from Iraq across Syrian territory to the Mediterranean.

Dec. 22: A military judge ordered the court-martial of 47 prominent Syrian political figures on charges of having plotted to set up a pro-Iraqi government. Among those charged were former President Adib Shishakli, Adnan al-Atasi, son of former President Hashim al-Atasi, 7 other Parliament members and 4 ex-Cabinet ministers. Twenty-nine of those charged were under arrest; 18 fled to Lebanon. The court-martial order accused Lebanon of "housing conspirators." It accused Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Sa'id of conducting and financing a conspiracy with Shishakli, the outlawed Syrian Social-Nationalist Party, and ex-Army Col. Muhammad Safa, former Syrian military attache in the U.S. The plot was said to include the overthrow of President Quwwatli and setting up a pro-Iraqi government with Munir Ajlani, a former Cabinet minister, as Premier. Others named in the order were former Minister Amir Hasan al-Atrash, and former Foreign Minister Faydi al-Atasi.

The Cabinet of Premier Sabri al-Asali resigned. The Premier himself did not resign, but remained in office to form a new Cabinet.

Dec. 26: Syria told the Iraq Petroleum Company that she would not permit the repairing of damaged pipelines until Israeli forces withdrew from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

Syria accused Britain, France, and Turkey of having instigated a plot to overthrow her government. Syria said Iraq had financed and conducted the plot. The accusation was made at a preliminary hearing in court of Syrians involved in the plot.

Dec. 30: An IPC survey team started an 800-mile tour of sabotaged oil installations in Syria.

Dec. 31: The Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. said that the U.S. plan to protect the Middle East against the USSR would not be welcomed by the Arab states. He said that tension in the Middle East was caused by Israel and the Zionists rather than by Soviet penetration, and that Syria's policy was "noncommitment." Syria's relations with the U.S., he noted, were regulated by the UN Charter, and Syria was uninterested in any action outside that framework.

Premier Sabri al-Asali formed a new Cabinet:

Premier—Sabri al-Asali

Foreign Affairs—Salah al-Bitar

Economy—Khalil Qallas

State—Khalid al-'Azam

Public Works—Fakhir Kayyali

Public Health—Asad Harun

Agriculture—Hamid Khuja

Education—Hani Siba'i

Finance—Asad Mahasan

Justice—Ma'mun al-Kuzbari

State—Salih Aqil

Tunisia

(See also Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia)

1956

Sept. 6: Mongi Slim, first Tunisian ambassador to the U.S., presented his credentials to President Eisenhower. He declared that Tunisia wanted to be a buffer state between the Arabic and European worlds.

France protested against the expulsion of 2 French nationals implicated in a plot against the security of the Tunisian state. Tunisia replied with a protest against the French abduction of 4 Tunisians in the Ain-Draham frontier region.

Sept. 10: The Government announced a capital outlay budget of 19 billion francs for the next 12 months. All but 500 million francs of the amount was to be financed by French loans. The budget was 48% bigger than the previous one.

Sept. 15: A general strike began in Tunisia in protest against a French plane attack on a village, which killed a child and wounded 5 persons.

Sept. 19: The International Cooperation Administration announced a forthcoming shipment of 45,000 tons of wheat to Tunisia as a gift to help avert a threatened shortage.

Oct. 10: Premier Bourguiba said that he had urged the French to proclaim independence for Algeria as the only basis of negotiation with rebel leaders.

Oct. 17: Tunisia announced it would take control of its Algerian border away from French troops. The frontier was ordered closed. French units would be replaced by Tunisian Army and National Guard units.

Oct. 23: Anti-French disorders broke out in Tunisia following the capture by the French of a plane carrying 5 Algerian rebel leaders from Rabat, Morocco, to Tunis. Demonstrators attempted to attack the French consulate there but were thwarted by army units. A proclamation by the Neo-Destour Party condemned the French action as a violation of international law.

Oct. 27: Tunisian civilians and irregular forces clashed with French troops in 5 places in Tunisia.

Oct. 30: Tunisia declared that France's act of bad faith in the kidnapping of 5 Algerian rebel leaders was proof that France was not prepared to seek a negotiated settlement in Algeria.

Nov. 2: A 4-hour general strike was staged in Tunisia to show national support of Algerian independence.

A French armored column was attacked near Douz. Tunisia gave its full moral support to Egypt and

- denounced the British-French intervention. Resolutions pledged Tunisian support of any UN measures taken to stop the action.
- Nov. 7: Tunisia was admitted to UNESCO.
- Nov. 8: The Tunisian Government banned publication of *La Presse de Tunisie*, the country's leading French newspaper, for an indefinite period.
- Nov. 13: A Government decree amended the penal code to extend jurisdiction of Tunisian courts to "all infractions committed in Tunisia." French special envoy Roger Seydoux protested that the decree was a violation of the Franco-Tunisian agreement of June 3, 1955, which put French nationals under French courts.
- Nov. 29: Premier Bourguiba deposited Tunisia's ratification of the UN genocide convention at the UN.
- French troops setting up an Air Force relay station were attacked by Tunisians near Nabeul. One Tunisian was killed and 4 injured.
- Dec. 9: Premier Bourguiba returned to Tunis from a visit to the U.S. He praised France for having agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone.
- Dec. 25: Bourguiba called on Egypt to cancel measures taken against Jews living in Egypt and holding Tunisian passports. He said the Tunisian Government had never differentiated between Tunisians on the basis of religion and that every holder of a Tunisian passport was entitled to the same protection.

Turkey

(See also General, Cyprus, Syria)

1956

- Sept. 6: Turkey concluded a trade agreement with an American trade delegation for the export of 250,000 kilos of green olives to the U.S. in 1956 and 1 million in 1957.
- Sept. 10: Water tests carried out by the Ankara municipality with water-prospecting equipment ordered from the U.S. at a cost of TL 100,000 were successful, it was reported.
- Sept. 20: Turkey received 14 supersonic Thunderflash jet photo planes from the U.S. The shipment was the first of fifty ordered by the Turkish Air Force. Minister of Trade and Economy Mandalinci said that a bill was submitted to the Coordination Council authorizing the Ministry to exclude or add to the list of goods with fixed profit limits any commodities of its choice, the aim being to assure fluidity to Turkey's economic life. He stated that the Council would assess heavy penalties on businessmen who bypassed the anti-profitsteering laws.
- Sept. 24: A non-immigrant visa agreement was announced between Turkey and Canada.
- Sept. 26: Gen. Alfred Gruenther visited Turkey.
- Sept. 30-Oct. 1: Four new sugar factories were opened in Erzurum and Erzincan, Elazig and Malatya.
- Oct. 3: The Minister of Health inaugurated new annexes and polyclinic facilities of the Izmir Esref Pasa Hospital. He said that beds in official hospitals numbered 32,000, and private hospitals 8000.
- Oct. 5: A 15-year-old newsboy was fined \$22 for having shouted the news of Finance Minister Ökmen's resignation in the streets of Ankara. The fine was levied under the no-shouting clause of the press law.
- Oct. 23: Former Premier Günaltay, a member of the Opposition Republican Party, criticized the government of Premier Menderes for showing bias in executing the anti-electioneering law of June, 1956. He said that Democrat Party deputies in Parliament were allowed to make speeches and campaign for election, but that Republican deputies were not.
- Nov. 18: Premier Menderes left Ankara for meetings of the Baghdad Pact members at Baghdad.
- Nov. 19: Turkey agreed to buy \$46 million in surplus U.S. commodities, beginning with 6000 tons of wheat.
- Nov. 24: Turkey's highest court reversed a decision of the Istanbul Magistrates Court sentencing Peoples Republican Party secretary-general Kasim Gülek to 1 year in jail and 4 months "banishment" in Bursa. The conviction was set aside on grounds that insufficient evidence existed for claiming Gülek had "questioned the legitimacy of Turkey's Grand National Assembly," and that the convicting judges were prejudiced.
- Nov. 28: Zeyyat Mandalinci resigned as Minister of Trade and Economy. It was the 6th resignation in the Menderes Cabinet during 1956.
- Nov. 29: Abdallah Aker was named Commerce Minister to succeed Zeyyat Mandalinci.
- Nov. 30: Turkey announced that "routine" army maneuvers would be held soon and more men inducted into the armed forces.
- Dec. 2: The Sariyar Dam, begun in 1952 on the Sakaria River near Ankara to supply the electricity needs of the Ankara-Istanbul area, was opened.
- Dec. 4: Ankara University's political science faculty discontinued its senior courses following a walkout by 300 students protesting the government's removal of Dean Turhan Fevzioglu. He was accused of violating the education law by giving a political lecture. The lecture recommended that the university be free of state control. Prof Aydin Yalçin resigned in a gesture of sympathy for the dean.
- Dec. 6: Müammer Aksöy, instructor in civil law, resigned from the Ankara University political science faculty. He was the second faculty member to do so.
- Dec. 12: Serif Mardin, chief of protocol at the Foreign Ministry, resigned his instructorship at the University political science school. His resignation made a total of 3, all in protest against Government repression of academic freedom.
- Dec. 20: Kasim Gülek, publisher of the Ankara opposition newspaper *Ulus* and leader of the Opposition Party (People's Republican), and Ibrahim Cuceoglu, his editor, were each sentenced to a year in jail for publishing a speech critical of Premier Menderes' Government. The two were also fined TL10,000 each, and *Ulus* was suspended for 1 year. The fine and suspension were held in abeyance pending an appeal.
- Dec. 27: Turkey's coffee ration per family was reduced to 50 grams (about one-tenth of a pound), from a

half-pound ration for November. A shortage of tea was also reported, caused by transport difficulties.

Dec. 28: Premier Menderes told the Grand National Assembly that Turkey would never become involved in war between the Arab countries on one side and Britain and France on the other. He also said Turkey would never abandon the cause of the 120,000 people on Cyprus of Turkish descent, and that Turkey would welcome a partition plan for Cyprus.

Dec. 31: A secretary in the Greek Consulate was sentenced to 4 years in prison on a charge of attempting to smuggle U.S. and French currency out of Turkey.

Yemen

(See also General)

1956

Sept. 8: Yemen accepted an offer from Czechoslovakia to

send student missions to Czech universities to take courses in engineering and medicine free of charge for a 6-year period.

Sept. 24: Communist China announced recognition of the Yemen and establishment of diplomatic relations on the ministerial level.

Oct. 3: The Yemeni Minister in Cairo met with the Secretary General of the Arab League to discuss British "aggression" in Southern Yemen.

Oct. 18: Yemeni tribesmen clashed with a British convoy en route from Salah to Aden.

Nov. 2: Imam Ahmad issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to join Egyptian forces opposing the British-French invasion. A recruiting center opened in San'a.

Nov. 6: The total number of volunteers from Yemen for Egypt reached 21,179.

DOCUMENTS

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on the Recent Hostilities in Egypt

A/RES/390
2 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1948 [sic] of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel,¹

Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these developments,

1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3. Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter;

6. Decides to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present resolution.

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3.

A/RES/391
4 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolution of 2 November 1956,¹

1. Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours, a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.

¹ A/RES/390

A/RES/392
4 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Noting with regret that not all the parties concerned have yet agreed to comply with the provisions of its resolution of 2 November 1956,¹

Noting the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area,

Noting further that the resolution urged the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements,

1. Reaffirms its resolution of 2 November 1956 and once again calls upon the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution;

2. Authorizes the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area and request him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the present resolution;

3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines;

4. Decides to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present resolution.

¹ A/RES/390

A/RES/394
5 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Having requested the Secretary-General in its resolution adopted on 4 November 1956¹ to submit to it a plan for an emergency international United Nations force, for the purposes stated,

Noting with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General on the plan² and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 of that report,

1. Establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956;³

2. Appoints, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, as Chief of the Command;

3. *Authorizes* the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit from the observer corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization a limited number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorizes him, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, on the additional number of officers needed;

4. *Invites* the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

¹ A/RES/391

² A/3289

³ A/RES/390

A/RES/395

7 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution of 2 November 1956¹ concerning the cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and other matters related to the military operations in Egyptian territory, as well as its resolution of 4 November 1956² concerning the request to the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force,

Having established by its resolution of 5 November 1956³ a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force, having appointed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of the Command with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for the Command, and having invited the Secretary-General to take the administrative measures necessary for the prompt execution of that resolution,

Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General⁴ on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956² and having examined that plan,

1. *Expresses its approval* of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report;

2. *Concurs* in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;

3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of Member States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objective of its balanced composition;

4. *Requests* the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force;

5. *Approves, provisionally,* the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Establishes* an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command;

7. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Advisory Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive actions;

8. *Determines* that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions;

9. *Decides* that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself;

10. *Requests* all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved.

¹ A/RES/390

² A/RES/391

³ A/RES/394

⁴ A/3302

A/RES/396

7 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions adopted by overwhelming majorities on 2, 4 and 5 November 1956,¹

Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution of 5 November 1956, established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of its resolution of 2 November 1956,

1. *Reaffirms* the above-mentioned resolutions;

2. *Calls once again upon* Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;²

3. *Calls once again upon* the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions;

4. Urges the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and requests him promptly to report to the General Assembly on the compliance with this resolution.

¹ A/RES/390, 391, 392, 394.

² Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3.

A/RES/410
24 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General¹ on compliance with General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I) of 2 and 7 November 1956,²

Recalling that its resolution 1002 (ES-I) called upon Israel immediately to withdraw its forces behind the demarcation lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,³

Recalling further that the above-mentioned resolution also called upon France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory, in conformity with previous resolutions,

1. Notes with regret that, according to the communications received by the Secretary-General,¹ two-thirds of the French forces remain, all the United Kingdom forces remain although it has been announced that arrangements are being made for the withdrawal of one battalion, and no Israel forces have been withdrawn behind the armistice lines although a considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of the relevant General Assembly resolution;

2. Reiterates its call to France, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to comply forthwith with resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I);

3. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and to report without delay to the General Assembly on the implementation thereof.

¹ A/3384 and Add. 1 and 2.

² Provisionally issued under the symbols A/RES/390 and A/RES/396.

³ Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3.

A/RES/411
24 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General¹ on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force,

Having received also the report of the Secretary-General² on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal,

1. Notes with approval the contents of the *aide-memoire* on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General;¹

2. Notes with approval the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connection with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal, as set forth in his report;²

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may be speedily and effectively undertaken.

¹ A/3375.

² A/3376.

A/RES/412
26 November 1956

The General Assembly,

Having decided, in resolutions 1,000 (ES-I) and 1,001 (ES-I) of 5 and 7 November 1956,¹ to establish an emergency international United Nations Force (hereafter to be known as the United Nations Emergency Force) under a Chief of Command (hereafter to be known as the Commander),

Having considered and provisionally approved the recommendations made by the Secretary-General concerning the financing of the Force in paragraph 15 of his report of 6 November 1956,²

1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account to which funds received by the United Nations, outside the regular budget, for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Force shall be credited, and from which payments for this purpose shall be made;

2. Decides that the Special Account shall be established in an initial amount of \$10 million;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, pending the receipt of funds for the Special Account, to advance from the Working Capital Fund such sums as the Special Account may require to meet any expenses chargeable to it;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to establish such rules and procedures for the Special Account and make such administrative arrangements as he may consider necessary to ensure effective financial administration and control for that Account;

5. Requests the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly and, as appropriate, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to consider and, as soon as possible, to report on further arrangements that need to be adopted regarding the costs of maintaining the Force.

¹ Provisionally issued under the symbol A/RES/394 and A/RES/395.

² A/3302.

BOOK REVIEWS

GENERAL

DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD (2 vols), comp. by J. C. Hurewitz. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1956. Vol. I, 1535-1914, 290 pages; Vol. II, 1914-1956, 427 pages. \$15.25 (both volumes).

Reviewed by Harry N. Howard

As Dr. Hurewitz notes in his introduction to these two volumes, they are designed "to unfold European diplomacy in and on the Near and Middle East in modern times and, only secondarily, to illustrate the coincident aspects of intraregional international politics." All told there are some 228 documents divided equally between the first and second volumes. While there is no pretension that the work is at all exhaustive, and some students may quarrel here and there as to the selection of the material, there is certainly nothing so convenient or comprehensive to be found elsewhere in English.

Volume I centers on the major international issues of the period between 1535 and 1914, beginning with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Francis I of France and Süleyman the Magnificent, and ending with the Ottoman promise of a Concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1914. It covers the evolution of the capitulatory regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Iran; the development of the problem of the Turkish Straits since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774); the attempts to establish a fixed Persian-Ottoman boundary (1639-1914); the formation of special administrations for the Lebanon; the problem of the Suez Canal; the Cyprus issue; the conversion of the Persian Gulf into an Anglo-Indian lake; and the European scramble for railway and oil concessions down to the outbreak of World War I.

Volume II contains the basic documents since World War I, beginning with the German-Ottoman alliance of August 2, 1914, and ending with the Iranian reply of December 7, 1955

to the Soviet protest against Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. But within its framework are the pertinent documents concerning such significant developments as the secret plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire during World War I; the basic materials relative to the Palestine problem from the period of the Balfour Declaration to the offer of Prime Minister Eden to mediate the Arab-Israel controversy (1955); the problem of the Turkish Straits since 1920; the Anglo-Egyptian conflicts over the Sudan and the Suez Canal Zone; the spectacular rise of the oil industry in the general area of the Persian Gulf; the rise of the newly sovereign Near and Middle Eastern states, with a voice in world politics, the sapping of French influence, the decline of British power, and the competition of the U. S. and the USSR in the area.

Because of the very comprehensive character of the documentation, it is difficult to point to any particular selection. But one especially outstanding contribution of Professor Hurewitz's has been to provide the reader with editorial notes, introducing each of the documents he has included. These introductions are not only models of succinctness, but they serve to place the documents in their proper historical perspective. Moreover, each of the notes contains excellent bibliographical references for those who seek further information concerning the document or the problem with which it deals.

Professor Hurewitz has rendered a very significant service to all students of the Near and Middle East and to all practitioners of the art of diplomacy in this vast and complicated field. He is to be congratulated upon the preparation of these volumes, which are not only a most welcome addition to the growing library of important American works dealing with the Middle East, but an indispensable *vade mecum* to all who seek knowledge and understanding of its problems.

♦ HARRY N. HOWARD, formerly UN Advisor, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, is presently a Foreign Service Officer in Lebanon.

VIOLENT TRUCE, by Commander E. H. Hutchison. New York: Devin-Adair, 1956. 199 pages. \$3.50.

Reviewed by Sam Pope Brewer

Commander Hutchison was chairman of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) operating under the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) during 1952-54, possibly the most troubled period in Israeli-Jordan relations since the 1949 armistice. This period saw the Qibya massacre of 53 Jordan Arabs by an Israeli raiding party, the bus ambush at Scorpion Pass in which 11 Israelis were murdered, and the Nahalin raid, in which the Israelis killed 9 Jordanians and wounded 17. Details of these clashes and their subsequent negotiations between the MAC and Israel and Jordan are faithfully recounted in this book. In general, the book is a severe indictment of the Israelis as obstructive to UN observers in their efforts to maintain the truce, and arrogant to the point even of violence when the observers tried to press the case. Up to Hutchison's departure in October, 1954, the Israelis had refused for more than 6 months to attend MAC sessions because he had refused to cast a deciding vote finding Jordan responsible for the Scorpion Pass ambush, on the basis that there was no sound evidence to implicate Jordan. Though the raiders were believed to have been Arabs, he says, "there were Jordanian, Israeli, and Egyptian bedouins who were fully capable of carrying their hatreds to this extent."

The book is not written in a tone of bitterness, but it does pile up a long series of charges of Israeli obstructionism. Hutchison says that before leaving the U.S. he had heard only one side of the story: "The Israelis were staunchly protecting their new national home against the ever-increasing bitterness of the Arabs." He adds that he entered the Holy Land pro-Israel. Summing up his conclusions after his departure, he does not attack Israel, although criticizing specific actions. He does call attention to the Arab fear of Israeli expansion which, though it is generally discounted by Westerners, is very real in Arab minds.

As Commander Hutchison puts it: "The constant drive by leaders of Israel and World

Zionism for the ingathering of Jews means only one thing to the Arabs—eventual aggression by Israel for the acquisition of more territory. The Arabs remain in fear as long as Israel is incapable of presenting a workable plan to reach economic stability without expansion." He suggests that Israel "discontinue her drive to force and to encourage the ingathering while at the same time leaving an open door for those Jews seeking asylum from persecution."

The book contains accounts of Israeli truculence and intransigence on minor points which are depressing to anybody who hopes to see peace in this area. They undoubtedly could be matched on the other side. Their occurrence on either side helps to give an understanding of the problems to be settled. For example, Hutchison mentions a water cistern three yards inside Israeli territory at a point where the only inhabitants for miles around were a few poor Arabs on the other side of the armistice line. The Israeli officer on the spot told the UN observers: "If they (the Arabs) cross the line they will be shot." The incident is a thumbnail sketch of the whole state of mind along the armistice lines at the time.

For anyone working with Middle Eastern questions, Hutchison's book has some appendices that will be useful for reference. They cover such topics as the text of the controversial agreement on Israeli access to Mount Scopus, Major General Vagn Bennike's report to the Security Council on frontier incidents, the tripartite agreement to maintain the status quo, and the late Count Bernadotte's proposals of September, 1948, for a Palestine settlement. The book unfortunately lacks any detailed index.

♦ SAM POPE BREWER is Chief of the *New York Times* bureau in the Middle East.

ISLAMIC LAW IN AFRICA, by J. N. D. Anderson. London: HMSO, 1954 (Distrib. from New York). 300 pages; appendices, glossary, index to 409. \$11.00.

Reviewed by Herbert J. Liebesny

This excellent book fills a conspicuous gap in the literature on Islamic law as it is applied in the present world. While a considerable number of studies and monographs exist on Islamic

law in India, North Africa, Indonesia, and the Arab states, there has been no systematic up-to-date treatment of the present status and application of Islamic law in the British colonial areas of Africa and Southern Arabia.

As a student of Islamic law and particularly of its changes under the impact of Western thought and modern institutions, Professor Anderson is extremely well-equipped for the task of presenting such a study. His book is the outgrowth of a survey for the British Colonial Office which he undertook in 1950-51 in the British dependencies in East Africa, Southern Arabia, and West Africa. The purpose of the survey was to determine the problems which arise from the application of Islamic law in these various territories, with the ultimate goal, as Lord Hailey states in his foreword, of enabling the colonial administrations "to readjust current legislation on some comprehensive basis."

Professor Anderson deals with his subject primarily on a regional basis. An introductory chapter discusses several fundamental questions, among them the relationship of Islamic law to "native law" in the various territories, particularly the applicability of Islamic law and non-Islamic customary law in specific instances. There is also a brief discussion of the schools of Islamic law found in the territories considered in the book, of litigation among immigrant Muslims, and of the courts and rules of procedure. The main portion of the book is divided into two parts, one dealing in separate chapters with Aden, Somaliland Protectorate, Zanzibar, and the various East African protectorates, the other with those in West Africa. The Sudan is dealt with in an appendix. In other appendices the author discusses the immigrant Muslim communities, and some very special points of law, mainly relating to marriage. Of particular value is the Table of Ordinances, Decrees, etc., found in Appendix G, which will be appreciated by anybody who has to ascertain the law in force in the various territories on specific questions, particularly personal status law and land law. An excellent glossary of legal terms and a comprehensive index complete the book.

As the author points out, *shari'a* law finds its widest application in all East Africa in the Aden Protectorate (he extends East Africa to Aden because appeals from Aden now go to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa). In South Arabia *shari'a* law appears largely as a tool of the centralized government whether indigenous or foreign. The British have frequently taken the initiative in extending its sway and have helped relegate local custom into the background. In Professor Anderson's words, "It is a moot point how far (this British initiative) . . . can be regarded as an unmixed blessing to the country as a whole." In Aden as well as in the other territories the author interviewed a large number of persons concerned with the administration of justice, including many qadis. He presents in clear and concise fashion the many enactments applicable in a given territory, outlines actual practice as far as he could ascertain it, and gives a critical evaluation of the situation. Of particular value in the appendix on the Sudan is the comparison with Egyptian legislation.

The main value of the book lies in its being a guide for the lawyer and other persons concerned with the administrative or legal problems of the British territories in Africa and South Arabia. The sociologist will not find any discussion of the deeper sociological roots of the various legal developments. As Professor Anderson himself emphasizes, there is no detailed discussion of specific legal institutions. It should also be noted that the title of the book is somewhat misleading. It neither presents a full treatment of Islamic law nor does it deal with all of Africa. Another fact that the reader will regret is that the survey was made in 1950-51 but the book did not actually become available until 1955. Some of the discussions of details of legislation were therefore out of date even before the book was published.

However, the limitations are due mainly to its genesis. It is the result of an official survey taken for a specific purpose. The points raised in no way detract from the value of the work, which remains indispensable for anybody who has occasion to deal with the law of the British possessions in Africa and Southwest Asia.

◆ HERBERT J. LIEBESNY has made a special study, over a number of years, of legal problems and developments in the Middle East.

MUHAMMAD AT MEDINA, by W. Montgomery Watt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. 418 pages. 42s.

Reviewed by Edwin E. Calverley

This excellent book is the sequel to Dr. Watt's *Muhammad at Mecca*. Together the two form a discursive appraisal, rather than a descriptive biography, of Muhammad's career and character. In the present work Dr. Watt presents the events of Muhammad's life in ten chapters and twelve appendices, covering the period from his emigration from Mecca to the establishment of the Muslim state at Medina, the conquest and conversion of Mecca and most of Arabia, and his death at the apex of his great accomplishments.

One of the valuable contributions of the book to be mentioned is the exposition of the relationship of the religious and other factors in Muhammad's establishment of Islam. Converts were to worship and serve the Muslim God by obeying the Arab Prophet-ruler. The vital element in the new system was its ideological basis.

Another valuable contribution to the understanding of Islam is the book's discussion of the subject of Muhammad's sincerity at Medina. Western scholars generally agree now that at Mecca Muhammad was a sincere and genuine social and religious reformer, but many still find it difficult to accept his sincerity of character at Medina in view of his actions there. The three most quoted events are his marriage with the wife of his adopted son Zaid, his severe treatment of the Jews of Medina and elsewhere, and his extraordinary marital conduct.

Dr. Watt reports the circumstances of these actions in detail and finds them justifiable according to the standards of the time and place. Some of Muhammad's own wives criticized his marital conduct at the time, but there was no such criticism by male Muslims either then or later. Dr. Watt considers Muhammad to have been in his day "a reformer even in the sphere

of morals" (p. 332). But he asks, "Are there any principles to be learnt from the life and teaching of Muhammad that will contribute to the one morality of the future?" Then he states, "toward convincing Christian Europe that Muhammad is a moral exemplar, however, little, indeed nothing has so far been accomplished" (pp. 333-4).

Another excellent discussion deals with the new system of life that Muhammad introduced into Arabia as one based on religious bonds rather than blood relationship. The treatment of the religious institutions of Islam, however, is too brief to be fully satisfactory. For instance, in discussing the ceremony of the Worship, mention could have been made of the crucial importance for the success of Islam in its Median decade of the change of the *qiblah* from Jerusalem to Mecca, thus making Mecca again the religious capital of the area. Further, the subsequent (and consequent) incorporation of the age-old pagan pilgrimage to Mecca among the pillars of the new religion preserved the economic prosperity of the Meccans and in fact the tribes of the whole region, and thus aided in reconciling the inhabitants to the new regime.

◆ EDWIN E. CALVERLEY is Professor Emeritus of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Hartford Seminary Foundation, and co-Editor of *The Muslim World*.

ANNUAIRE DU MONDE MUSULMAN: STATISTIQUE, HISTORIQUE, SOCIAL ET ECONOMIQUE, 1954, ed. by Louis Massignon. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. 428 pages. Frs. 2650. (In French)

Reviewed by Howard A. Reed

The fourth edition of this encyclopedic manual appears, after a quarter-century hiatus, in succession to the earlier versions of 1923, 1926, and 1929. Personal tragedies forced the postponement of projected editions in 1931 and 1935, and a complete edition prepared in 1939 had to remain unpublished due to the war. Professor Massignon and his former student, Vincent Monteil, have collaborated in bringing the present work up to date (i.e. 1954) as far as possible. It is based on the ill-fated compilation of 1939 and the earlier editions, but is more detailed than they were.

The range of territories covered is immense, for the *Annuaire* contains many significant details about areas like Mozambique, where less than 5% of the population is Muslim, and on other regions where Islam is acknowledged but which seldom appear in general surveys of Islam. The work attempts to present essential statistical, historical and cultural data on the contemporary status and influence of Islam and Muslims both in territories where they are dominant as well as those where they form minority groups. This information is classified under five major headings, Demography, Government, Administration, Labor and Production, and Bibliography. Individual countries and territories are grouped together into three main geographical regions, Asia, Africa, and Europe. Muslims in the Southeast Pacific, America, and North Africans in France are grouped together in a fourth category. Four special indices at the end of the book deal with ethnology, races and languages, and social and religious matters. There is also a sacred index devoted to chief religious groupings, venerated names, and centers of pilgrimage. A useful table lists page references to individual country sections and the number of Muslims in each area. The total world Muslim population is given as 365,406,000.

Unfortunately this edition is marred by an unusually large number of errors, due in part to the compilers' preoccupation with moral and social issues during the recent critical years of Franco-Muslim relations. For example, there are 13 errors in the section on Turkey (pp. 175-86) and many other statements are out of date for 1954 or even for 1950. There are many worthwhile citations in the various bibliographical sections, but important publications, such as the IBRD's *The Economy of Turkey* (1951); E. Bisbee's *The New Turks* (1951); The International Labor Office's *Labor Problems in Turkey* (1950); J. K. Birge's *A Guide to Turkish Area Study* (1949); or the *Türkiye Bibliyografyası* (1928), are omitted from the list for Turkey. The bibliographies for Yemen, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt omit many key studies published before 1954. Also, useful general reference works such as Hazard's *Atlas of Islamic History* (1951), the Royal Institute

of International Affairs' *The Middle East—A Political and Economic Survey* (1950), or Europa Publications' *The Middle East* (1953) are not mentioned.

Professor Massignon's eloquent introductory essay illuminates the spirit in which he and M. Monteil have labored to produce this amazing compilation of data set in a suitable historical and sociological framework. The author is eminently qualified for such a monumental task, and it is an indispensable reference work. The *Annuaire* is also replete with facts and insights on the psychology and spiritual life of Muslims today. It is in these dimensions of depth, breadth, and a sense of personal, religious kinship that the book makes its particular, even unique contribution. It stands alone as a one-volume survey of the entire Muslim world.

♦ HOWARD A. REED, a student of modern Islam in Turkey, is on the staff of the Ford Foundation.

INDIA

JOBS AND WORKERS IN INDIA, by Oscar Ornati. Ithaca: Institute of International Industrial and Labor Relations, 1955. 188 pages; appendices, index to 215. \$4.00.

Reviewed by J. H. Dunderdale

India's rapidly changing social scene presents an intriguing challenge to all students of society and social evolution. Yet the complexity of the Indian social picture and the scarcity of reliable data that may be used as guideposts, discourage all but the most determined of investigators. Professor Ornati's willingness to respond to the challenge deserves high praise, and his study of Indian labor should be given a warm welcome because of its useful data and interpretative analysis.

The book has two purposes. The first purpose is to serve as a handbook to give basic information on labor and labor policies in India. A secondary purpose is to point out some of the gaps that exist in the information available on labor conditions, and to suggest topics for future research on the nature and place of the labor force in India's economy.

One of the most enlightening sections of the book, comprising chapters VII and VIII, deals with labor organization. These chapters unravel

the complexities that have characterized the development of trade unions in India since their beginnings forty years ago. They give a clear picture of the evolution of the major national unions and of their present relationships. The value of this section would have been enhanced still more, if the material presented in Appendix II had been woven into the material contained in these two chapters. The reader is left to speculate on one key question, namely: "What would happen to the unions if the support they now enjoy in the form of government-inspired legislation and government administrative procedures were to be withdrawn?"

Though the author explains that his approach is "Western," he does not avoid all the pitfalls into which many Westerners who write about Indian society are apt to stumble. The pitfall of over-simplifying Indian conditions is the one he finds most difficult to avoid. For example, Professor Ornati concludes that the Indian labor force is inefficient, transient, and poorly paid; that it consists of unskilled, uneducated workers; that the basic interest of its workers is not in the factory or in the city where the factory is located, but in the village and in the agricultural activities centered about the village. While statistics and case records may be cited to support these characteristics, it is only fair to point out that none of them are absolute or universal. The question of transiency is a case in point. While there is a certain amount of coming and going between city and village on the part of workers, it can be proven that factory, mine labor and plantation labor are now reasonably settled. A generation of laborers has grown up that is more familiar with the city, the mine and the plantation than with the village that had been home to their forbears for many generations. The laborers of this generation may go to the village to get married or observe some special festival but they return to the city where life for them is now more familiar and more congenial.

Professor Ornati emphasizes, quite rightly, that poor housing conditions in the city contribute to the inefficiency of the worker, but he errs when he idealizes village conditions and tries to maintain that the worker lowers his

standard of living when he leaves the village, where he is accustomed to a dwelling that "consists of two cottages and offers privacy as well as protection" (p. 53). The one-roomed hut, with its mud walls, mud floor, and thatched roof, that the average villager shares with his family and sometimes with a goat and a few chickens, hardly deserves that description.

Nor is there an adequate basis for suggesting that so far as poverty is concerned, "the industrial worker is even worse off than his agricultural brother." (p. 52). If we accept Professor Ornati's figures on worker wages, which he says average between RS 70/ and RS 100/ per month, then the average industrial worker is comparatively well-to-do, since the average agricultural laborer does not earn more than RS 25/ per month. It is true that the industrial laborer is in a difficult plight if he loses his job. But the agricultural laborer in the best districts never has more than 32 weeks employment in a year and in less fertile districts he is fortunate if he has 12 weeks of employment.

Despite these tendencies on occasion to over-simplify and to idealize, Professor Ornati is a knowledgeable and dependable guide. His book, as Professor C. N. Vakil of the University of Bombay School of Economics and Sociology states in his introduction, is "a creditable piece of work."

♦ J. H. DUNDERDALE is a Y.M.C.A. secretary with twenty years' experience in India.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1947-54, by J. C. Kundra. Groningen, Holland: J. B. Wolters, 1956 (Distrib. by Institute of Pacific Relations). 225 pages; biblio., index to 239. \$4.50.

Reviewed by Albert E. Kane

This little book bravely attempts in five short chapters to sketch the general background and discuss the aims of India's foreign policy between 1947 and 1954, as well as to tell the story of India's relationships during this period with the nations of the West and the Commonwealth. The fundamental objection to this study is its assumption that a worthwhile history can be written about very recent events. While the author candidly admits that his analy-

sis lacks the objective evidence which only time can provide, he quotes extensively from the published statements of Nehru and naively bases his own conclusions thereon.

The introduction, by A. Appadorai, briefly outlines what appears to be India's current foreign policy: non-alignment with power blocs, support for the freedom of dependent peoples, opposition to racial discrimination anywhere, and a strong desire to maintain world peace. The author also lists India's motives as, one, the natural desire to avoid involvement in any war, which would interrupt her internal economic development, and, two, determination to preserve her independence in foreign relationships by not becoming an appendage of either one of the two major power blocs. He believes that India regards Communism as a reaction to foreign oppression or an unjust internal system, and not as a sinister international conspiracy, as the West deems it to be. He notes, however, that India opposed Communist expansion into neighboring Burma and Ceylon. He stresses India's belief that peace cannot be upheld through defensive alliances, since they create tensions and increase the danger of war; but no alternative method is offered other than the suggestion that events can be shaped better by the power of ideas.

The author is inclined to suspect every American move and to idealize every Indian one. He seems to accept an Indian view that U.S. military aid to Pakistan was not to help in the fight against Communism, but was a "form of intervention" in Indo-Pakistani relations. The U.S. is also berated ideologically for not taking an unequivocal stand against the Dutch on Indonesia. On the other hand, India was justified in not sending troops to Korea, even though she opposed the North Korean aggression, because if that war had not remained localized, she might have become involved in it. India was right to remain within the Commonwealth, also, not for ideological reasons, but because her self-interest demanded the obtaining of Commonwealth preferences and the support of the Commonwealth in world affairs. The paradox between these views and India's avowed aims in foreign policy is not fully explained.

♦ ALBERT E. KANE is a lawyer and long-time student of Indian affairs.

IRAN

MISSION FOR PEACE: POINT 4 IN IRAN, by William E. Warne. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. 320 pages. \$4.00.

Reviewed by Mehdi Kianfar

Mission for Peace is the story of the day-to-day operations of the Point 4 Program in Iran. It goes much farther than that, however. The book begins with President Truman's introduction of the Program to Congress, and the American people, in his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949, as "a bold new program of the United States to share technical knowledge in order to help the peace-loving peoples of underdeveloped countries to realize their aspirations for a better life."

The book is actually the balance sheet of William Warne, who directed the American technical assistance program in Iran from 1951 to 1955. The author considers the establishment of the Iran program and the search for qualified men from various departments of the Government to staff the program, concluding with his own selection and departure for Iran. This section, which includes personal reminiscences of the author's career in the Department of the Interior, is fortunately short. Elsewhere he does not limit the scope of his book to the operation of Point 4, but examines all aspects of Iranian life—politics, diplomacy, economics, social anthropology, and agriculture.

The book offers readers many interesting and even humorous anecdotes on Point 4 activity in Iran, such as the contribution of its jackasses to developing Iran's feudal agricultural system. Some Iranians challenged the effectiveness of the Program in changing their backward agricultural system and improving economic conditions. They viewed it as a "drop in the bucket," and advanced the argument that a country continually threatened by both external and internal Communism, as Iran was, needed a dynamic short-range plan for economic development to offset the threat of subversion. Point 4, these officials believed, was too much a long-range effort to be genuinely valuable to Iran.

Mr. Warne, in replying to this challenge, said that the Point 4 Program was not designed to bring Iran, in one leap, from the 14th century to the 20th, but to teach Iranians to progress by slow, safe steps. He calls it evolutionary, not revolutionary, in its very concept. In one sense the book is thus a defense of the Point 4 approach to all underdeveloped countries. The author would have done better to concentrate on the record of the Program in Iran, and not try to debate it.

Mission for Peace is an interesting and readable book. However, the author's interpretations of political problems and his judgment of some of the Iranians he met are not free from error, bias, and favoritism. Thus in describing his visit to Mulla Kashani (p. 67) he mentions the Mulla as a man who wore a white turban. Mulla Kashani is Sayyid (holy) and has always worn a black turban, according to the religious tradition in Iran. He also writes (p. 151) that Reza Shah, after his return from Paris, started to plan for a "water piping project." Actually Reza Shah never went to Paris, and the water piping project never existed.

Although the book is not based on scholarly research, it is an informative work on Point 4 operations in Iran. The rosy picture which the author paints on the value of the program to Iran is open to debate. Nevertheless, Point 4, like the UN Technical Assistance Program in Iran, through its activities in the past few years, has discredited the idea that people in underdeveloped areas are too ignorant and backward to adopt new ways.

◆ MEHDI KIANFAR, himself a native of Iran, recently received his doctorate from The American University, Washington, D. C.

PERSIAN GULF

KUWAIT AND HER NEIGHBORS, BY H. R. P. Dickson. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956. 627 pages; maps, genealogical tables, 75s.

Reviewed by Sir Rupert Hay

Colonel Dickson's new book is a potpourri of history, personal reminiscences, and tribal tales, with scattered digressions on other mat-

ters. As its title indicates, it is chiefly concerned with Kuwait and her immediate neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but there are side glances at the rest of the Arab world and even Turkey and Africa.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I is little more than a gazeteer, heavy reading but a useful background to the other parts. Part II is described as "mainly historical," but is interlarded with the author's own experiences as well as those of his grandfather. Events in which the author himself did not play a part form a rather bare chronicle, and there is perhaps too much adulation and too little criticism of personages in the area. Part II also contains an unexpected digression on the subject of the American Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, which has done much wonderful medical work in the Persian Gulf neighborhood.

Part III is "mainly reminiscent" and consists of tribal tales and personal reminiscences classified on a purely chronological basis and connected by brief historical passages like beads on a string. In these reminiscences the author frequently refers with obvious pride to the unique opportunities he enjoyed of meeting and conversing with Arab tribal ladies of noble birth.

Part IV, which consists of one chapter only, is described as "supplementary." It begins with an account of the first shipment of oil from Kuwait and ends with a reprint of an article from *The Petroleum Times* by Margaret C. Clarke on the progress of the Kuwait Oil Company. Between these are sandwiched the views of "a prominent Lebanese politician," Dr. Harold Storm of the American Arabian Mission, and the author on the impact of the West on the Middle East. This is the most interesting part of the book. The author concludes with the very sound, if conservative, advice that the West should cease trying to force its concepts of civilization on the Middle East and preach the virtues of character building and religion.

The book, although edited for publication by Clifford Witting, who provides a brief foreword about the author and his wife, remains rather a hodge-podge. It contains much good material, but it is a book to be dipped into rather than read straight through. The general

reader may find the multitude of Arabic names and words confusing, although there is a reasonably accurate glossary of the latter at the end. Also there are many excellent illustrations, maps, and genealogical tables.

As a colleague and friend of Colonel Dickson's in the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia and for eight years in the Persian Gulf, this reviewer has often listened to his stories. It is good to know that they have now been put on record for posterity in this book, which forms a fitting supplement, in a lighter vein, to his more serious *The Arab of the Desert*.

♦ SIR RUPERT HAY, now retired, served the British Government of India and subsequently the British Foreign Office with distinction for many years. From 1946-53 he was Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

TURKEY

THE STRUCTURE OF THE OTTOMAN DYNASTY, by A. D. Alderson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 186 pages; 22 genealogical tables. \$12.80.

Reviewed by G. G. Arnakis

The House of Osman controlled the destinies of the Turks and other peoples in Asia and Europe for nearly 650 years—a length of time that gave it undisputed seniority over its European counterparts, the Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Romanovs. Yet prior to the appearance of this excellent book, there was no comprehensive scholarly work on the Ottoman dynasty *per se*. Mr. Alderson has put together an enormous amount of information on the private and public life of the sultans. His compact chapters deal with Ottoman succession, accession, deposition and abdication, regency, fratricide, the harem, marriage and divorce, births, deaths, and many other aspects of their rule. The chapters are short, averaging 7 pages. The author's success in organizing his material within so limited a space is due to his practice of concluding each chapter with a table of essential information—ranging from the mothers of the sultans and their national origin to all titles and nicknames applied to members of the dynasty. The institution of fratricide, begun by Mehmed the Conqueror, is explained not only in terms of the ruler's desire to be

left without potential rivals but also as an effective device for preventing the appearance of an aristocracy of blood, which would be contrary to the nature of the administrative pattern—i.e. the Slave Institution. At the end of the 16th century, as the author points out, fratricide was substituted by the *kafes* (Cage) where the royal princes passed their lives under conditions little better than those of a penitentiary.

Quite as important as the chapters of the book are the genealogical tables of the 37 sultans or caliphs, including in each case lists of wives and children, all with their dates of birth, marriage, and death, and accompanied by explanatory notes with bibliographical references. Nine more tables show the marriage alliances of the Osmanlis with other Turkish dynasties, as well as with the Comneni of Trebizond, the Palaeologi, the Serbs, and the Safavids. Because of the frequent recurrence of the same given name, the author has resorted to the system of numbering each member, and the number is inserted before the name in all instances, in the tables, in the text, and in the index.

One is inclined to think that these tables (XX-LXIII) were originally meant to be the core of the book, and that all preceding material was to serve as prolegomena to the tables. The author's diligence and erudition has been lavished upon the genealogies of the sultans and their labyrinthine family relations. He has an intimate knowledge of the background of what might have been a dynastic chronicle. It must be noted, however, that, living in Istanbul, he has relied heavily upon contemporary Turkish historical writing, which, unfortunately, has so far remained outside the pale of Western historiography, in some respects he has followed the technique of presentation and even the style of Turkish historians, notably Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, the leading authority on the Ottoman period. The author has accepted, without reservation or discussion, Uzunçarşılı's dates for the reign of Osman (1281-1320), the death of Osman (1324 instead of the traditional 1326, which is the year of the fall of Brusa where he was buried), the suppression of the Janissaries (1828 instead of 1826) and other controversial

minutiae. It is important to remember that Turkish historians are still inclined to draw conclusions from limited, doubtful, or scanty documentary evidence, while a certain amount of healthy skepticism would not be wasted in an effort to ascertain the truth.

Throughout the book Mr. Alderson has used the modern Turkish (i.e. post-1929) alphabet and the Turkish plural endings—Osmanlılar, Krim hanları, Memlûkler, and Safeviler, for example. It would have been better to have used the more familiar anglicized forms: Osmanlis or Ottomans, Crimean khans, Mamelukes or Mam-luks, and Safavids. Aside from this and other minor matters, the author has given us a well-written work of scholarship on a long-neglected subject.

◆ G. G. ARNAKIS is Professor of Byzantine History at Texas Christian University.

SHORTER NOTICES

MUSHKILAT AL-MAWSIL (THE MOSUL PROBLEM: A STUDY IN ANGLO-IRAQI-TURKISH DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC OPINION), by Fad-hil Hussain. Baghdad: al-Rabitta Press, 1955. 336 pages. No price indicated. (In Arabic)

This book is the Arabic translation of the author's doctorate dissertation submitted in 1952 to Indiana University. It covers in 12 fully documented chapters the political and diplomatic developments relating to the dispute between Turkey and Iraq over the Mosul province in the post-World War I period. Although this phase of Iraq's modern history has received frequent treatment by Western and Arab writers, the present work constitutes by far the most exhaustive contribution to the subject to date. The author makes ample use of Arabic and Iraqi sources not easily accessible to the student, and the Arabic translation is excellent. It is to be noted with special satisfaction that the technical production of the book is of superior quality, and that the consistency and precision of the footnoting system is very rarely encountered in similar works appearing in the Arab World today.

◆ H. B. SHARABI, Washington, D. C.

HERITAGE OF THE DESERT, by Harry B. Ellis. New York: Ronald Press, 1956. 300 pages; biblio., index to 311. \$5.00.

As an introduction to the Arab East for Americans, this is a useful and informative work. Mr. Ellis was for several years correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* in the Middle East and has many illuminating anecdotes to relate of his time there.

With regard to the central theme of the book, that the "heritage of the desert" is a Bedouin system of values which permeates all Arab society, Mr. Ellis is on somewhat shaky ground and there will be many who will not agree. He offers the figure of the late Ibn Saud as prototype of the Bedouin. But the King was city-born and bred, though he understood Bedouins very well and used them in his climb to power.

There are a number of minor errors of fact, particularly in the sections dealing with the Islamic faith, but for a work so broad in scope they do not detract materially from its general worth.

◆ WILLIAM L. SANDS, Washington, D. C.

A HISTORY OF TURKEY, FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC, by M. Philips Price. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 224 pages. \$4.50.

This book by Philips Price, M.P. and frequent visitor to Turkey, deals with the evolution of Turkey from a corrupt Empire to a vigorous "parliamentary" democracy. The author feels that the original Ottoman strength lay in its Westward, rather than Eastern, orientation. The book has some merit as a general introduction to Turkey and a summing-up of the rise and fall of the Empire. It also includes some useful first-hand information on the Russo-Turkish Caucasus campaigns in World War I, where Price was an observer. Unfortunately it suffers from poor organization and is carelessly edited, and there are many errors of both fact and observation. The practice of placing the bibliography at the end of each chapter merely disguises the sparseness of entries. Startling omissions are the important Cyprus issue and the Baghdad Pact. Turkey deserves a better report than this.

◆ WILLIAM SPENCER, Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ETHIOPIA, by William E. H. Howard. Groningen, Holland: J. B. Wolters, 1956. 204 pages. No price indicated.

This volume presents the outlines of Ethiopia's governmental institutions and processes in fairly broad brush strokes. The author deals with the main divisions and responsibilities of Imperial, provincial and local administration in this two-thousand-year-old empire, concentrating for the most part on recent changes introduced by Emperor Haile Selassie. In addition, some material is provided concerning the religious, social, and ethnic divisions which shape the evolution of public administration in Ethiopia. The study, however, suffers from inadequate treatment of such important subjects as Ethiopian-Eritrean federation, the development of customary law, and the role of Koranic courts in Muslim areas. Moreover, no mention is made of one of the most important innovations introduced in recent years—Ethiopia's Revised Constitution, promulgated by the Emperor in November, 1955¹.

♦ WILLIAM H. LEWIS, Washington, D. C.

¹ The text is in the *Middle East Journal*, 10 (Spring, 1956).

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

General

Africa's Challenge to America, by Chester Bowles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956. 134 pages. \$2.75. Organized from a series of lectures, it argues for a reevaluation of our foreign policy in Africa to support independence movements instead of emphasizing military alliances.

Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, by V. V. Barthold. Transl. by V. and T. Minorsky. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956. Vol. I, 184 pages. Gld. 15. The first volume (Vol. II will be published in 1957), called *A Short History of Turkestan*, is also the first English translation of Barthold's classic work on Muslim Turkestan, originally prepared as a syllabus of lectures delivered at the University of Turkestan, 1920-1.

History of the Arabs, by Philip Hitti. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. 822 pages. \$9.00. A new edition which contains much revised material, especially on the pre-Islamic kingdoms of South Arabia.

The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, by Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956. 206 pages; appendix, index to 227. \$4.00. A study of Arab nationalism, largely theoretical, by the Undersecretary of

the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development in Jordan.

Queen of the East, by Alexander Baron. New York: Ives Washburn, 1956. 319 pages. \$3.95. A novel about Zenobia of Palmyra and her contest with the Emperor Aurelian.

The Recovery of the Holy Land, by Pierre Dubois. Transl. by Walter Brandt. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. 267 pages. \$4.50. Translation of a 14th century pamphlet written by Dubois as a plan to rescue Palestine from the Muslims. Included is a long introduction describing the life and times of Dubois.

Who's Who in Egypt and the Near East, 22nd ed., foreword by James Blattner. New York: W. S. Heinman, 1956. 688 pages. \$14.00.

Winter Quarters, by Alfred Duggan. New York: Coward-McCann, 1956. 284 pages. \$3.75. A scholarly but readable and well-documented novel about the Roman campaign and disaster of Crassus against the Parthians.

Cyprus

Cyprus Challenge, by Percy Arnold. London: Hogarth Press, 1956. 222 pages. 21s. Reminiscences by a former editor of the *Cyprus Post*, 1942-45. Does not deal with the present situation.

Egypt

Mirage, by Ruth McKenney. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956. 726 pages. \$4.95. A long, unwieldy novel about Napoleon's campaigns in Egypt.

The Sphinx Awakes, by Gerald Sparrow. London: Robert Hale, 1956. 148 pages; appendices, index to 217. 21s. A book by a retired British judge about the rise and present status of the Nasir Government in Egypt, it is oversimplified and highly uncritical. Half the book is devoted to reproduction of original documents, such as the Sudan Agreement.

India

Himalaya Barbary, by Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956. 241 pages. \$4.50. An anthropologist's report on North India's borderland tribes, while undertaking a Government mission.

The Indian Capital Market, by V. R. Cinvante. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 226 pages. \$2.65. A study of the dynamic aspects of development of backward economies, with particular reference to the inflow of capital into India under the Five-Year-Plans.

Jawaharlal Nehru, by Frank Moraes. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 521 pages. \$6.75. A biography by the editor of *The Times of India*.

The Legacy of Lokamanya, by Theodore L. Shay. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 215 pages. \$2.10. A discussion of the political philosophy of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a 19th century Indian reformer.

Nehru: Conversations on India and World Affairs, by Tibor Mende. New York: George Braziller, 1956. 144 pages; biblio. \$3.00. A written record of tape-recorded conversations between Nehru and the author in early 1956.

Planning for an Expanding Economy, by C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmanand. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956 (Printed in India). 386 pages; Notes, index to 404. \$4.50. A detailed analysis and critique of India's second Five-Year-Plan, comparing it to the first. *Shadow of the Monsoon*, by William Manchester. New York: Doubleday, 1956. 384 pages. \$4.50. A novel about Americans in the Himalaya jungles.

Iraq

New Babylon: a Portrait of Iraq, by Desmond Stewart and John Haylock. London: Collins, 1956. 256 pages. 16s. A lively personal account.

Israel

A Gallery of Zionist Profiles, by Louis Lipsky. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956. 250 pages. \$3.75. A collection of brief biographies of noted 19th and 20th century Zionists, with an introduction by Maurice Samuel.

Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People, by Salo Baron and others; ed. by Leo W. Schwartz. New York: Random House, 1956. 542 pages. \$5.00. An interpretive history of Jewish culture from the Biblical age to modern Israel.

Israel and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1956. 322 pages. \$3.00. The report of a study group set up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and subsidized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Israel Argosy, no. 4, ed. by Isaac Halevy-Levin. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956. 202 pages. \$3.75. (In English and Hebrew.) An anthology of contemporary Israeli poems, essays, short stories, and a novel.

Palästina Zwischen Krieg und Frieden, by E. Jannes. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956. 243 pages. f 13.45 (In German). An historical survey dating back to Roman times.

Rebel and Statesman: the Jabotinsky Story, by Joseph Schechtman. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956. 437 pages; notes, index to 467. \$6.00. Deals with the Revisionist leader's early life from 1880 to his resignation from the WZO in 1923. A second projected volume will complete the story of Jabotinsky's life.

Tebilla, and other Israeli Tales, by S. Y. Agnon and others. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956. 271 pages. \$3.75. A collection of short stories.

What Price Israel? by Alfred Lilienthal. rev. ed. Chicago: Regnery Press, 1956. 274 pages. \$1.50. Brought up to date.

Lebanon

Studies on the Government of Lebanon, comp. by the Department of Public Administration, American University of Beirut. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1956. 306 pages; charts. LL 4/00 (In Arabic). A collection of lectures presented by the various Ministries of the Government of Lebanon at AUB.

North Africa

Argelia y su Destino, by Carmen M. De la Escalera.

Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1956. 289 pages. Ptas. 125 (In Spanish). A Spanish history of Algeria from the French conquest to the present time. *Azalai, the Gathering of the Camels*, by John Skolle. New York: Harper's, 1956. 272 pages. \$4.00. A travel book about the tribes and territories of the Sahara. The author accompanied an azalai, or salt caravan, from Taoudeni to Timbuktu.

Les Conventions Franco-Tunisiennes du 3 Juin 1955, by Nor Ladhari. Tunis: Imprimerie du Nord, 1956. 186 pages. Frs. 400 (In French). Contains the full texts of the Conventions, plus an analysis.

The Forgotten Place, by John Fores. New York: Coward-McCann, 1956. 256 pages. \$3.00. A British novel about smuggling in French North Africa.

The Lighthearted Quest, by Ann Bridge. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 262 pages. \$3.75. A rather superficial novel of an Englishwoman in North Africa.

Nordafrika: Tunesien, Algerien, Marokko, by Margret & Eberhard Wohlfahrt. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1955. 771 pages. DM 16.80 (In German). An extensive social and economic survey of the 3 North African countries.

Ocean of Fire, by Robert Christopher. New York: Rand McNally, 1956. 256 pages. \$3.95. A travel journey in the Sahara. Photographs.

Les Potiers de Nabeul, by P. Lisse & A. Louis. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956. 280 pages; figures, plates. f 14.30 (In French). A sociological study of Tunisia.

Sahara Adventure, by Philip Dirole. Transl. by Katherine Woods. New York: Messner, 1956. 185 pages; biblio., maps. \$4.50. Travels in the Fezzan by a well-known underwater explorer.

The Tangerine House, by Rupert Croft-Cooke. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. 218 pages. \$4.50. An English writer's sojourn in Tangier.

The Unfaithful Wife, by Jules Roy. New York: Knopf, 1956. 178 pages. \$1.25. A philosophical novel set in North Africa.

Verités Sur L'Afrique du Nord, by Pierre Boyer de Latour. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956. 232 pages. Frs. 600 (In French). A report on the author's tours as Resident General in Morocco and Tunisia, to Sept. 1955.

Pakistan

A Constitution for Pakistan, by Herbert Feldman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 103 pages. \$95. A brief study of constitutional development in Pakistan to late 1955.

Saints of the Sind, by Peter Mayne. New York: Doubleday, 1956. 254 pages. \$3.75. A travel journey among the various and numerous Muslim saints of the Sind region in lower Pakistan.

The Sudan

Mission on the Nile, by Father James Dempsey. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 247 pages. \$6.00. Missionary life among the little-known Shilluk people of the Upper Sudan, by a Catholic priest. Although slanted, it contains some valuable first-hand sociological information on the Shilluk.

The 1953 Pilot Population Census for the First Population Census of the Sudan. Khartoum, 1955 (Printed in Austria). 143 pages; maps, photographs, charts. No price indicated (In English). An official report on the Sudan's first census, prepared by the Department of Statistics, Ministry of Social Affairs, in accordance with recommendations of the UN Statistical Commission. Publication delay was caused by implementation of the main Sudan population census, which report has not been issued.

Turkey

Aimée, by Margaret Lathrop Law. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1956. 308 pages. \$3.95. A historical novel based on the life of Aimée Dubuc de Rivery, alleged to have been Valide Sultana during the reign of Sultan Selim III and the mother of Mahmud II (1808-39).

Atatürk'un Nöbet Defteri, 1931-38, comp. by ÖzelSahingiray (Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, no. 8. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1955. 750 pages. T.L. 20 (In Turkish). Reproduction of a "watch log" kept by Atatürk's aides during this period, listing his major movements and callers.

Byzantium and Istanbul, by Robert Liddell. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 239 pages; appendices, index to 256. \$5.00. A travel guide.

Europa Minor, by Lord Kinross. New York: William Morrow, 1956. 157 pages. \$4.00. A sequel to *Within the Taurus*, covering the author's travels along the Lycian and Carian coasts of South and Southwest Turkey. Although full of vivid description, it suffers by comparison with Freya Stark's reports on the same journey.

Gallipoli, by Alan Moorehead. New York: Harper's, 1956. 384 pages. \$4.50. A thorough and extremely readable study of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign.

Turkey in My Time, by Ahmed Emin Yalman. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. 280 pages; index to 294. \$4.00. The author, a prominent Istanbul editor, tells the highly personal story of his own involvement in Turkish national life since World War I.

Art, Archaeology

Decorative Art of Asia and Egypt, by Helmut Th. Bosert. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 53 pages. \$12.50. Four hundred decorative motifs in color on applied art in Egypt, the Islamic countries, and the Far East.

Iran, by Basil Gray. New York: Graphic Society, 1956. 57 pages; 32 plates in color. \$16.50. Sixth in the UNESCO World Art Series, it includes reproductions of miniature paintings illustrating mss. from the 14th to the early 17th centuries.

The Lost Pyramid, by M. Zakaria Goneim. New York: Rinehart, 1956. 190 pages. \$3.50. A popular account of a "find" in Egyptology.

Linguistics, Literature, Religion

The Arabian Nights Entertainment, transl. by Sir Richard Burton, notes by Henry Torrens and others. 2

vols. New York: Dial Press, 1956. 961 pages. \$12.50. Contains a preface by John Winterich about the origins, translations, and annotations of the tales.

Cave of Riches: the Story of the Dead Sea Scrolls, by Alan Honour. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. 159 pages. \$2.75.

A Comprehensive English-Hindi Dictionary, ed. by Raghu Vira and others. New York: W. S. Heinman, 1956. 1579 pages; illus. \$20.00.

The Dead Sea Scriptures, transl. by Theodore H. Gaster. New York: Doubleday, 1956. 362 pages. \$4.00. The first English translation of the Scrolls.

Lehrbuch der Türkischen Sprache, by H. Jansky. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956. 243 pages. f 18.20 (In Turkish and German). A dictionary.

The Middle East: Its Religion and Culture, by Edward J. Jurji. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 159 pages. \$3.00.

Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. by H.A.R. Gibb & J. H. Kramers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956. 671 pages; diagrams, plates. \$12.75. First American edition of the classic reference work on Islam.

FORTHCOMING BOOKS

Allah Be With Us, by Elizabeth Fenton. London: Robert Hale. A novel of the search for a missing husband, set in Cairo and the Sudan.

The Arab-Israeli War, 1948, by Edgar O'Ballance. London: Faber & Faber. An account by a military commentator.

Byzantium: Greatness and Decline, by Charles Diehl, transl. by Naomi Walford. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Freedom and Death, by Nikos Kazantzakis. London: Faber & Faber. The Cretan revolt against the Ottoman Empire, in the form of a novel.

High Places of Africa, by Jean-Claude Berrier & Raymond Denizet. London: Robert Hale. Story of an expedition to eastern Sahara and Ethiopia.

Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History, by M. Mahdi. Leiden: E. J. Brill. An analysis of Ibn Khaldun's text.

Israel and Her Neighbors, by Eliahu Elath. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. A study of Arab-Israeli relations by the Israeli Ambassador to London.

Marriage and Family in India, by K. M. Kapadia. New York: Oxford University Press. The history of polygyny and polyandry in Hindu and Muslim societies traced against the background of economic circumstances and religious beliefs.

The Nature of Passion, by R. Prawer Jhabvala. New York: Norton. A novel of the nouveau riche in modern urban India.

Revolution on East River: the Twilight of National Sovereignty, by James A. Joyce. New York: Abelard Schuman. A discussion by a British lawyer and political scientist of various issues brought before the UN, including Suez, Arab neutralism, and colonialism vs. nationalism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

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Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of abbreviations, see page 117. For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 118.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, descriptive, travel, natural history, geology)

- 9312 "Middle East Force." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 82 (0 '56) 1094-1103. Collection of photographs of ports, rulers, and shipping scenes in the Persian Gulf-Red Sea area.
- 9313 WRIGLEY, GLADYS M. "The domestication of the camel." *Geog. Rev.* 46 (0 '56) 578-9. Origins of the domesticated camel.

See also: 9395.

HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 9314 DIECKMANN, EDWARD A. "Sunday punch weapon." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 82 (0 '56) 1088-93. Account of the development of "Greek fire" as a secret weapon and its successful use by the Byzantine navy in its many battles with the Moslem invaders.
- 9315 DUBLER, C. E. "Bemerkungen zu G. E. v. Grunebaums neuen studien zur islamischen kulturgeschichte." *Asiat. Stud.* (Bern) 9 (1955) 108-18. Comments on the various essays in Von Grunebaum's *Studies in Islamic cultural history and Islam—essays on the nature and growth of a cultural tradition*.
- 9316 EHRENKREUTZ, ANDREW S. "The Crisis of *dinar* in the Egypt of Saladin." *J.A.O.S.* 76 (Jl-S '56) 178-83. Saladin adopted a studied policy of monetary debasement because of the need of gold to finance his military campaigns and his efforts to restore internal security. Victory vindicated the policy and so Saladin's

successors were able to revert to the qualitatively high standards of the Fatimids.

- 9317 JEFFREYS, M. D. W. "Pre-Columbia Arabs in America." *Islamic Rev.* 44 (Ag-S '56) 26-9. An array of non-documentary evidence to support the thesis that Arabs with negro slaves came to America about 1000 A.D.
- 9318 MUELLER-WODARG, DIETER. "Die landwirtschaft Aegyptes in der fruhen 'Abbasidenzeit." *Der Islam* 32, no. 2 (1956) 141-67. This concluding portion of the study deals with pastoral economy (camel, horse, donkey and mule, cattle, fowl) and the production of honey and silk in the 8th-9th century.
- 9319 SCOTT-REID, DON. "Aleppo—Syria's northern capital." *Arab World* 29 (O '56) 7-11. Brief history and description of this colorful trade center as it is today.
- 9320 SEMIONOV, A. A. "The cultural level of the first Sheibanids." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok*, 2, no. 3 (1956) 51-9. A number of manuscripts are cited by the author to show cultural continuity in the Uzbek state during the 15th-16th century.
- 9321 TUCCI, UGO. "Una relazione di Giovan Battista Vechietti sulla Persia e su regno di Hormuz (1587)." *Oriente Mod.* 35 (Ap '55) 149-60. An annotated text of the report.
- 9322 VASILIEV, A. A. "The iconoclastic edict of the caliph Yazid II, A.D. 721." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* (Cambridge, Mass.) 9-10 (1956) 23-47. Analysis of the Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, and Armenian sources for this famous edict which has been regarded as responsible for the anti-pictorial development of Islam and which is also said to have influenced the iconoclastic attitude of Byzantium during the 8th and 9th centuries.

- 9323 VASILIEV, A. A. "Notes on some episodes concerning the relations between the Arabs and the Byzantine empire from the fourth to the sixth century." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 9-10 (1956) 306-12. Raids of the Arabs, their attitude toward Christians and their Christianization. These are preliminary studies for a projected book on the history of the relations between Byzantium and the Arabs at the beginning of Islam and the immediately preceding period. Edited after the author's death by Professor Marius Canard.

See also: 9403.

HISTORY AND POLITICS (Modern)

- 9324 "A challenge to law." *Round Table* 184 (S '56) 307-11. The British case against Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal Company.
- 9325 "Iraqi Kurdistan." *World Today* 12 (O '56) 412-32. Some up-to-date facts, chiefly political, on this little known region.
- 9326 "Middle East communism—a symposium." *Mid. East Forum* 31 (summer '56) 5-10. Four members of the staff of the American University of Beirut—George Kirk, Burhan Dajani, N. A. Faris, Mahmud Zayid, and a pro-communist physician—George Hanna—analyze the Arab mood, nature of the present and potential communist appeal, and the possibilities for Western counter-propaganda and action.
- 9327 "Nasserism and communism." *World Today* 12 (O '56) 390-8. Nasserism is no longer an ideology, if it ever was one, but "an attitude of mind" that has become obsessive on liberating Africa and the Middle East. It seems to have missed its chance to carry out basic social and economic reforms and will inevitably lose out in the competition with communism, which has everything that Nasserism has, plus a precise and practical social and economic programme.
- 9328 "The Turco-Egyptian flirtation of autumn 1954." *World Today* 12 (N '56) 447-57. Efforts to effect closer relations between Egypt and Turkey were abruptly terminated by the joint communiqué of the Iraqi and Turkish governments on Jan. 6, 1955, announcing their decision to conclude a treaty as soon as possible. Thereafter "Egyptian policy plunged headlong down the slope . . . to the nationalization of the Suez Canal."
- 9329 ABUETAN, BARID. "East-West Middle East policies." *Mid. East Aff.* 7 (Ag-S '56) 269-85. Analyzes the basic premises of the Western powers, the U.S.S.R., and the Arab States and then illustrates them with an account of the Security Council debates of April-June 1956.
- 9330 AHRAMOVICH, R. T. and BELOV, I. F., "An example of good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok* 2, no. 2 (1956) 45-55. Discussion of Soviet relations with Afghanistan.
- 9331 ALAN, RAY. "Stirrings in Araby." *Commentary* 21 (Ap '56) 344-51. Touches lightly on the effects of the contacts of the various sections of the Arabian Peninsula with the West and some of their internal and external problems.
- 9332 BAGRAMIAN, MARGUERITE. "The Armenian question and U.S. foreign policy and public opinion." *Armenian Rev.* 9 (autumn '56) 37-46. Traces the vacillation of the United States towards the Armenians from the time of President Cleveland and the 1894-96 massacres through World War II and the *varlik vergisi*.
- 9333 BEGLAR, N. "The constant factor in Moscow's Turkish policy." *Caucasian Rev.* (Munich) 1 (1955) 12-21. A provocative paper. Soviet Turkish policy is the heir of Tsarist Turkish policy, as required by Russian geopolitical interests. So flexible and skilful is the execution of that policy that the Kremlin's attempt to attain its objectives encourage the thought that the objectives themselves have been abandoned.
- 9334 CHARACHIDZE, G. "The Georgian Communist Party and the national question." *Caucasian Rev.* (Munich) 1 (1955) 22-35. Stalinism destroyed Georgian national communism and made any idea of a truly autonomous Soviet republic inconceivable.
- 9335 DE GAURY, GERALD. "The end of pashadom." *R.C.A.J.* 43 (Jl-O '56) 243-7. Thumbnail sketches of some of the famous Turks, Englishmen, and Arabs who held the title of pasha. Their power along with their careers often ended abruptly. Sir John Glubb's fate was in accordance with the ancient tradition.
- 9336 DJABAGUL, V. "Soviet national policy and genocide." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 71-80. Largely owing to the people's refusal to cooperate in abandoning their nationalist sentiments, the Soviets gradually developed a policy of severe repression of "bourgeois nationalism." The article cites eyewitness accounts of the genocidal actions employed against the North Caucasians.
- 9337 ELLER, E. M. "U.S. destiny in the Middle East." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 82 (N '56) 1160-9. The military, economic, and political importance of the Middle East to the United States as interpreted by a former commander of the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force.
- 9338 GLUBB, JOHN. "Anglo-Arab relations." *Arab World* 28 (Jl '56) 7-10. To both questions "Has England been imperialistic?" and "Does England always help Israel against the Arabs?" Gen. Glubb answers with an emphatic "no," that Egyptian propaganda to this effect is exaggerated.
- 9339 HADJIBEYLI, DJ. "Some echoes of the 1927 purge in Azerbaïdjan." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 36-46. Mass liquidation of the old communists was accomplished by administrative action, without trials of any kind. As a result, the Party was able to escape responsibility for its arbitrary acts.
- 9340 HAHN, LORNA H. "Algeria—the end of an era." *Mid. East Aff.* 7 (Ap-S '56) 286-93. Whether the French fight it out to the end or negotiate with the insurgents, it is clear that "Algeria can no longer be regarded as another part of France."
- 9341 HESSLER, WILLIAM. "By the shores of Araby: the Persian Gulf command." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 82 (O '56) 1027-41. Description of the present naval command COMIDEASTFOR, a United States naval organization covering the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and the western part of the Bay of Bengal.

- 9342 HIRSCH, ABRAHAM. "From the Indus to the Jordan: characteristics of Middle East international river disputes." *Pol. Science Quart.* 71 (Je '56) 203-22.
- 9343 HOLT, PETER M. "Sudanese nationalism and self-determination." I, II. *Mid. East J.* 10 (summer and autumn '56) 239-47, 368-78. The recent and sudden emergence of self-determination in the Sudan resulted from the interaction of two factors, the appearance of a genuine nationalist movement and the strained relations between the partners in the condominium. Disillusioned with Egypt over Nasser's ouster of Nagib, Sudanese nationalists pressed for rapid independence.
- 9344 HOURANI, ALBERT. "Arabic culture." *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston) 198 (O '56) 125-31. The author skilfully analyzes the crisis of the Arab mind today. He suggests that the causes are to be found in environmental factors rather than in the "human essence" of the Arabs. "The fact, and the problem, of Islam" would seem to be central, but other than providing some historical background, Mr. Hourani fails to offer much help in understanding the role Islam is playing in setting the course of Arab destiny.
- 9345 HUDSON, G. F. "America, Britain, and the Middle East." *Commentary* 21 (Je '56) 516-21. The best policy for advancing the interests of the free world is that whereby the Western governments unite to stand firm through reanimation of the Tripartite Pact, which would be at the modest price of a purely temporary increase of unpleasantness in Anglo-American and Arab relations.
- 9346 INGRAMS, HAROLD. "The outlook in South-west Arabia." *R.C.A.J.* 43 (Jl-O '56) 176-76. Most informative about Arab psychology and, because of the author's candor, the British techniques of "giving advice."
- 9347 JERRAHIAN, RITA. "From the armistice to the treaty of Sèvres, II." *Armenian Rev.* 9 (autumn '56) 135-45. Deals chiefly with the question of a mandate for Armenia to be administered by the United States. For various reasons the Senate rejected President Wilson's recommendation to accept it.
- 9348 KNIGHT, M. M. "The Algerian revolt: some underlying factors." *Mid. East J.* 10 (autumn '56) 355-67. Political inequalities spurred Algerian Muslims to rebel against French overlordship, but intensifying the political factors were such economic problems as the larger income and land control of the *colon* minority.
- 9349 KOCHARIAN, S. "Soviet national policy in Armenia." *Caucasian Rev.* (Munich) 1 (1955) 81-92. Lenin was actually indifferent to Armenia, Stalin despotic and hypocritical. Stalin's successors have been continuing his policy.
- 9350 KOSOK, P. "Revolution and Sovietization in the Northern Caucasus." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 47-54. The Soviet administration has failed to ameliorate the two major evils of Czarist times, i.e., court martial for North Caucasians who committed crimes while Russians were tried in civil courts, and the expropriation of land.
- 9351 LAQUEUR, WALTER Z. "The Moscow-Cairo axis." *Commentary* 21 (My '56) 408-17. Its aim, according to the author, is to drive the West out of the area. The only way to thwart it is to adopt a posture of firmness, for "whenever Colonel Nasser has faced a determined, inflexible opponent he has proved very reasonable indeed."
- 9352 LASHAURI, M. "The state of historical science in the Georgian SSR." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 93-9. The systematic falsification of Georgian history has had unfortunate consequences. Very little useful work has been produced since 1940. However, the influence of the late Professor Dzhevakhishvili is still felt among the Georgian intellectuals.
- 9353 LEHRMAN, HAL. "Western self-interest and Israeli self-defense." *Commentary* 21 (My '56) 401-8. Identifies Western self-interest with Israeli self-defense. Discusses the *pros* and *cons* of a policy involving the annulling of the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950.
- 9354 DE LEONE, ENRICO. "L'assedio e la resa di San'a' del 1905 attraverso il carteggio inedito di Giuseppe Caprotti." *Oriente Mod.* 36 (F '56) 61-81.
- 9355 LEWIS, WILLIAM H. "The Ethiopian Empire: progress and problems." *Mid. East J.* 10 (summer '56) 257-68. Aside from economic problems, Ethiopia has certain political problems peculiar to her structure. Chief of these is the assimilation of Eritreans and Somalis.
- 9356 LONDON, ISAAC. "Evolution of the U.S.S.R.'s policy in the Middle East 1950-1956." *Mid. East Aff.* 7 (My '56) 169-78. An analysis based principally on 5 Soviet diplomatic pronouncements. Since the end of World War II "the Soviet Union has passed through the stages of defeat, defensive preoccupation and a positive and active policy in the area. From being an outsider, it is on the way to becoming a determining factor in the shaping of the region's future."
- 9357 LUETHY, HERBERT. "Algeria in revolt." *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston) 198 (N '56) 73-7. The problem of Algeria is almost insoluble owing to its nearly total integration into France. Should the French retreat, there would be anarchy and a reversion to barbarism. At best there would remain a "solitary enclave of French territory fortified against the assaults of the Arab hinterland—a second Israel at the other end of the Mediterranean."
- 9358 LUKE, SIR HARRY. "The Middle East,—then and now." *R.C.A.J.* 43 (Jl-O '56) 219-25. An entertaining account of some visible aspects of the Middle East scene some 50 years ago.
- 9359 MARDICK, JOHN R. "A secret of the seraglio." *Armenian Rev.* 9 (autumn '56) 110-5. Was Abdul Hamid's mother an Armenian? If so, does this explain his psychopathic hatred of the Armenians? Is this well-told story fact or fiction?
- 9360 NAMITOK, A. "The Caucasus." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 5-11. Despite some differences, the peoples of the Caucasus are fundamentally united. The Soviet policy of russification and of setting one group against another has not been successful. The present outward calm is not a sign of submission.
- 9361 NATIRBOFF, I. "The Circassians' part in the civil war." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 38-44. The Cir-

- cassians had an unusually difficult time during the civil war from 1917-1920 in trying to protect themselves against the Bolshevik invaders and at the same time to repel the equal threat posed by the partisans of the old regime.
- 9362 PAYRE, GABRIEL. "Réflexions, à propos de l'Orient, sur le tempérament britannique." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 34, no. 2 (1956) 3-7. Certain features of the English way of life—insularity, the concept of the "gentleman," and the primacy of economic policy—have been consciously or unconsciously applied in imperial administration. They go far to explain the persistence of British influence in the Orient, as this admiring study points out.
- 9363 PERLMANN, M. "From Teheran to Tangier." *Mid. East. Aff.* 7 (My '56) 179-87. A review of political developments during the first quarter of 1956.
- 9364 PERLMANN, M. "The voice of Cairo." *Mid. East. Aff.* 7 (Ag-S '56) 294-9. Concluding an account of the Western reaction to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The author asks: "The voice is the voice of Cairo. But the hands?"
- 9365 SANJIAN, AVEDIS K. "The sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): its impact on Turkish-Syrian relations (1939-1956)." *Mid. East. J.* 10 (autumn '56) 379-84. Officially unresolved, since Syria does not recognize the Turkish annexation, the Sanjak problem remains a convenient political weapon for the Syrian press.
- 9366 SHAMSUTDINOV, A. M. "The national liberation struggle of the Turkish people in 1919-1922." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok* 2, no. 2 (1956) 56-68.
- 9367 SWEET-ESCOTT, BICKHAM. "The West and the Middle East." *R.C.A.J.* 43 (Jl-O '56) 187-99. A lucid and objective analysis of American and British interests and the basic factors involved. No solution, even the direction in which a solution may be sought, is proposed.
- 9368 URATADZE, G. "The suppression of an element of Georgian independence." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 55-9. Its policy of colonial rapine encountered mass resistance and led Moscow to suppress all signs of independence. In the process the Soviets spared neither the old Georgian political parties, the workers and the peasants, nor even the Georgian communists who first fought with the Red Army but later refused to aid red imperialism.
- See also: 9319, 9391, 9393, 9403, 9426.
- ### ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
- (General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communications)
- 9369 "The fragrant weed." *Arab World* 29 (O '56) 22-5. Tobacco production, started in a serious way during the 1930's, is now a major element in the economy of northern Iraq.
- 9370 BARON, R. "La Réorganisation des collectivités urbaines au Maroc." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 35, no. 3 (1956) 36-41. Emphasizes the urban sector of the industrial quarters of Casablanca.
- 9371 BUSSON DE JANSSENS, G. "Les musulmans d'Algérie et le crédit agricole mutuel." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 35, no. 3 (1956) 42-52. To benefit from credit facilities and modernize their agricultural practices.
- 9372 FAIVRE, C. "Le khammessat en Algérie, sa réforme et son avenir." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 34, no. 2 (1956) 46-54. Characteristics of this form of agricultural contract on the basis of which the Algerian *fellahs* work the soil. This study was written before the venerable institution was modified legislatively.
- 9373 GATAULLIN, M. F. and MALUKOVSKII, M. V. "The Egyptian republic on the road to economic independence." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok* 2, no. 3 (1956) 119-29. Survey of data on the Egyptian economy during the last few years.
- 9374 HARTNOLL, C. L. "High dam for high stakes." *Arab World* 28 (Jl '56) 11-7. Reviews the advantages and disadvantages of the Aswan High Dam as well as the Sudanese alternative, but concludes that the merits far outweigh all other considerations.
- 9375 JACKSON, W. A. DOUGLAS. "Transportation and economic development in Soviet Asia." *Geog. Rev.* 46 (O '56) 574-6. Reviews "recent discussion of existing and possible routes of movement into and through . . . western Siberia, northern Kazakhstan, and Soviet Central Asia."
- 9376 POLK, W. R. and THWEATT, W. R. "The changing economic scene." *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston) 198 (O '56) 148-52. A base of major public works is the only hope for the economic future of the Arab World. It will be primarily up to the governments concerned to do the job. They have accepted the challenge, but whether or not they succeed is "the great political and economic question of the decade."
- 9377 SAGIRASHVILI, D. "Georgia under Bolshevik rule." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 112-21. Since its Sovietization in 1921 Georgia has descended to the same economic depths as the other republics while merciless exploitation of the country's resources for military purposes goes on apace.
- 9378 SALVY, G. "Où en est le Sahara?" *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 34, no. 2 (1956) 60-71. Discussion of some of the problems—financial and administrative—involved in implementing the French decision to exploit the desert resources in systematic fashion.
- 9379 EL-SHERBINY, ABDEL AZIZ and SHERIF, AHMAD FOUAD. "Marketing problems in an underdeveloped country—Egypt." *L'Egypte Contemp.* 47 (Jl '56) 5-85. A broad-gauged study, with chapters on the structure and workings of the Egyptian economy, retail facilities, wholesale facilities, vertical integration of trade, producers' marketing activities, government regulation and control of marketing activities, and a general appraisal.
- 9380 YAAARI, S. "The markets for Middle East oil." *Mid. East. Aff.* 7 (Je-Jl '56) 213-21. Most crude oil entering international trade in recent years came from Middle East wells. In 1953 they supplied the entire Eastern Hemisphere, with the exception of the communist bloc countries.
- See also: 9348, 9398.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and health, religion, law)

- 9381 "La jeunesse tunisienne." *I.B.L.A.* 19, no. 2 (1956). The entire issue of the journal is devoted to various aspects of Tunisian youth—studies, professions, culture, problems, etc.
- 9382 BADR, GAMAL MOURS. "Some remarks on real action proceedings." *Tulane Law Rev.* 29 (1955) 731-4.
- 9383 BADR, GAMAL MOURS. "Unification of the laws of the Arab countries." *Rev. Egypt. de Droit Internat.* 11 (1955) 115-20. There is a marked trend toward unifying the legal systems of the various countries, a part of the larger movement toward Arab political unity. Civil law, herein discussed, has made the greatest advances in this direction.
- 9384 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "L'individu et la société dans la Tunisie d'hier et d'aujourd'hui." *I.B.L.A.* 19, no. 1 (1956) 1-30. Interesting analysis of the individual, family, and society derived from Tunisian folk wisdom embodied in proverbs.
- 9385 GIBB, H. A. R. "Social reform: factor X." *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston) 198 (O '56) 137-41. Two major forces are at work in the Arab World today. One is the movement toward authoritarian governments aiming at military power and political alliances and based on Western techniques. The other is the variety of efforts to reunite the Arab peoples morally by rebuilding society on Islamic principles. Their interaction may result in the evolution of a psychologically sound social order capable of solving the problems now confronting the Arabs.
- 9386 GRUETTER, IRENE. "Arabische bestattungsbräuche in frühislamischer zeit." *Der Islam* 32, no. 2 (1956) 168-94.
- 9387 HIRSCH, ABRAHAM M. "River boundaries in the Middle East: a study of their definition in conventional international law." *Rev. de Droit Internat. pour le Moyen Orient* 4 (D '55) 423-35.
- 9388 HIRSCH, ABRAHAM M. "Utilization of international rivers in the Middle East: a study of conventional international law." *Amer. J. of Internat. Law* 50 (Ja '56) 81-100.
- 9389 MAGNIN, J. "Entr'aide familiale et institutions démocratiques." *I.B.L.A.* 19, no. 1 (1956) 31-52. The traditional means by which Tunisian society has met the problems of personal and family tragedies are no longer adequate. The resultant state of "social insecurity" is widespread and profound.
- 9390 MATOSSIAN, MARY. "Armenian society 1850-1914." *Armenian Rev.* 9 (autumn '56) 49-63. A valuable sketch of the principal institutions of eastern Armenia and the changes brought about by the impact of Russian and Turkish pressures and of Western European ideas. Based largely on Armenian source material.
- 9391 PEROWNE, STEWART. "Levant dusk: the refugee situation." *R.C.A.J.* 43 (Jl-O '56) 235-42. Interesting details of the efforts made by the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem to help the Arab refugees.
- 9392 SARAFIAN, VAHE A. "Turkish Armenian and expatriate population statistics." *Armenian Rev.* 9 (autumn '56) 118-28. The Turks, Russians, and Armenians all have had their own reasons for falsifying statistics and it is therefore difficult to ascertain with accuracy the present numbers and distribution of the Armenians, let alone those in earlier days. The author indicates that there are more Armenians in Turkish Armenia and elsewhere in Turkey than is generally believed, the number of crypto-Armenians being wholly undeterminable.
- 9393 TRAHO, R. "The health resorts of the Caucasus." *Caucasian Rev.* (Munich) 1 (1955) 100-11. These justly famous resorts, the most important of which are here described, are in theory available to any Soviet citizen. In practice, however, there is discrimination in assigning permits for travel to the resorts and special privileges for the elite. An "insignificant person" will have difficulty in securing accommodations and even when successful will be shabbily treated after he arrives.
- 9394 ZAGOLO, AFAY. "Changes in the ethnic and religious composition of the population of the Caucasus." *Armenian Rev.* 9 (autumn '56) 85-99. A study of the complex population changes in the area between 1896 and 1939. The author concludes that a solution of the difficulties purely by internal forces is impossible, that only a strong outside power—presumably a future democratic Russia—will be able to arrange for a just settlement of the innumerable problems of administrative and cultural nature.

See also: 9327, 9349, 9351, 9375.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND QUR'ANIC STUDIES

- 9395 JEFFREYS, M. D. W. "Early Arab navigation in the Indian Ocean." *Islamic Rev.* 44 (Je '56) 33-5. It was the Hindus, not the Greeks and Romans, to whom the Arabs owed most of their knowledge of astronomy.
- 9396 PINES, S. "Une version arabe de trois propositions de . . . Proclus." *Oriens* 8 (D '55) 195-203.

See also: 9314.

ART

(Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics and philately, painting and music)

- 9397 FRANZ, HEINRICH GERHARD. "Das medaillon als bauornament in der kunst der Omayyadenzeit." *Z. des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* (Wiesbaden) 72, no. 1 (1956) 83-98, 3 text figs. Origin and development of the use of medallions in Umayyad buildings.
- 9398 GINESTOUS, P. "Bizerte et sa région: la vie artisanale." *I.B.L.A.* 19, no. 1 (1956) 93-114. Of economic as well as artistic nature are the skills of this important Tunisian city's potters, rug weavers, cabinet makers, and iron mongers. Illust.
- 9399 JORDANIA, R. "Georgian folk music and its importance in European folklore." *Caucasian Rev.* (Mun-

- ich) 1 (1955) 128-37. Georgian national songs are in danger of disappearance or distortion. They are important because they are the only type of popular music based on the harmonic principles of the Middle Ages which in turn go back to the Pythagorean scale. The complex development of Georgian music can be traced down to the first centuries of our era.
- 9400 KHATCHATRIAN, A. "Le tracé étoilé de la lanterne d'al-Mu'izz à Kairouan." *Art Asiat.* (Paris) 2, no. 2 (1955) 137-43. Tries to establish a relationship between the mathematical form of a bronze lantern of al-Mu'izz (1028-51), probably from his palace at Sabra near Kairouan and Armenian church plans.
- 9401 KÜHNEL, ERNEST. "Die Kunst Persiens unter den Buyiden." *Z.D.M.G.* 31, no. 1 (1956) 78-92, 31 figs. A first survey of the arts under the Buyids (ca. 930-1055). After a short historical introduction the author discusses architecture, gold and silver work, pottery, textile weaving, woodcarving, book illumination and painting. A valuable contribution, though the age and significance of several pieces remain to be discussed.
- 9402 LISSE, P. "Tradition, évolution et adaptation de la sculpture sur pierre dans le Cap Bon." *I.B.L.A.* 19, no. 1 (1956) 81-92. Stone sculpture has always constituted an important decorative element in Tunisian architecture. In Cap Bon, three kilometres from Nabeul, the old tradition survives in all its vigor. Illust.
- 9403 MANUKIAN, S. "Transcaucasian architecture." *Caucasian Rev.* 1 (1955) 60-70. The author examines the development of architectural forms in Transcaucasia on the basis of time—with regard to the changes determined by the various shifts of Soviet policy—and place, noting the ethnographic, historic, and cultural features of the peoples inhabiting the region.
- 9404 PARROT, ANDRÉ. "Bronze royal sassanide." *Syria* 32, no. 3-4 (1956) 308-9, pls. A royal bronze bust (of Peroz I, Khusrau II, or Yazdagerd II) in fragmentary state yields further information about another such bust now in the Louvre.

LANGUAGE

- 9405 BASSET, ANDRÉ. "La langue berbère." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 34, no. 2 (1956) 39-45. The position of Berber today. Some 5 million people speak it.
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ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique
 Acad., Academy
 Aff., Affairs, affaires
 Afr., African, Afrique, etc.
 Amer., American
 Archeol., Archaeological, archéologique
 B., Bulletin
 C., Central
 Cent., Century
 Contemp., Contemporary, etc.
 Cult., Culture
 D., Deutsch
 Dept., Department
 East., Eastern
 Econ., Economic, économique
 For., Foreign
 G., Gesellschaft
 Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc.
 Gr. Brit., Great Britain
 Hist., Historical, historique, etc.
 Illust., Illustrated
 Inst., Institute
 Internat., International
 J., Journal
 L., Literature, etc.
 M., Morgenländisch, etc.

Mag., Magazine
 Mid., Middle
 Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.
 Mus., Museum, musée
 Natl., National
 Nr., Near
 Numis., Numismatic, numismatique
 O., Oriental, oriente, etc.
 Pal., Palestine
 Phil., Philosophical
 Philol., Philological, Philologique
 Polit., Political, Politique
 Proceed., Proceedings
 Quart., Quarterly
 R., Royal
 Res., Research
 Rev., Review, revue
 Riv., Rivista
 S., School
 Soc., Society, société
 Stud., Studies
 Trans., Transactions
 U.S., United States
 USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Univ., University, université
 Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung

Arabic

K., Kitab, etc.
 Maj., Majallah, etc.

Russian, Polish, etc.

Akad., Akademii
 Fil., Filosofi
 Inst., Institut
 Ist., Istori
 Izvest., Izvestia
 Lit., Literaturi
 Orient., Orientalni
 Ser., Seriya
 Sov., Sovetskoye
 Uchon., Uchoniye
 Vostok., Vostokovedeniya
 Yaz., Yazika
 Zap., Zapiski

Turkish

Fak., Fakülte
 Üniv., Üniversite

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